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FOREWORD 
Like computer systems and like all human beings, policy-makers always 
use proxies. Examples are countless. On the one hand, competition 
authorities take consumer welfare as a proxy for social welfare, perfect 
competition as a proxy for the maximisation of consumer welfare, market 
shares as a proxy for market power and evidence of price parallelism as a 
proxy for collusion. And sometimes they are wrong. On the other hand, 
regulators, striving to mimic the functioning of perfectly competitive 
markets, infer from market failures the need to abandon laissez-faire 
principles and to regulate, using proxies to assess the impact of future and 
existing regulations. Increasingly, they are required to assess the past, 
present and future direct and indirect costs and benefits of regulations, and 
to justify intervention on the basis of such estimations. In so doing, they 
sometimes err.  
When it comes to regulatory impact assessment, the scientific 
ambition of economics is heavily challenged: a crystal ball enabling a full 
vision of the future social, environmental and economic impact of proposed 
regulations is nowhere to be found. After all, this brings bad news and 
good news. The bad news is that ex ante impact assessment is no panacea, 
and is doomed to be always found imperfect and – to a certain extent – 
arbitrary. The good news is that, notwithstanding such imperfection, well-
crafted methods of impact assessment can instil a greater degree of 
‘awareness’, transparency, efficiency and accountability in the policy 
process. As a matter of fact, scholars in many fields of the social sciences 
have discovered that regulatory impact assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis can provide the best contribution to the quality of legislation when 
those in charge of implementing them are aware of both their potential and ii | FOREWORD  
their inherent limit. The Socratic motto ‘γνωθι σεαυτον’, here, is to be kept 
on the desk, always. This is, indeed, the difficult ‘Art of the State’. 
In this monograph, I focus on the latest EU experience in developing 
methods for ex ante assessment of the economic, social and environmental 
impacts of major proposed regulations. My work aims at stimulating 
discussion amongst scholars and policy-makers on the upcoming review of 
the EU integrated impact assessment model, scheduled for early 2006. I 
offer it, however, with a caveat: like computers, policy-makers and all other 
human beings, I also used a number of proxies throughout the work – in 
choosing scorecard items, relying on previous streams of literature, 
formulating roadmaps and, more generally, in my attempt to provide a 
static picture of an inherently dynamic process. Hence, I also may be 
wrong, and apologise if some readers find my conclusions insufficiently 
firm. 
I have been thinking about a monograph on impact assessment for 
quite a long time. The idea did not materialise, however, until Daniel Gros 
and Karel Lannoo offered me the opportunity to start and manage the 
Regulatory Affairs Programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies, 
in Brussels. From such a privileged position, I have had the chance to fully 
appraise the features and paradoxes of EU better regulation, and apply my 
previous theoretical studies to the field observation of impact assessment 
practices in the EU, the US and the UK. For this reason, my first 
acknowledgment goes to Daniel and Karel for giving me this opportunity. I 
also would like to thank Jacques Pelkmans for his valuable comments and 
suggestions, Davide Cortesini for drawing an outstanding Möbius strip, 
which adorns the cover, and Anne Harrington and Els Van den Broeck for 
patient and creative editorial advice. Needless to say, some useful hints in 
this monograph are not mine, unlike all errors and imperfections.  
 
Andrea Renda 
Senior Research Fellow, CEPS 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the frantic environment surrounding the European Union after the 
French and Dutch ‘no’ votes on the Constitutional Treaty, EU policy-
makers are striving to identify the key drivers that will lead Europe back 
on track. ‘Competitiveness’ is the keyword in Brussels now, and one of the 
recognised drivers of competitiveness is ‘better regulation’. As a matter of 
fact, the EU Better Regulation Action Plan is perceived as one of the most 
crucial milestones for achieving the ambitious Lisbon Goals.1 The European 
Commission itself recently acknowledged that Europe’s “disappointing 
economic performance” calls for further action in the field of better 
regulation, in order to stimulate growth and employment by streamlining 
the regulatory environment, with stronger emphasis on the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity in developing more cost-effective 
regulatory tools, and enhanced focus on cutting red tape.2  
Recently, efforts to improve the quality of EU regulation have relied 
on the full implementation of the new EU Integrated Impact Assessment 
(IIA) model introduced in 2002,3 in the wake of the Mandelkern Report.4 
                                                      
1 The European Commission Action Plan on simplifying and improving the 
regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278) was part of a wider better regulation 
package launched in June 2002.  
2 See the European Commission Communication, “Better regulation for growth 
and jobs in the European Union”, COM(2005)97, 16 March 2005. In the press 
release, the Commission introduced the equation of “Less red tape = more growth” 
(see Press Release, IP/05/311, 16 March 2005). For a description of the 
Commission’s new approach, see section 2.3. 
3 The IIA model was introduced on 5 June 2002, with a European Commission 
Communication on impact assessment (COM(2002) 276), which included 
guidelines on how to carry out an extended impact assessment, entitled “Impact 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation, the joint Letter 
of the Irish and three incoming presidents of ECOFIN filed on January 
2004, the ‘Doorn motion’ within the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament and the joint statement issued on December 2004 by 
the Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, UK, Austrian and Finnish Presidencies on 
“Advancing Regulatory Reform” are all evidence of a growing interest in 
linking impact assessment to competitiveness at the EU level.5 The 
Commission itself reacted by launching a new strategy for the 
simplification of the regulatory environment and by issuing a new 
Communication on Better Regulation in March 2005, as well as new 
Guidelines on Impact Assessment three months later. More recently, 
Commission Vice-President Günther Verheugen stated that in the coming 
years all EU regulatory initiatives will have to pass muster under the IIA 
model, announcing that the Commission “will only put forward proposals 
that have undergone an impact assessment” and that “this approach 
should guarantee that we know the full costs and benefits of future 
legislation”.6  
So far, so good. But can Europe really live up to the promise? Does 
the EU impact assessment model truly possess the salvific virtues ascribed 
to it by EU policy-makers? Piercing the veil, available evidence reveals that 
the way in which the procedure has been implemented to date has resulted 
in a sea of disappointment. The quality of extended impact assessments 
appears to be low and is even decreasing over time. Commission DGs in 
charge of performing the assessment seem quite far from enabling greater 
awareness of “the full costs and benefits of future legislation”. As will be 
explained in more detail below, of the 70 extended impact assessments 
completed before July 2005, only a few quantified or monetised the 
expected costs and benefits arising from the proposal. Only in a limited 
number of cases were business compliance costs assessed, and the same 
                                                                                                                                       
Assessment in the Commission - Guidelines“ and “A Handbook for Impact 
Assessment in the Commission - How to do an Impact Assessment“, recently 
replaced by new “Impact Assessment Guidelines”, SEC(2005)791, 15 June 2005.  
4 M a n d e l k e r n  G r o u p ,  F i n a l  R e p o r t ,  2 0 0 1  ( a v a i l a b l e  a t  http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/secretariat_general/impact/docs/mandelkern.pdf). 
5 All these recent initiatives are described in more detail below, in section 2.2. 
6 See Verheugen’s speech at the UK Presidency Conference on Better Regulation, 
Edinburgh, 23 September 2005 (available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
regulation/documents/better_regulation_conference_speeches/pdf/050923_verheugen.pdf – 
last visited 5 December 2005). IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 3 
 
applies to administration costs. And when it comes to justifying the 
viability of a proposed new piece of legislation, things get even worse. As a 
matter of fact, the cahier de doléances is long enough to leave few beacons of 
hope: the gap between the sein and the sollen of EU impact assessment is, in 
one word, huge. 
Against this worrying backdrop, the UK Presidency, which ran from 
July to December 2005 (a period coinciding with the completion of this 
monograph), has taken a significant departure in its approach to impact 
assessment from previous EU policy. But this should come as no surprise. 
Past evidence reveals that many of the most important steps towards the 
introduction and refinement of impact assessment procedures at EU level 
have occurred under UK Presidencies, and have heavily borrowed from the 
UK experience, undoubtedly the avant-garde of impact assessment at 
member state level.7 The ambitious integrated impact assessment model 
adopted in 2003 is currently being replaced by a new approach, which 
mostly focuses on the need to ‘cut red tape’.8 In doing this, the UK 
Presidency is drawing heavily on its national ‘better regulation’ strategy, 
which led to drastic changes and, most recently, to a consultation for the 
enactment of a revolutionary Better Regulation Bill, as well as a cross-
government initiative to measure and then cut administrative costs.9  
In particular, the UK Presidency has put strong emphasis on the 
simplification of the existing regulatory environment and the reduction of 
administrative burdens. Following the so-called ‘Hampton Review’ in 
March 2005, the UK Government established a new Better Regulation 
Executive with the specific purpose of identifying areas for reducing 
regulatory burdens, under the motto ‘less is more’ which directly recalls 
the goal of achieving ‘more value with less money’ that lied at the core of 
the whole ‘New Public Management’ revolution in the UK in the early 
                                                      
7 See section 1.3.  
8 See Advancing Better Regulation in Europe, discussion paper prepared by the UK, 
Austrian and Finnish Presidencies for consideration at the (ECOFIN) Council on 6 
December, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st15/st15140.en05.pdf 
(visited on December 30, 2005). 
9 A description of the new UK initiative on better regulation is contained in section 
1.2.2. See also the Better Regulation Executive’s website 
(http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/index.asp – last visited 5 December 
2005). 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1980s.10 The UK Presidency has attempted to replicate such an initiative at 
the EU level, by focusing on the creation of a common methodology for 
assessing administrative burdens, based on the Standard Cost Model 
successfully implemented in the Netherlands, and on the promotion of the 
risk-based approach adopted after the UK ‘Hampton Review’.  
What remains to be seen and discussed, however, is whether this new 
approach will ultimately lead EU policy-makers to succeed in 
disentangling the conundrum of procedures and overlapping pieces of 
legislation that characterise most sectors of the EU economy, or whether 
further refinements will be needed in order to help EU and national 
administrations in the successful implementation of ex ante and ex post 
assessment. If anything, the changing landscape of impact assessment in 
the EU will require yet another effort for EU officials in charge of impact 
assessment. If a wholly new model is put in place, DGs in charge of impact 
assessment will have to become familiar with a new procedure, and this 
will slow down the process further – like in the myth of Sisyphus, 
condemned to an eternity of rolling a boulder uphill, to watch it roll back 
down again.  
As the Commission has scheduled a comprehensive review of its 
impact assessment model for early 2006, the time has come to take stock of 
the results achieved so far in assessing the impact of legislation, and to look 
forward to the changes and refinements that would help the Commission 
to live up to the promise of setting up an efficient, transparent, effective 
and accountable impact assessment system. The ambition of this paper is to 
contribute to the identification of the steps to be followed in order to get the 
best out of impact assessment and better regulation at EU and member 
state level. 
Chapter 1 briefly describes the state of the art in impact assessment, 
contrasting some of the most successful models implemented at national 
level – most notably, the US and UK experiences – and the EU Integrated 
Impact Assessment model. Chapter 2 contains a scorecard analysis of the 70 
                                                      
10 The ‘new public management’ revolution in the UK was inspired by a stream of 
literature that advocated a more performance-oriented culture amongst public 
bureaucrats and a wider use of outsourcing, market-type mechanisms and public-
private partnerships for the delivery of public services. See Jan Erik Lane, New 
Public Management, London: Routledge, 2000; and most notably Christopher Pollitt 
and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 5 
 
extended impact assessments performed by Commission DGs until July 
2005, discussing the results of the analysis and describing the actions that 
have been undertaken by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
in order to strengthen the use of such a regulatory tool. Chapter 3 proposes 
a number of ‘roadmaps’ for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the EU model in the years to come, with a view to getting (at least close) to 
the Lisbon goals by 2010. Chapter 4 offers conclusions.  | 7 
 
1.  Impact Assessment Models  
The use of impact assessment tools has become widespread in OECD 
countries over the past two decades. Countries that successfully introduced 
a culture of impact assessment in their regulatory processes include, most 
notably, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – all of which 
share, not surprisingly, common law legal systems.11 The first, complete 
procedure for assessing the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation was 
introduced in 1981 in the US, under the administration of President Ronald 
Reagan, although other attempts had been made in previous years with the 
‘Quality of Life Review’ and the ‘Inflation Impact Assessment’ performed 
by the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS).12 The US model of 
impact assessment is nowadays so pervasive in US administrations that 
every year the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publishes a 
comprehensive calculation of the costs and benefits of regulations enacted 
over the previous year, the so-called “Yearly Report on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations”.13 And, although a fierce debate has 
emerged both on the quality of government calculation of costs and 
benefits and on the soundness of the methodology adopted in performing 
                                                      
11 See e.g. OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice in OECD Countries, Paris, 
1997; and more recently, Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) Inventory, Note by the 
Secretariat, 29th Session of the OECD Public Governance Committee, 15-16 April 
2004, International Energy Agency, Paris. 
12 The ‘Quality of Life Review’ was introduced under the Nixon Administration 
with an OMB memorandum on “Agency regulations, standards, and guidelines 
pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and 
public health and safety”, 5 October 1971 (available at http://www.thecre.com/ 
ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm – last visited 5 December 2005). Subsequently, the 
Inflation Impact Assessment procedure was officially launched by Gerald Ford on 
27 November 1974, with Executive Order 11,821 (available at http://www.thecre.com/ 
ombpapers/ExecutiveOrder11821.htm – last visited 5 December 2005).  
13 See the OMB draft Report on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
(available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol-reports_congress.html – 
visited 5 December 2005). 8 | ANDREA RENDA  
ex ante assessments, the US experience is still to be considered the ‘polar 
star’ for EU policy-makers.14 
Attempts to provide a comprehensive review of the EU economy 
have recently proliferated, especially after 2003 when the European 
Commission started developing a list of structural indicators of member 
states’ progress towards the Lisbon goals.15 More recently, the Commission 
has attempted to detect more specific links between ongoing sectoral 
reforms and overall progress, particularly in its 2005 report on the ‘cost of 
non-Lisbon’.16 However, a lot still needs to be done in devising new tools 
for  ex post monitoring of the costs of EU regulations. Accordingly, it is 
worth taking stock by providing a brief description of some of the most 
relevant and insightful international experiences in ex ante and ex post 
assessment of the impact of regulations, most notably in the US and UK, 
before looking forward to next developments at Community level.  
1.1  The US impact assessment model: The polar star 
The United States was the first country to adopt a model of regulatory 
impact assessment. The earliest evidence of rules requiring the calculation 
of prospective costs and benefits of new regulations dates back to the 
Nixon administration, when US firms started complaining about the costs 
of regulation and uncontrolled ‘regulatory creep’, mostly as a result of 
newly passed environmental legislation.17 The administration reacted with 
the so-called ‘Quality of Life Review’, which mandated a preliminary 
calculation of firms’ costs resulting from compliance with new 
environmental rules as a fundamental pre-condition of good-quality 
                                                      
14 See Box 2 in chapter 3, for a description of the current debate on the merits and 
soundness of current quantitative estimates provided by US federal agencies and, 
more generally, of quantitative benefit-cost analysis. 
15 The 2003 and 2004 reviews of the EU economy are available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm 
– last visited 5 December 2005.  
16 See European Commission Staff Working Paper, The Economic Costs of Non-
Lisbon, SEC(2005)385, 15 March 2005. 
17 For a short illustration of the major waves of regulatory reform in the US, see 
“The Role of Economic Analysis in Regulatory Reform”, chapter 1 of OMB Report 
to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/chap1.html – visited 5 December 2005).  IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 9 
 
regulation.18 The Review, conceived as a privileged channel for public 
consultation, soon ended up enhancing the risk of regulatory capture, 
leaving legislative initiatives in the environmental field prey to aggressive 
and well-organised interest groups.19  
Under the Ford administration, the US government showed an 
increased interest in promoting the use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing 
the prospective impact of proposed regulations. Executive Order 11,821, 
issued in 1974, mandated an Inflation Impact Assessment by federal 
agencies. Such procedure introduced an ex ante assessment of the expected 
impact of new regulatory measures on the inflation rate.20 The creation of 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability aimed at ensuring that proposed 
regulations that were likely to exert a significant upward impact on 
nominal prices could be rejected in case they carried an incomplete or 
insufficient assessment of the inflationary impact.21  
The Inflation Impact Assessment procedure can indeed be considered 
as a first version of what would later become the US Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (RIA) model. As a matter of fact, economists in the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability gradually transformed the mere estimation of the 
inflationary impact into a real cost-benefit analysis, to be used as a 
‘counter-argument’ during public consultation processes mandated by the 
1946 Administrative Procedure Act.22 US President Gerald Ford amended 
                                                      
18 “Quality of Life Review”, op. cit. 
19 See L. Rodriguez, “Constitutional and Statutory Limits for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Pursuant to Executive Orders 12291 and 12498”, Boston College Environmental Affair 
Law Review 505, 512, 1988. See also, for a short description, Robert W. Hahn and 
Robert E. Litan, “Counting Regulatory Costs and Benefits: Lessons for the US and 
Europe”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, p. 474. 
20 See e.g. M. Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform from Ford to Clinton, CATO 
Institute, 2000 (available at www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n1a.html – visited 5 
December 2005). 
21 See J. Morrall III, “Ebbs and Flows in the Quality of Regulatory Analysis”, speech 
at the Weidenbaum Center Forum on Executive Regulatory Analysis: Surveying 
the Record, Making It Work, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 17 December 
2001 (available at http://wc.wustl.edu/ExecutiveRegulatoryReviewTranscripts/ 
Morrall.pdf – visited 5 December 2005).  
22 See J. Morrall III, “An Assessment of the U.S. Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Program”, in Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practices in the Main OECD Countries, 
OECD, Paris, 1997.  10 | ANDREA RENDA  
the inflation Impact Assessment model by issuing EO 11,949, and stating 
that “[t]he title of Executive Order No. 11,821 of November 27, 1974 is 
amended to read ‘Economic Impact Statements’”.23  
A few years later, during the Carter administration, the 10 most 
relevant new regulations in each year’s US government agenda were made 
the subject of extended ex ante assessment by a specialised ad hoc group of 
economists called the ‘Regulatory Analysis Review Group’.24 But the 
introduction of a more comprehensive regulatory impact assessment 
procedure only occurred under the Reagan administration.    
1.1.1 The Reagan and Bush (Sr.) Administrations 
Under the Reagan administration, with EO 12,291, issued in 1981, federal 
agencies were obliged to adopt a real regulatory impact analysis.25 The 
Executive Office mandated a thorough reassessment of the existing 
regulation in force, for the purpose of identifying norms to be abolished or 
simplified. The evaluation and oversight of agencies’ behaviour, previously 
performed by the CWPS, was taken on by OIRA (Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs), which was created within the Office of Management 
and Budget for the purpose of implementing the 1980 Paperwork Reduction 
Act. OIRA was given the power to suspend regulations by sending them 
back to the sponsoring agency until a satisfactory cost-benefit analysis was 
performed. The OMB, as a result, became a sort of regulatory 
clearinghouse.  
Since then, more than 1,000 proposed regulations have been 
scrutinised by the OMB. Possible contrasts between OMB and agencies 
were addressed with the help of a new Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 
chaired by then Vice-President George Bush, Sr.26 The Task Force was also 
                                                      
23 See Executive Order No. 11,949 of 31 December 1976 (available at 
http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/ExecutiveOrder11949.htm – visited 5 December 
2005).  
24 See Weidenbaum, op. cit. 
25 The text of EO 12,291 is available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/EO12291.PDF (last 
visited 5 December 2005).  
26 The other members were the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, 
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of OMB, Assistant to the 
President for Policy Development and the Chairman of the Counsel of Economic 
Advisers. See the White House’s Fact Sheet on Reagan’s Initiatives to Reduce 
Regulatory Burdens, 18 February 1981 (available at http://www.thecre.com/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 11 
 
asked to estimate the savings that could follow from a full implementation 
of the new RIA procedure. The result was striking: according to the 
administration, the new procedure produced yearly cost savings as high as 
$10-20 billion. This calculation was heavily criticised, however.27 Similarly, 
the activity of the Task Force was subject to fierce opposition. The Reagan 
administration was accused of having drastically reduced the budget and 
personnel of federal agencies, achieving substantial decreases in the cost of 
regulation, but also a dramatic reduction in the number of proposals issued 
by federal agencies. As a consequence, in 1983, the Task Force was 
abolished and the OMB was given back its dominant role in the US RIA 
procedure.28 
A second Executive Order, in 1985, required agencies to provide the 
OMB with detailed information on their regulatory agenda at the end of 
each year. This eventually paved the way for what has been termed the 
‘grand experiment’, i.e. the OMB Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits 
of Federal Regulations, a yearly publication that constitutes a unique example 
of a comprehensive, yearly calculation of total costs and benefits of the 
corpus of existing regulations.29 
Under the Bush Sr. administration, the role formerly played by the 
Task Force on Regulatory Relief was assigned to the Council on 
Competitiveness, chaired by Vice-President Richard Quayle, which was 
given a mandate to abrogate all federal rules that could hinder the 
                                                                                                                                       
pdf/Reagan_RegainInitiatives.pdf – last visited 5 December 2005). President Reagan 
identified regulatory relief as one of the four key elements for the recovery of the 
US economy. The results were nevertheless quite disappointing. See Reagan’s 
Memorandum on the “Comprehensive Review of Federal Regulatory Programs”, 
15 December 1986; and the commentary by William A. Niskanen, “The Weak 
Fourth Leg of Reaganomics”, The Wall Street Journal on 30 June 1988.  
27 See Weidenbaum, op. cit., and S. Breyer, “Regulation and Deregulation in the 
United States”, in G. Majone (ed.), De-regulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform 
in Europe and the United States, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.  
28 See A. Morrison, “OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way 
to Write a Regulation”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 99, No.  1059, 1986, p. 1062 
(describing Reagan’s EO as implicitly designed to ensure that regulation was only 
a ‘last resort’ option). 
29 See the description provided by Robert W. Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, “The 
Grand Experiment in Regulatory Reporting”, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 55, 
No. 3, Summer, 2003, pp. 607-642. 12 | ANDREA RENDA  
competitiveness of US firms.30 The main goal was to minimise regulatory 
burdens faced by the economy. Such a revolutionary attempt was strongly 
criticised by the Democrats and a number of economists, but also by federal 
agencies, Congressional Commissions and environmentalist associations, 
which lamented that the OMB (and in particular, the OIRA) exercised an 
excessive and unchallenged veto  power on proposed regulations. Some 
commentators complained that OIRA and the White House had been 
captured by powerful interest groups, which inspired their intervention to 
stifle and repeal needed regulations, thus decreasing the transparency and 
accountability of federal rule-making. Institutional tension reached a peak 
when Congress refused to confirm a politically appointed agency director.31 
According to an authoritative commentator, the excessive 
centralisation of the RIA procedure and the consequent critiques 
contributed to an institutional void and a lack of legal certainty that led to 
an increase in the burden of regulation, particularly in the fields of public 
health, environment and public safety.32 At the end of the Bush mandate, 
the US RIA model appeared at once as a pioneering experience worldwide 
and a problem ‘in search of a solution’, in strong need of careful redressing, 
mostly aimed at reducing regulatory burdens for US firms.  
1.1.2 RIA under the Clinton Administration 
A tentative reaction to this impasse was the enactment of Executive Order 
No. 12,866 in 1993, under the Clinton administration.33 Within the more 
general context of ‘reinventing government’ and the National Performance 
                                                      
30 See Weidenbaum, op. cit.  
31 See e.g. the 1992 Report by the OMB Watch and Public Citizen, Voodoo 
Accounting: The Toll of President Bush's Regulatory Moratorium, stating that claims of 
huge public savings resulting from the announced regulatory moratorium were 
hardly substantiated. See also B.D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The 
Eruption of Presidential Influence. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1995; 
and B. Woodward and D.S. Broder, “Quayle’s Quest: Curb Rules, Leave ‘No 
Fingerprints’”, Washington Post, 9 January 1992.  
32 See R.W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s Numbers, AEI-
Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-06, Washington, 
D.C., July 1999. See also W.F. West, “The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: 
Organizational Stability and Responsive Competence at OIRA”, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, No. 1, Center for the Study of the Presidency, Washington, D.C., 2005.  
33 The text of EO 12,866 is available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/ 
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Review, EO 12,886 attempted to ‘cut red tape’ by providing OMB with the 
power to adjudicate conflicts over proposed regulations within a strict 90-
day deadline from presentation of the RIA form by the federal agency. If, 
after the deadline has expired, the conflict between OIRA and the 
sponsoring agency had not been solved, the President or the Vice-President 
entered the stage to solve the controversy.34 The unconditional veto power 
previously awarded to the OMB was then transformed into a conditional 
opposition with limited potential to infinitely delay entry into force of 
newly proposed regulations. Furthermore, the Vice-President’s power to 
directly influence administrative policy was replaced with a milder role of 
‘default’ mediator in case the agency and OIRA failed to negotiate a 
mutually satisfactory solution. This escamotage significantly increased the 
transparency of regulatory reforms in the US.35  
One of the major problems to be solved was undoubtedly OMB’s 
overwhelming workload in the regulatory review process. Before the 
Clinton mandate, the OMB, with just 40 employees, had reviewed on 
average more than 2,200 federal regulations every year.36 In order to avoid 
the inevitable inefficiency that followed from such a drastic centralisation, 
EO 12,866 introduced a minimum threshold, specifying that only 
regulations whose expected impact was greater than $100 million were 
                                                      
34 See ibid., at section 7: “[t]o the extent permitted by law, disagreements or 
conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that 
cannot be resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the 
President, or by the Vice President acting at the request of the President, with the 
relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other interested government officials).” 
35  Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review, Federal Register 58, 
Washington, D.C.: The White House, 30 September 1993. EO 12866 also required 
that all written communications to OIRA or the White House from non-
governmental parties should be placed on the public record. Moreover, the EO 
ordered that only the OIRA administrator or the deputy administrator could 
receive oral communications from parties outside the government, and mandated 
docketing of all conversations between OIRA and agencies as well as between 
White House officials and private interests.  
36 See, inter alia, the description provided in the OMB’s Report to Congress on the 
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1 (available at 
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subject to mandatory ex ante impact assessment.37 In October 1994, OIRA 
produced a report entitled “The First Year of Executive Order No. 12866”, 
finding that the number of significant rules reviewed by OIRA had fallen to 
900 per year, 60% lower than the 2,200 per year average reviewed under the 
previous Executive Order, and that about 15% of the rules were found to be 
‘economically significant’. The report also found that the 90-day review 
period had been generally respected, and concluded that the new openness 
and transparency policy had served to defuse, if not eliminate, the criticism 
of OIRA’s regulatory impact analysis and review programme. 
1.1.3 RIA under George W. Bush 
Although the overall US impact assessment model has remained 
unchanged since George W. Bush took office, a number of relevant changes 
have been introduced to the institutional setting of RIA. In particular, these 
concern the role and powers attributed to the OIRA and the Vice President. 
As is happening in the EU, the regulatory pendulum in the US shifted 
patently in the direction of reducing administrative burdens and ensuring 
least-costly new regulations.  
First, EO 13,258, issued on 26 February 2002, removed the Vice 
President from the regulatory review process.38 Such removal responded to 
critiques that hinged on the excessive powers granted to the executive in 
shaping bureaucrats’ decisions, as well as to growing concerns that the 
involvement of the Vice President could significantly raise procedural 
costs. At the same time, the Bush administration tried to grant enhanced 
powers to OIRA. Its structure was consolidated into only four branches –
Health, Transportation and General Government; Information Policy and 
Technology; Natural Resources, Energy and Agriculture; and Statistical 
and Science Policy. OIRA had six branches in 1992, and five under the 
                                                      
37 More precisely, ‘significant regulatory actions’ under EO 12,866 rules were those 
that: i) had an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
governments or communities; ii)  created a serious inconsistency or otherwise 
interfered with an action taken or planned by another agency; iii) materially 
altered the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan 
programmes or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or iv) raised novel 
legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities or the 
principles set forth in EO 12,866.  
38 67 Federal Register No. 9,385, 2002. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 15 
 
Clinton administration. Such consolidation was aimed at revitalising OIRA, 
as testified to by its increased staffing level. OIRA had 90 staff members in 
1981, but the size had decreased to 69 under Reagan, 60 under Bush Sr. and 
47 during the Clinton administration. The George W. Bush administration 
started out by hiring seven new members and is gradually increasing the 
staff, hiring also scientists and engineers, and thus bringing skills that 
OIRA had never had before.39 OIRA administrator John Graham started 
issuing ‘prompt letters’, which suggest that agencies give priority to 
specific issues – a novelty that was welcomed with enthusiasm by 
authoritative scholars such as Bob Hahn and Cass Sunstein.40 
More generally, the removal of the office of the Vice President from 
its oversight role seems to have led to a more aggressive confrontation 
between OIRA and federal agencies. Along with some other commentators, 
the US General Accounting Office remarked that the role played by OIRA 
vis-à-vis federal agencies has shifted from a ‘collaborative, consultative’ 
role under Clinton to that an ‘adversarial gatekeeper’ model in the Bush 
administration.41 Data on the number of rules returned or withdrawn by 
OIRA confirm this shift. West reports that an annual average of 106 rules 
were either returned or withdrawn during the last two years of the Bush Sr. 
administration, whereas the corresponding figure was only 20.5 under 
Clinton and jumped again to 172 during George W. Bush’s first year in 
office.42  
OIRA’s strengthened role also led to increased attention to standards 
applied in performing cost-benefit analyses and to a marked reduction in 
                                                      
39 See West, op. cit. 
40 The list of issued ‘prompt letters’ under the George W. Bush Administration is 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html (visited 5 
December 2005). For positive comments on the introduction of prompt letters, see 
R.W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, Regulatory Oversight Takes Exciting New Tack, 
Working Paper No. 01-25, AEI/Brookings Joint Center Policy for Regulatory 
Studies, Washington, D.C., September 2001. 
41 See the report by the General Accounting Office on OMB’s Role in the Reviews of 
Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of these Reviews, September 2003. See also 
West (op. cit.), finding that the review has become “less invasive and less 
confrontational”. This new pattern of relationships is sometimes referred to as a 
‘hot-tub approach’, after a definition given by Sally Katzen, Clinton’s first OIRA 
administrator.  
42 See West, op. cit., p. 19. 16 | ANDREA RENDA  
the estimated dollar cost of new rules. The average annual cost of new rules 
decreased from $8.5 billion under the first Bush administration to $5.7 
billion under Clinton and down to $1.5 billion in the first three years after 
George W. Bush took office. And, although the total regulatory burden 
appears to have continued to grow, its growth rate appears to have 
significantly declined over the past few years.43 This was also the result of 
the proliferation of government initiatives on administrative simplification, 
aimed at streamlining the regulatory environment, facilitating dialogue 
with small businesses and, more generally, cutting red tape. 
1.1.4 US initiatives on administrative simplification 
The reform of US RIA, as mentioned above, was not conceived as a stand-
alone salvific tool to remedy the mounting burden of US regulatory costs. 
Already in 1980, Congress responded to the disappointing results 
contained in the Final Report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork by 
enacting the Paperwork Reduction Act – which required agencies to request 
OMB approval before collecting information from the public and led to the 
creation of the OIRA – and the Regulatory Flexibility Act – which mandated 
special analysis of rules affecting small businesses and small governments 
and created the Chief Counsel for Advocacy as a separate, presidentially 
appointed officer within the Small Business Administration.44 In 2001, the 
House of Representatives passed by a unanimous vote the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act, aimed at strengthening the dialogue between the 
OMB, federal agencies and small businesses, with a specific focus on firms 
with less than 25 employees. An inter-agency task force was also created, in 
charge of exploring ways to streamline and consolidate federal paperwork 
requirements for small businesses. 45  
                                                      
43 See e.g. the testimony of James L. Gattuso to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, 
Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs Committee on Government Reform, US 
House of Representatives, on “What is the Bush Administration’s Record on 
Regulatory Reform?”, 17 November 2004 (available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/Regulation/tst111604a.cfm – visited 5 December 2005). 
44 See the text of the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act at 
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_PaperworkRedAct1980.PDF  (visited 5 December 
2005); and the 1980  Regulatory Flexibility Act, at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/ 
Carter_RegFlexAct1980.PDF (visited 5 December 2005) 
45 See http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/hr327_02.pdf (visited 5 December 2005). IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 17 
 
Important steps towards No. 12,866 must be historically 
contextualised in an era of major reforms, which also affected 
Congressional activities, until then exempted from external scrutiny. For 
example, the 1993 Government Performance and Result Act (GPRA) required 
departments to present yearly agendas, which listed prospective 
regulations, the major goals pursued, the strategies enacted to achieve such 
goals and all available data on the costs and benefits associated with such 
proposals.46 Moreover, the 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
prescribed that the Congressional Budget Office provide an estimate of the 
costs resulting from all new proposed regulations and required federal 
agencies to identify the preferred regulatory option by following a cost-
effectiveness criterion.47 
But perhaps the most important initiative undertaken during the last 
two decades is the National Performance Review (NPR) (later named the 
National Partnership for Reinventing Government), launched in 1993 
under the supervision of Vice President Al Gore.48 The NPR, inspired by 
the seminal contribution of Osborne and Gaebler, published a report aimed 
at streamlining and improving the efficiency of federal government 
activity, which led to cutting as many as 252,000 government jobs in the US 
administration.49 The NPR later launched a page-by-page review of existing 
                                                      
46 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html#h1. The 1993 GPRA 
set the objective to “improve Federal program effectiveness and public 
accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction”.  
47 The text of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 is available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/unfund.pdf. A good example of the attention paid to 
impact analysis in the US is the commentary to the UMRA published by the 
Congressional Budget Office, and available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/18xx/doc1891/ 
umra00.pdf (visited 3 August 2005).  
48 On the experience of the NPR led by Al Gore, see J. Kamensky, The US Reform 
Experience: The National Performance Review (available from the US Government 
archive at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/kamensky.html). The 
NPR was introduced with the objective of “ creating a government that works 
better and costs less” based on four principles: putting customers first, cutting red 
tape, empowering employees and cutting back to basics.  
49 On ‘reinventing government’, see D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1992. See also Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a 
Government that Works Better and Costs Less, Report of the National Performance 18 | ANDREA RENDA  
regulation, leading to the identification of 31,000 pages of the federal code 
to be modified and 16,000 pages to be completely eliminated. 50  
As a result of all these measures, the OMB is now able to publish 
yearly estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation as well as a 
report on the “Federal information collection burden”, which sets yearly 
burden-reduction targets for individual agencies.51 Currently, the goal of 
cutting red tape is the competency of a number of administrative and 
politically appointed bodies, ranging from the OIRA to the Chief Counsel 
on Advocacy to the National Ombudsman and individual agency 
Ombudsmen.52 Recent attempts to reduce paperwork requirements include 
technology-driven initiatives such as the creation of the FirstGov.gov 
website, electronic docketing, filing and reporting requirements and the 
creation of other one-stop shops; the introduction of new time limits for 
                                                                                                                                       
Review, September 1993. The reinventing government approach was recently re-
launched in Positive Outcomes: Raising the Bar on Government Reinvention by Ted 
Gaebler, John Blackman, Linda Blessing, Raymond Bruce, Wallace Keene and Paul 
Smith, Chatelaine Press, 1999.  
50 In his introductory remarks to the National Performance Review of 3 March 1993, 
President Clinton specified that: “Our goal is to make the entire federal 
government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of 
our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward 
initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate 
the entire national government.” The effects of the staff downsizing of US public 
administration were analysed in detail by the US Office of Personnel Management 
(available at http://www.opm.gov/studies/downsize.pdf). 
51 See OMB, Report to Congress on Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, op. cit.  
52 Programme Ombudsmen have become widespread in the US administration. In 
1990, the Administrative Conference of the US had already issued a 
recommendation that urged agencies with significant interaction with the public to 
consider establishing an agency-wide or programme-specific Ombudsman. With 
the 1993 National Performance Review, the Ombudsman role was promoted 
throughout federal agencies, for the purpose of increasing public participation in 
agency proceedings and improving customer service. Currently active programme 
Ombudsmen include the Small Business Administration Ombudsman, the US 
Customs Service Trade Ombudsman, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Office of Ombudsman, the Environmental Protection Agency (programme-
specific) Ombudsmen, the Food and Drug Agency Office of the Ombudsman and 
the Security and Exchange Commission’s Ombudsman of Municipal Securities. See 
also OECD, From Red Tape to Smart Tape. Administrative Simplification in OECD 
Countries, Paris, 2003, p. 244.  IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 19 
 
administrative decision-making, not included in the original text of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and in a few cases of the ‘silent is consent’ 
rule; and the mandatory consideration of alternatives to command and 
control regulation, with specific emphasis on market-driven, de-regulatory 
options.  
Increased attention on small businesses led to the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), which amended the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act by requiring covered agencies to perform a ‘small 
business impact’ test unless the agency head certifies to the Chief Counsel 
on Advocacy that the proposed rule will not affect a substantial number of 
small entities. Such certification is published in the Federal Register and 
subject to judicial review. Under the SBREFA, federal agencies are also 
required to issue guidelines and provide assistance to small businesses in 
complying with new regulations. Initiatives undertaken for this purpose 
include the creation of the RegFair hotline and website by the Small 
Business Administration and the appointment of the US Business Advisor, a 
one-stop-shop providing access to Government information, services, and 
transactions.53  
Finally, an impressive number of other initiatives are in place to link 
federal rule-making to individual constituencies and to strengthen dialogue 
in the advocacy and post-regulatory stage. These include an increased 
dialogue with standard-setting organisations, the ‘tiering’ of regulations, 
the organisation of ‘problem-solving days’, the creation of the Citizen 
Advocacy Panel and many others.54 
1.1.5 The US RIA model 
Overall, the new RIA model introduced with EO 12,866 has set a new 
benchmark for policy-makers worldwide in the field of ex ante policy 
evaluation. This does not mean, however, that RIA sceptics have left the 
stage. According to some commentators, the rapid transition away from 
traditional command and control regulation created a shock for US firms, 
and the comprehensive reform package has not fully met the initial goals. 
According to others, the OMB, having survived the sharp criticism levelled 
against it for exercising excessive discretion, today is granted insufficient 
powers to require agencies to provide a formal demonstration of the 
                                                      
53 Ibid., p. 242. See www.business.gov (visited on 30 December 2005).  
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positive impact expected by a new regulation.55 Finally, the approach 
adopted by the OMB to cost-benefit analysis was heavily criticised on 
grounds of being anti-regulatory, non-neutral, overly ambitious and 
methodologically incorrect.56 
The institutions that are most heavily involved in the RIA procedure 
are the proposing agencies and the OIRA. As shown in Figure 1, in the 
initial stage the proposing agency drafts a preliminary RIA form, 
comparing different regulatory options – which must include the so-called 
‘zero option’ (leaving the existing regulation unchanged) – and providing a 
rough estimation of benefits and costs associated with each alternative 
option and an indication of the relevance of the expected impact of the 
proposed regulation, which is the conditio sine qua non for the activation of 
the RIA procedure.57 The RIA form is then subject to a 60-day notice and 
comment period, in which interested parties can file their comments and 
suggestions regarding the regulatory option chosen by the agency.58 After 
the notice and comment period, the final RIA form is completed as an 
obligatory step before a final proposal can be drafted and submitted for 
approval. At this stage, the OIRA has 90 days to approve or reject the 
proposed regulation on the basis of the quality of cost-benefit analysis 
performed by the agency. If the proposal is approved, the proceedings go 
forward. If not, negotiations between OIRA and the proponent agency 
ensue.  
D u r i n g  t h i s  s e c o n d  s t a g e ,  O I R A  can call upon its power to reject 
proposals at will, until the proposal is accompanied by a sufficiently 
detailed and precise regulatory impact analysis. As recalled in section 1.1.3, 
the number of rules returned or withdrawn by OIRA has dramatically 
                                                      
55 See, inter alia, R.W. Hahn, J. Burnett, Chan Yee-Ho, E. Mader and P. Moyle, 
“Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with 
Executive Order 12866”, Harvard Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer, 
2000.  
56 See Box 2 below in chapter 3, for a more detailed discussion of this critique.  
57 See EO 12,866, op. cit. 
58 The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act already recognised the citizen’s right to 
participate in the consultation process. The 60-day notice and comment period was 
in any event considered only partially satisfactory, as it often results in a mere 
procedural step, more than a real opportunity to collect valuable views from the 
general public and targeted groups. See OECD, The OECD Review of Regulatory 
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increased under the current Bush administration, as a result of the new 
‘gatekeeper’ role assumed by OIRA after the removal of the Vice 
President’s oversight role. 
Figure 1. The US RIA model
OIRA OIRA OIRA To Congress To Congress
Agency Agency
Better RIA Better RIA
To Congress To Congress OIRA OIRA OIRA
yes
no
yes no
Agency Agency
Preliminary RIA Preliminary RIA
Final RIA Final RIA
Draft regulation Draft regulation
Consultazione Consultation
 
But the oversight activities introduced during the Clinton 
administration were not limited to Presidential oversight. In 1996, the 
Congressional Review Act prescribed that all sponsoring agencies were 
bound to send their proposals to the Congress for an evaluation. The US 
Congressional Budget Office can repeal any draft regulation within 60 days 
from receipt of the proposal.59 Such an oversight mechanism also extends to 
Congressional bills, thus completing the framework of controls over the 
cost-effectiveness of federal legislation. Nonetheless, a number of 
commentators have recently advocated the extension of the RIA model to 
independent agencies.60 Given the highly ‘political’ nature of the US RIA 
model, however, such an extension would significantly undermine the 
independence of such agencies from the executive. 
                                                      
59 The Congressional Review Act is part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (available at http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/blcra.htm – last 
visited 5 December 2005).  
60 See e.g. Gattuso, op. cit. 22 | ANDREA RENDA  
1.1.6 The US experience: Main lessons for the EU debate 
The US impact assessment model is undoubtedly at the forefront of 
international success stories in policy evaluation. The US is close to being 
defined as a ‘cost-benefit state’, with all the advantages and shortcomings 
that such a definition entails.61 A close look at the problems that have 
occurred in the implementation of the US RIA model over the past two 
decades is of great help in identifying the next steps that may be taken at 
EU and member state level. 
A first lesson to be drawn is related to the remarkable transparency of 
RIA in the United States, thanks also to the public availability of proposals, 
comments, complaints and communications between OIRA and agencies, 
and to a massive use of notice and comment procedures, deeply rooted in 
the US tradition since the end of World War II.62 Opening the door to 
mandatory public consultation is, a double-edged sword, as it enables 
increased participation by the general public in the early stages of the 
regulatory process, but at the same time exposes regulators to risks of 
lobbying and capture. This is what occurred in the US following the Quality 
of Life Review, and continued at least until EO 12,866.63  
An important feature of the US model, that still represents an 
unattainable frontier – at least in the short run – for EU institutions, is the 
diffusion of an evaluation-oriented culture within US administrations. On the 
one hand, the conceptual heritage of ‘reinventing government’ led to a 
gradual transformation of the US bureaucracy, with the introduction of 
performance as the ultimate goal of the bureaucrats’ visible hand. On the 
other hand, the unmatched pervasiveness of US RIA enables OMB to 
publish yearly estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation, as 
mandated by the 1997 Treasury and Government Appropriations Act.64 The 
yearly publication of estimated costs and benefits of federal regulations 
                                                      
61 For a summary of the current debate on cost-benefit estimates, see Box 2 below. 
See also C.R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State, Working Paper No. 39, University of 
Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics, May 1996.  
62 The public consultation procedure was introduced by the 1946 Administrative 
Procedure Act.  
63 For an insightful illustration, see OECD, The OECD Review of Regulatory Reform in 
the United States, Paris, OECD, 1999. 
64 See OECD, Regulatory Reform in the United States: Government Capacity to Ensure 
High-Quality Regulation, OECD, Paris, 1999, p. 10. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 23 
 
certainly fosters the transparency of government regulation, stimulating 
the political and economic debate.65 
Another remarkable feature of the US system is the large number of 
institutional entities involved in the regulatory process. While the role 
played by the Congressional Budget Office complements OIRA’s oversight 
activity, creating an inter-institutional competition that is normally 
considered virtuous for the quality of regulation, most regulations must 
pass muster under regulatory flexibility procedures and regulatory burden 
reduction screens, and are subject to review by an impressive number of 
constituencies, with specific regard to consumers and small businesses.66  
Moreover, the US procedure seems to have generated significant cost 
savings. Under the Reagan administration, yearly savings were estimated at 
roughly $10-20 billion. Non-governmental estimates can however be very 
different. According to one authoritative economist, the cost of regulations 
even increased after the introduction of compulsory RIA for federal 
agencies, and has never stopped mounting since then.67  
On the other hand, relevant critiques have been addressed to the 
current implementation of RIA in the US. A 2000 study by Bob Hahn and 
Bob Litan on 48 proposed regulations subject to RIA between 1996 and 1999 
showed that in 27% of the cases agencies had not considered alternative 
options, and only in 31% of the cases had agencies quantified both expected 
costs and benefits of proposed regulations. Moreover, only in 63% of the 
cases had the proponent agency calculated all identified costs, whereas 
only in 28% of proposals had the agency calculated the net present value of 
                                                      
65 On the reliability of government cost-benefit estimates, see Box 2, chapter 3.  
66 Institutional competition becomes virtuous whenever different entities intervene 
in the same procedure, but with different and sharply defined roles. In this case, 
creating a network of competing regulators and oversight agencies produces 
beneficial effects both in terms of overall transparency and efficiency. See e.g. R. 
Lutter,  Economic Analysis of Regulation in the U.S.: What Lessons for the European 
Commission?, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, 
D.C., 2001.  
67 R.W. Hahn and R. Litan, An Analysis of the Third Government Report on the Benefits 
and Costs of Federal Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 2000; and E.A. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-benefit 
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective”, University of Chicago Law Review, 
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the regulatory intervention.68 More recently, in 2004 Bob Hahn and Pat 
Dudley analysed 55 cases of RIA performed by federal agencies between 
the Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, with similar results.69 
Accordingly, economists have stressed the need for further improvements 
in the accuracy of cost-benefit estimates by federal agencies as a necessary 
measure for improving the quality of ex ante evaluation. Robert Hahn and 
Robert Litan have also issued recommendations on how to improve the 
quality of US RIA, by enhancing the soundness and pervasiveness of the 
model.70 
Furthermore, besides critiques addressed towards the quality of RIAs 
performed by federal agencies, some disagreement has emerged as regards 
the scope of application of the US RIA model. As of today, the US impact 
assessment procedure only involves federal agencies, not independent 
authorities, i.e. the authorities that normally deal with the most relevant 
part of economic regulations.71 And, while it is certainly true that such 
authorities ought to be left independent of the executive, many 
commentators have criticised the decision to limit the application of RIA 
scrutiny to all new rules except core economic and social rules enacted by 
giant regulators, such as the FCC (Federal Communications Commission), 
the FTC (Free Trade Commission) or the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission).72  
                                                      
68 Ibid. 
69 R.W. Hahn and P. Dudley, How well does the government do cost-benefit analysis?, 
Working Paper 04-01, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Washington, D.C., January 2004. 
70 See R.W. Hahn and R.E. Litan, “Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons 
for the U.S. and Europe”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, 
pp. 473-508 (see in particular pp. 496-499, suggesting that “Congress pass a law 
requiring that all federal regulatory agencies submit annual cost and benefit 
estimates of major regulations to OMB”, and that “OMB issue a scorecard 
assessing the overall quality of regulation and ask the agencies to complete a 
scorecard for each major regulation”).  
71 R.W. Hahn and C. Sunstein, “New Executive Order For Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis”, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 150, No. 1489, May 2002; T.O. McGarity, “Regulatory Analysis 
and Regulatory Reform”, Texas Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 1243, 1987. See also R.H. 
Pildes and C.R. Sunstein, “Reinventing the Regulatory State”, University of Chicago 
Law Review, 62, 1, 1995. 
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Finally, the US regulatory review model has been the subject of 
extensive study by game theorists and political scientists, as its peculiar 
institutional setting lends itself to applications of principal-agent models 
and raises issues of political control over the bureaucracy.73 For example, 
Lazer (2004) finds evidence that, although the staff at OIRA has remained 
quite stable between Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, the White 
House has radically redistributed its attention and political support 
towards OIRA members with compatible political viewpoints. The 
appointment of John Graham as the OIRA head and the gradual 
strengthening of OIRA’s role as gatekeeper are seen as consistent with the 
removal of the Vice President from the review procedure, a solution aimed 
at ensuring that the White House keeps control over federal agencies and at 
the same time economising on its fairly limited capacity to gather 
information on proposed new rules.  
This finding is compatible with a competitive agent model of control, 
and suggests that, in the regulatory review model adopted in the US, 
presidential influence is exerted mostly through an institutionalisation of 
the conflict and competition between the anti-regulatory OIRA and activist 
regulatory agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In this model, the 
President has a clear incentive to exert heavy control on the bureaucracy 
also because the White House competes with the Congress in controlling 
bureaucrats.74 
 
 
                                                      
73 See, inter alia,  T. Moe, “Regulatory performance and presidential 
administration”,  American Journal of Political Science, 26(2), pp. 197-224, 1982; T. 
Moe, “Control and feedback in economic regulation: The case of the NLRB”, 
American Political Science Review, 79, 1985, pp. 1094-1016; T. Moe, “The new 
economics of organization”, American Journal of Political Science, 79, pp. 1094-1117. 
See also William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago, 
IL: Aldine, 1971. 
74 See D. Lazer, Regulatory Review: Presidential Control through Selective 
Communication and Institutionalized Conflict, 1998 (available at 
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1.2  The UK experience: From ‘light touch’ to ‘limited touch’ 
regulation 
The UK experience on impact assessment is starkly different from that in 
the US, and can be considered as the expression of Europe’s ‘state of the 
art’ as well as a possible reference model for the past and current EU 
impact assessment models. Compared to the US model, the UK model 
exhibits peculiar features, mostly related to: i) the choice to provide for a 
gradual introduction of the procedure; ii) the peculiar attention to 
compliance costs borne by target firms; iii) a strong emphasis on the impact 
of regulation on small and medium-sized firms; and iv)  the type of 
regulations that are subject to impact assessment (in the US proposed 
regulations by federal agencies, in the UK draft bills presented to the 
Parliament).  
The first attempts to introduce a culture of impact assessment and an 
ex ante evaluation of the expected impact of proposals examined by the 
Parliament can be traced back to the Thatcher administration. The UK 
Government, however, decided to proceed with caution, initially 
mandating only a simplified procedure, which entailed that sponsoring 
administrations estimated only the impact of proposed legislation on the 
costs borne by firms to comply with the new rules (so-called ‘Compliance 
Cost Assessment’ or CCA). The CCA procedure, introduced in 1986, clearly 
aimed at reducing administrative burdens that were found to be 
skyrocketing – just as in most other EU countries – as a result of regulatory 
creep.75 The slogans used at that time – such as ‘building businesses – not 
barriers’ and ‘lifting the burden’ were self-explanatory.76 
The introduction of CCA must be contextualised within the more 
general reform of UK public administration that led, during the early 1980s, 
to a true, disruptive cultural revolution in UK administration, transforming 
a procedure-oriented bureaucracy into a more performance-oriented, 
efficiency-driven branch of the government. The so-called ‘new public 
management’ wave led to a significant improvement in the efficiency of the 
UK administration, achieved through a reform of contractual arrangements 
with CEOs, but also through a growing use of market-type mechanisms 
(MTMs), an increased outsourcing of functions inefficiently performed by 
                                                      
75 See R. Boden, J. Froud, A. Ogus and P. Stubbs, Controlling the Regulators, London: 
MacMillan Press, 1998.  
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the state and more generally though stronger emphasis on performance 
and citizens’ satisfaction in the delivery of public services.77  
The UK CCA model relied heavily on the coordination and oversight 
of an ad hoc g o v e r n m e n t  t a s k  f o r c e ,  w h o s e  m a i n  r o l e  w a s  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  
‘anti-red tape’ initiatives and to assist sponsoring administrations in 
drafting CCA forms. In 1986, following the ‘Building businesses – not 
barriers’ initiative, the agency was given the name of Enterprise and 
Deregulation Unit and was nested in the Department of Employment. In 
1987 it was renamed the Deregulation Unit and moved to the Department 
of Trade and Industry, where it was assisted by a task force of business 
representatives. The Deregulation Unit conducted its activities in an 
‘adversarial, inquisitorial’ way, challenging administrations by setting 
ambitious yearly targets for the reduction of administrative burdens, 
paving the way for a massive deregulatory effort. In 1992, most 
departments had gone a long way towards reducing regulatory creep, but 
the real target of reducing administrative burdens seem not to have been 
achieved.78 Commentators and politicians highlighted that a further 
cultural shift was needed in UK administrations in order to drive the 
process of cutting red tape and facilitating business activities. The ‘new 
wave’ of reforms launched in 1992 maintained the same ‘gatekeeper’ model 
and led to the creation of new ad hoc, sector-specific bodies similar to the 
US federal agencies. Seven new task forces were created in 1992 alone – 
including a Deregulation Task Force – for the purpose of facilitating the 
deregulation initiative launched by John Major’s administration. These task 
forces spawned as many as 605 deregulatory initiatives, which led, inter 
alia, to: i) the 1994 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act, which introduced 
legislative means to abrogate regulatory burdens; ii) the ‘think small first’ 
initiative, which forced administrations to award top priority to the impact 
                                                      
77 For an illustration of the ‘new public management’ approach, see Jan Erik Lane, 
New Public Management, London: Routledge, 2000; and Christopher Pollitt and 
Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. The approach survived the 1980s and 1990s and is still 
considered to provide significant guidance for policy-makers in the modernisation 
of government. See e.g. OECD, Modernising Government: The Way Forward, Paris, 
2005, p. 85 and p. 181.  
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of existing and new regulations on small enterprises; and iii) the extension 
of CCA to parliamentary bills and EC directives. 79   
However, evidence soon testified that these huge efforts were 
producing only little progress in alleviating compliance costs. When the 
DTI moved to the Cabinet Office in 1995, a new initiative was launched for 
improving the overall UK regulatory environment for businesses. 
Departments were asked to issue monthly reports on their planned 
legislative activities and were warned not to use ‘gold-plating’ of EC 
directives, especially after the unfortunate experience in the transposition 
of the Data Protection Directive.80 Moreover, in 1996 the CCA procedure 
was gradually transformed into a wider ‘regulatory appraisal’, which 
included risk assessment and the requirement to quantify benefits as well 
as costs.81  
Only in 1998, under the Blair premiership, a real Regulatory Impact 
Assessment procedure was introduced, based on a thorough analysis of 
costs and benefits of identified regulatory options, including the ‘zero 
option’. According to the UK Cabinet Office, the new RIA procedure will 
allow future yearly savings up to £100 million. This would certainly be a 
remarkable result, although there is still no empirical evidence available to 
confirm such estimates.82 Again, this new wave of reforms was 
accompanied by a thorough restatement of the role and functions of UK 
administration. The White Paper on Modernising Government marked the 
final shift from an input-oriented to an outcome-oriented approach to 
delivery of public service.83 Greater attention was devoted to the 
simplification of the regulatory environment, with the creation of the Small 
Business Service and the Panel for Regulatory Accountability within the 
Cabinet Office. Likewise, in 2000 the Deregulation Unit was heavily 
reformed in its composition and main functions, and renamed the 
Regulatory Impact Unit (RIU). Regulatory impact units were also created at 
                                                      
79 Ibid., p. 198.  
80 See e.g. the Report by the Better Regulation Task Force, Simplifying EU Law, 
December 2004, p. 18 (available at http://www.brtf.gov.uk/docs/pdf/simplebetter.pdf – 
visited 5 December 2005).  
81 See, inter alia, the House of Commons Research Paper No. 04/52, Small Firms: 
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departmental level. The RIU’s ‘Scrutiny Team’ became a cross-
departmental task force and adopted a more collaborative approach vis-à-
vis administrations, with an eye to helping them develop a stronger culture 
of evaluation and cost-effectiveness.84  
The internal structure of the RIU became more articulated at the end 
of the 1990s. In 1997, a Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) was created 
within the RIU, replacing the Deregulation Task Force as an independent 
advisory group with a strong representation from businesses, consumers 
and the voluntary sector.85 The BRTF must advise the Government by 
ensuring that proposed regulations are “necessary, fair and affordable”, as 
well as simple to understand and administer. Besides advising the 
Government, the BRTF also advises departments at an early stage of 
drafting, by issuing non-coercive recommendations. But perhaps the most 
important role played by the BRTF lies in the drafting of guidelines and 
documents on methodological issues. Starting in 2000, the BRTF published 
reports on the impact of regulation on small firms in specific sectors (e.g. 
the IT sector, the hotel/catering sector, etc.). In 2003, the task force began to 
identify best practices in regulatory impact assessment (the so-called 
‘champions of better regulation’), bringing them to the attention of the 
National Audit Office.86 Most notably, the BRTF issued in 1998 and 
updated in 2000 and 2003 a list of ‘principles of good regulation’, which 
specifies that regulation and its enforcement should be proportionate, 
accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted.87 Starting in 2002, the 
BRTF issued specific guidance on methodological issues, by recommending 
the adoption of non-regulatory alternatives;88 combating regulatory 
                                                      
84 See OECD, From Red Tape to Smart Tape, op. cit., p. 201.  
85 See the BRTF’s website (http://www.brtf.gov.uk).  
86 See the BRTF’ Annual Report 2001/2002, Champions of Better Regulation (available 
at  http://www.brtf.gov.uk/docs/pdf/ar2002.pdf – visited 5 December 2005). In April 
2002, the Committee of Public Accounts recommended that the National Audit 
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88 See BRTF, Alternatives to State Regulation, July 2000 (available at 
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inflation;89 and streamlining legislation.90 The importance of the work 
carried out by the BRTF is also testified to by the recent document on the 
use of consultation at EU level.91 The BRTF also relied on voluntary 
measures such as the Enforcement Concordat, a non-statutory code 
designed to ensure that central and local enforcement agencies developed a 
more proportionate approach to regulatory enforcement. By December 
2001, 96% of local authorities and the vast majority of central agencies had 
voluntarily adhered to the prescriptions of the Concordat.92   
Finally, the BRTF also developed a “test of good regulation and 
pitfalls to be avoided” which applies to all available regulatory options 
(state and non-state regulation). The BRFT suggests that administrations 
make sure that proposed initiatives have broad political support; are 
enforceable and easy to understand; are balanced and avoid “impetuous 
knee-jerk reactions”; avoid unintended consequences; balance risk, costs 
and practical benefits; seek to reconcile contradictory policy objectives; and 
identify accountability issues.93  
The valuable contribution from the BRTF was incorporated in the 
RIU Guide to regulatory impact assessment, published in 2000 and then 
revised and updated in 2003.94 The Guide included a detailed illustration of 
the criteria to be followed in performing cost-benefit analysis. Sponsoring 
administrations now can rely on insightful documents, which include 
specific guidance on alternatives to state regulation, including “regulation 
                                                      
89 See BRTF, Avoiding Regulatory Creep, October 2004 (available at 
http://www.brtf.gov.uk/docs/pdf/hiddenmenace.pdf – visited 5 December 2005).  
90 See BRTF, Make it Simple Make it Better – Simplifying EU Law, December 2004 
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Cabinet Office, 1999.  IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 31 
 
through information”, regulation through codes of practice, self-regulation, 
deregulatory options, market-based options, etc.   
1.2.1 The 2001 Regulatory Reform Act and the 2002 Regulatory Reform 
Action Plan 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of initiatives aimed at promoting better 
regulation, the ambitious plans formulated by the UK government after 
1998 did not fully materialise. Administrations still lacked sufficient 
awareness of the need to enact cost-reducing regulations and to ease 
regulatory burdens, and the growth of the regulatory burden seemed not to 
have slowed down. Furthermore, the Parliament exhibited a lack of 
legislative capacity, with specific respect to the transposition of EU 
directives. New initiatives were thus undertaken to address the issue of 
reforming existing legislation, with specific emphasis on simplifying 
procedural steps towards the revision of legislation currently in force, by 
granting the Government enhanced powers to intervene in existing 
primary and secondary legislation.  
A first attempt to establish fast tracks to lift the burden of already 
existing primary and secondary legislation had been made with the 1994 
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act. The Act enabled the Government to 
make a Deregulation Order (DO) to amend or repeal a provision in primary 
legislation that was considered to impose a burden on businesses or others 
or could be reduced or eliminated without removing any necessary 
protection. The results, however, were quite disappointing: during the 
1995-96 Session, 19 proposed Deregulation Orders were submitted before 
the Parliament, but the number decreased to 12 in 1996-97 and to five in the 
1997-98 Session. The following year, only four proposed DOs reached the 
Parliament, highlighting the need for releasing some of the overly 
restrictive limits set by the 1994 Act on the scope of governmental power to 
tackle regulatory burdens.95  
The stark disappointment with the limited outcome of the 1994 Act 
led to a wide consultation launched by the Cabinet Office in 1999. In the 
paper entitled “Proposed Amendments to the Deregulation and 
Contracting Out Act of 1994”, published in March 1999, the Cabinet Office 
stated that it was “possible to extend the scope of the power to fulfil its 
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commitment to modernise government and deliver regulatory 
arrangements appropriate for the years to come”. After a tough negotiation 
between the Government and the Parliament, agreement was reached on 
the need to reform and widen the Government’s order-making power.  
Such an extensive negotiation process eventually led to the approval 
of the Regulatory Reform Act, which came into force on 1 April 2001, 
enabling ministers to amend or repeal laws in order to lift regulatory 
burdens through a streamlined approach which entailed, inter alia, the 
removal of ‘double-banking’, aimed at simplifying Parliament procedures. 
More importantly, for the purpose of this paper, the 2001 Act addressed the 
persistent lack of standardised procedures for reviewing existing 
legislation. A RIA-like procedure was mandated for the review of existing 
legislation, ensuring further Parliamentary scrutiny of Government 
proposals for regulatory review through a special procedure (called the 
‘super-affirmative’ procedure), in which the Regulatory Reform Orders 
(RROs, which replaced the Deregulation Orders) are subject to public 
consultation and then to a detailed scrutiny by the Regulatory Reform 
Committee in the House of Commons and the Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee in the House of Lords.96  
Under the 2001 Act, the RROs can serve a number of different 
purposes, including: i) making and re-enacting statutory provisions; ii) 
imposing additional burdens provided they are proportionate; 
iii) removing inconsistencies and anomalies in legislation; iv) dealing with 
burdens caused by a lack of statutory provision to do something; v) 
applying RIA to all legislation that has not been amended in substance 
during the last two years; vi) relieving burdens from anyone, except 
government departments where only they would benefit; and vii) allowing 
administrative and minor details to be further amended by subordinate 
provisions orders.97 
After the entry into force of the 2001 Act, encouraging outcomes 
started to emerge. At the end of 2003, more than 240 deregulatory measures 
                                                      
96 See the House of Commons Second Special Report of the Deregulation 
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had already been delivered with the new RRO system. Some of these 
produced significant outcomes: for example, licensing reforms, including 
increased flexibility over opening hours, are expected to save roughly £1.9 
billion in the first 10 years of implementation; reforms to business tenancies 
had the potential to save “approximately £6.5 million a year in court costs 
alone”; and the removal of limits to the number of partners in a firm was 
estimated to save around £10,000 per relevant partnership.98 Provisions 
aimed at lifting the burden on small firms included measures that raised 
the audit threshold from £1 to £5.6 million (which freed 69,000 businesses) 
and the introduction of a flat rate scheme that saved 672,000 small 
businesses from having to complete detailed VAT returns. As regards the 
simplification of Parliament procedures, the UK reached out into the seven 
countries that met the target for 98.5% on-time transposition of EU 
directives. Studies by KPMG, the World Bank and OECD ranked the UK as 
the most competitive regulatory environment, with specific regard to 
regulatory costs.99 But in 2005, evidence gathered during the so-called 
‘Hampton review’ revealed that small businesses were still faced with 
disproportionate regulatory burdens.100 This led the UK Government to a 
decision not to raise the flag on better regulation, but instead to proceed 
with new, more ambitious initiatives.  
1.2.2 Latest developments: The 2005 Action Plan and the creation of the 
Better Regulation Executive  
The past few years were dominated by a re-launch of UK initiatives on 
cutting red tape and reducing regulatory creep for small businesses. These 
include a number of administrative simplification initiatives, mostly linked 
to the e-Government initiatives and one-stop-shops created at central and 
agency level (such as the portal Ukonline.gov, the info4local and Small 
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Business Service initiatives).101 The 2002 Regulatory Reform Action Plan was 
updated in 2003.102 The number of Regulatory Reform Orders scrutinised 
by the Parliament skyrocketed, creating further need for stronger 
methodological requirements and Government oversight. For this reason, a 
number of important initiatives were undertaken to increase the internal 
consistency of such a complex reform endeavour.  
First, in June 2005, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
launched a new, ambitious Better Regulation Action Plan. The Action Plan 
announced the introduction of a ‘quite different’ appraisal model, aimed at 
embedding the risk-based approach in regulatory decision-making. The 
risk-based approach was announced as providing for “no inspection 
without justification, no form filling without justification, and no 
information requirements without justification.”103 The Action Plan 
followed the publication of the “Less is More” paper by the BRTF, as well 
as the Hampton Review on administrative burdens, which had suggested 
the adoption of a risk-based approach as well as massive consolidation of 
UK regulators. As a result, Chancellor Brown announced the plan to reduce 
UK regulators from 31 to as few as seven.104 The plan, included in the 
forthcoming  Better Regulation bill currently under consultation, will be 
finalised and implemented in September 2006.  
Under the prescriptions of the Action Plan, Departments will start 
measuring the total administrative burden they impose upon businesses 
(including the costs of form-filling, undergoing inspections and complying 
with data requirements).105 Moreover, businesses will be invited to propose 
areas of regulation and administrative costs that are needlessly 
burdensome, also through a brand new online portal (accessed at 
www.betterregulation.gov.uk). The Panel for Regulatory Accountability 
within the Cabinet Office will be in charge of setting challenging targets for 
burden reduction for each department by the 2006 pre-budget report. In 
early 2006, departments will have to start preparing ‘simplification plans’ 
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by reviewing existing legislation and taking into due account proposals 
coming from businesses as well as guidelines contained in the Hampton 
review and in the BRTF’s “Less is More” document.106 
In particular, the ‘Better Regulation’ bill will mandate new fast tracks 
for repealing or amending outdated and unnecessary legislation, set out the 
powers to merge regulatory bodies and introduce new tools aimed at 
promoting the use of a risk-based approach as recommended during the 
Hampton review. After the consultation period expires, the bill will be 
introduced to Parliament in early 2006 and will be subject to Parliamentary 
approval. Its entry into force is scheduled for summer 2006. Detailed 
deregulatory proposals – mostly based on suggestions by businesses – will 
then be included in a further ‘Deregulation’ bill to be submitted to 
Parliament by the second session of 2006.107  
But there’s more in the new 2005 Action Plan. For example, a new 
Local Authority Better Regulation Group is being set up, comprising local 
authorities, national regulators and government departments, “to improve 
the coordination of local and national regulatory services”. In order to 
establish a common approach to risk assessment and regulatory best 
practice, authorities will agree on a national Regulatory Enforcement 
Concordat, whose first draft will be published in autumn 2005. The 
Department of Trade and Industry already started a consultation on a new 
Consumer and Trading Standards Agency, in charge of developing a single 
code of practice to replace and harmonise the 203 trading standards offices 
currently active nationwide, thus reducing differences in the quality and 
consistency of regulation experienced by businesses with multiple 
locations. 
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Most importantly, the new Action Plan also specified the priorities to 
be pursued by the UK Presidency of the European Union. These include 
advocating the introduction and correct implementation of comprehensive 
impact assessment at EU level, as well as methods to estimate clearly and 
transparently the administrative burdens imposed by EU proposals on 
businesses. The UK Government also planned to develop a list of priorities 
for simplifying the EU regulatory environment, and drafted a timetable for 
delivering regulatory simplification in 2006. Finally, the UK Government 
plans to promote the use of the new risk-based approach also at EU level.108 
But the Action Plan also paved the way for a thorough reassessment 
of the whole RIA model adopted in the UK. The appointment of John 
Hutton, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, as Cabinet-level minister led 
to replacing the RIU with a Better Regulation Executive (BRE), in charge of: 
i) providing stronger central coordination of delivery and implementation 
of the Hampton review as well as the ‘make it simple-make it better’ and 
the ‘less is more’ recommendations from the BRTF; ii) supporting the Panel 
for Regulatory Accountability as ‘gatekeeper’, challenging departments in 
case of insufficient progress towards regulatory reform; and iii) acting as 
‘consultant’ to departments for the purpose of enabling cultural change and 
more outcome-oriented processes.109  
In launching the consultation phase on the new Better Regulation Bill 
on 20 July 2005, the Government announced that it had accepted all eight 
recommendations issued by the BRTF in the “Less is More” report, and 
decided to focus on the following three main objectives:  
•  regulating only where necessary and with a light touch that is 
proportionate to risk, 
•  setting exacting targets for reducing the cost of administering 
regulations and 
•  rationalising the inspection and enforcement arrangements for both 
business and the public sector.  
The Action Plan also announced that in January 2006 the BRTF will 
be replaced with a new Better Regulation Commission, whose main role 
will be to advise and challenge government departments on regulatory 
reform issues and to scrutinise departmental plans for regulatory 
simplification.  
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Finally, by the end of 2006, the National Audit Office will start 
reporting to the Parliament on departments’ performance in implementing 
the new risk-based methodology and in effectively reducing the burden of 
regulation, as well as on regulators’ performance against the 
recommendations of the Hampton Review.110  
As clearly emerges from this brief explanation of the main features of 
the new Action Plan, the institutional setting of UK Better Regulation is set 
to be constantly changing and will significantly depart in the next two 
years from the model adopted up to 2004. As recalled by Sir John Hutton in 
launching the consultation on the new Better Regulation Bill, “[t]he potential 
economic gains from stripping away unnecessary regulation are 
enormous”. Hutton also recalled estimates by the BRTF that the new 
approach “could boost British national income in the long term by 1% of 
GDP – a huge gain of around £10 billion for the UK economy”.111 The BRTF 
also calculated that adopting the standard cost model already adopted in 
the Netherlands (SCM) for measuring administrative burdens and then 
targeting a 25% cut in such burdens over four years could reduce direct 
regulatory costs on businesses by £7.5 billion, yielding a £16 billion increase 
in the UK GDP in the medium term.112  
                                                      
110 See, again, the Cabinet Office’s press notice, “Cabinet Office kicks-off project”, 
op. cit., and the Cabinet Office’s Consultation Document, A Bill for Better 
Regulation, op. cit. 
111 See the Cabinet Office’s press notice, “Transforming the Regulatory Landscape – 
Launch of a Consultation on a Bill for Better Regulation”  (available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/news/2005/050720_bill.asp – visited 5 
December 2005). The approach taken by the UK Government has been termed ‘one 
in, one out’, to express the need to “encourage a better balance between the 
introduction of new regulation and deregulation”. See speech by Sir David 
Arculus, Chairman of the Better Regulation Task Force, to staff of the Financial 
Services Authority, 29 June 2005 (available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/ 
Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/0705_sda.shtml – visited 5 December 2005). 
112 See the Statistical Appendix to the Less is More White Paper (available at 
http://www.brtf.gov.uk/pressreleases/2005/lessismore.asp#stats  – visited 5 December 
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1.2.3 The UK RIA model 
Figure 2 shows the RIA model adopted by the UK government. As is easily 
seen, the procedure is essentially composed of two stages.113 In the first 
stage, the proponent administration performs an initial regulatory impact 
assessment, identifying the range of alternative regulatory options 
available for solving the specific issue at hand. The initial RIA form also 
carries an identification of the preferred regulatory option. Such form is 
then filed with the competent ministry, which decides whether to proceed 
in the drafting of the proposed new regulation. The RIA form then is sent 
back to the proponent administration, whose task is now to identify the 
most appropriate methodology for the type of regulation at stake (for 
example, cost-effectiveness analysis, compliance cost assessment, cost-
benefit analysis, risk-risk analysis, etc.).114 The choice of the methodology is 
made in consultation with RIU (now BRE) and the Small Business Service, 
created for the purpose of representing the interests of small and medium-
sized enterprises as targets of new regulations.  
At this stage, the proposed regulation is sent again to the Ministry, 
which is required to verify whether the proposal meets the thresholds for a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Statement  (RIAS), a detailed RIA whose 
completion is mandatory only if the expected impact is greater than £20 
million; when the issue is of particular interest to the general public; or 
when the proposal is likely to exert a biased impact on different social 
groups.  
The BRE takes part also in this process, and collaborates with the 
sponsoring administration in drafting the RIAS. The result of this process is 
the publication of the so-called ‘partial RIA’, followed by a consultation 
process and inter-departmental dialogue. As a matter of fact, in the UK 
experience, RIA is part of a wider process in which the proposed regulation 
is filed with the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Office. The proposal 
will be handed back to the competent minister with attached comments 
and guidelines on the methodology to be used for impact assessment and 
on actions to be undertaken for solving the regulatory issue at stake. Only 
                                                      
113 See RIU, Better Policy-Making: A Guide to Regulatory Impact Assessment, op. cit.  
114 For an illustration of methodologies currently used in the UK RIA model, see 
the Treasury’s Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, updated 
in 2003 (available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/05553/Green_Book_03.pdf – 
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when the final RIA form is drafted, such form is signed by the minister and 
sent to the Parliament for discussion and approval.  
Department Department
Initial RIA Initial RIA
Minister Minister
Do not proceed
Proceed
Department Department
Choice of methodology Choice of methodology
Consultation with Consultation with
BRE and SBS BRE and SBS
Minister Minister
Partial RIA Partial RIA
Complete RIA Complete RIA
Final RIA Final RIA
Regulatory Impact  Regulatory Impact 
Assessment  Assessment 
Statement (BRE) Statement (BRE)
Consultazioni formali, 
ricerca del consenso 
interministeriale
Minister signs Minister signs
To Parliament To Parliament
Formal consultation,  Formal consultation, 
inter inter- -departmental  departmental 
dialogue dialogue
Figure 2. The UK RIA model
 
1.2.4 Main lessons from the UK experience 
The UK RIA experience surely ranks amongst the most advanced best 
practices and constitutes an example of insightful practical implementation 
of a policy tool that has so far seldom kept the promise of significantly 
enhancing the quality of regulation. However, not all that glitters is gold: 
the huge effort devoted by UK administrations in refining the RIA 
procedure has so far produced only limited visible improvements in the 
efficiency and accountability of the UK regulatory process, as testified to by 
the constant overlapping of initiatives launched by the Cabinet Office, 
always in search of new organisational arrangements and methodological 
refinements in its RIA procedure.  
Amongst the most evident virtues of the UK model, as already 
recalled, is certainly the choice to gradually introduce complex RIA tools, 
with no resort to trial stages in which administrations are immediately 
called to adopt overly complex procedures in a restricted sample of 
selected proposals. The complexity of the UK RIA model has increased 
over time, as administrations became more familiar with the new 40 | ANDREA RENDA  
organisational culture imposed by the ‘new public management’ 
revolution. The application of the economic theory of organisation, which 
inspired the whole new public management movement, allowed for a 
thorough understanding of the importance of cultural change as a key 
driver for an efficient transition towards a better performance in public 
administrations, efficient organisational behaviour and, in turn, better 
regulatory processes.115 The UK bureaucracy had the time to become 
familiar with the tools of economic analysis needed for assessing the costs 
and benefits of regulation, which normally are not part of the standard 
endowment of the ‘Weberian-style’ bureaucrat. 
Moreover, the UK experience must be appreciated for its attention to 
principles of good regulation. According to the guidelines of the Better 
Regulation Task Force, which were accepted and endorsed by the Cabinet 
Office, proposed bills must be proportionate, consistent, targeted, 
transparent and accountable. Proportionality implies that regulators should 
intervene only when necessary, that regulations must be appropriate to the 
risks posed and that costs associated with regulations have to be identified 
and consequently minimised. The principle of proportionality also includes 
a careful scrutiny of the impact of proposed regulations on small 
businesses, which are estimated to account for 99.8% of UK businesses.116 
The ‘think small first’ principle was first developed in the UK and was 
adopted at EU level as early as the 1980s.  
The targeting principle is also particularly important. The Better 
Regulation Task Force has mandated regulators to focus on the problem 
and minimise side effects, thus avoiding a scattergun approach. The 
a p p r o a c h  t o  r e g u l a t i o n  m u s t  b e  c l e a rly ‘goals-based’ and flexible, with 
room for consultation between regulators and targeted groups. 
Furthermore, an emphasis on compliance costs still remains in the 
                                                      
115 The initial stage of UK RIA was characterised by a strong emphasis on cultural 
change as a key driver of better regulation. The Thatcher administration even 
started distributing economics and public choice materials to senior public 
officials, in order to raise their awareness and stimulate performance-oriented 
behaviour. See N. Bosanquet, “Sir Keith’s Reading List”, Political Quarterly, 52(3), 
1983, pp. 324-341.   
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principles of good regulation, which specify that “those being regulated 
should be given the time and support to comply”.117  
Finally, it is worth noting that at least some administrations in the UK 
have reached a significant level of accuracy in estimating the costs and 
benefits of proposed regulations as well as in the drafting of RIA forms, 
although the Chairman of the Better Regulation Task Force, David Arculus, 
recently reported to the National Audit Office (NAO) that stark differences 
exist between agencies that perform RIA quite well (e.g. the Department of 
Trade and Industry) and administrations that produce poor quality 
estimates (the Home Office, the Department of Transport and the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport).118  
In addition, the UK model has been heavily criticised for not taking 
adequately into account goals other than the economic efficiency of 
proposed regulations.119 In particular, the application of cost-benefit 
analysis to proposals with strong expected social impact might lead to 
neglecting important objectives for policy-makers, such as safety, social 
justice or fairness. Three objections must be put forward in this respect, 
however. First, the new RIA procedure still maintains a strong emphasis on 
protecting small businesses, an objective that seems at least partially 
inconsistent with the mere search for economic efficiency.120 Secondly, RIA 
is always presented as a tool that may help regulators, with no ambition to 
become a panacea for policy-making or to entirely replace the ‘art’ of 
                                                      
117 See e.g. Better Regulation: Making Good Use of Regulatory Impact Assessments – A 
Report by the Comptroller and the Auditor General, 15 November 2001 (available at 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/0102329.pdf – visited 5 
December 2005). The five principles of good regulation (transparency, 
proportionality, targeting, consistency and accountability) were introduced by the 
Better Regulation Task Force in 1997 and then updated in 2000 and 2003. See also 
Principles of Good Regulation (available at http://www.brtf.gov.uk/docs/pdf/ 
principlesleaflet.pdf - last visited 7 December 2005).  
118 See the National Audit Office reports on RIAs at http://www.nao.org.uk/ria/ 
index.htm, and the Letter to the Comptroller General of BRTF Chairman David 
Arculus of 26 May 2005 (available at http://www.brtf.gov.uk/docs/pdf/ 
sir_john_letter_26may05.pdf), requesting further scrutiny of RIAs by the NAO. 
119 See OECD, UK Regulatory Reform: Challenges at the Cutting Edge, Paris, 2002. 
120 The ‘Small Business (Litmus) Test’ is performed by individual sponsoring 
administrations in collaboration with the Small Business Service, created by the 
Labour administration in 2000 with the specific aim to cut small business red tape.  42 | ANDREA RENDA  
regulation with the ‘craft’ of cost-benefit analysis. Thirdly, individual 
sectoral agencies such as the Office of Communications (OFCOM), Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and the FSA (Financial Services 
Authority) started developing ad hoc RIA methodologies, submitting them 
to public consultation. Such an initiative will arguably foster the 
introduction of more specific tools in an otherwise standardised assessment 
model.121  
Finally, as already recalled, it must be added that the cost-saving and 
efficiency-enhancing potential of the RIA model is still not confirmed by 
any empirical evidence. According to some commentators, the ‘gold-
plating’ approach adopted in transposing some EC directives into national 
law caused an undesirable increase in administrative burdens and other 
regulatory costs in a number of cases.122 This is also made dependent on the 
absence of a thorough assessment of all the regulatory options available to 
the regulator. Cases of ‘costly’ adoption of EU legislation include the 
transposition of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) into national law 
with the Data Protection Act of 1998. The adoption of the EU framework led 
– according to estimates by the UK chambers of commerce – to a 50% 
increase in business compliance costs. Such experience led Whitehall to 
consider issuing ad hoc guidelines for the adoption of EU legislation, which 
recently culminated in the distribution of a ‘Transposition Guide’ drafted 
by the RIU and of the ‘Make it simple make it better’ list of 
recommendations by the Better Regulation Task Force.123   
 
                                                      
121 See section 3.3 below.  
122 See BRTF, Make it Simple Make it Better, op. cit.  
123  The Regulatory Impact Unit or RIU (now renamed Better Regulation 
Executive) devoted peculiar attention to the transposition of EU legislation. 
Major publications on this topic are the Transposition Guide: How to Implement 
European Directives Effectively (available at http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/regulation/docs/europe/pdf/tpguide.pdf);  Better Policy-Making: A Guide to 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (available at http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/regulation/docs/europe/pdf/tpguide.pdf); Better Policy-Making: Checklist to 
Ensure Good Quality European Legislation (available at http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/regulation/docs/europe/pdf/tpguide.pdf) ;  a n d ,  f i n a l l y ,  t h e  Report on 
Improving UK Handling of European Legislation (available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/documents/europe/pdf/euchecklist.pdf – last 
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1.3  EU impact assessment: Panacea or Pandora’s box? 
The European Commission has adopted methods for assessing the impact 
of its regulations since 1986, when the Business Impact Assessment (BIA) 
System was launched under the UK Presidency. The BIA system, like the 
UK Compliance Cost Assessment procedure, exhibited a strong focus on 
the impact of proposed regulations on business enterprises, with no 
specific emphasis on social welfare as a whole. As such, the BIA procedure 
elicited strong criticisms for its lack of theoretical soundness and minimal 
impact on the regulatory costs faced by European firms.124 For this reason, 
such a system was gradually integrated with an array of initiatives and 
projects (such as the Business Test Panel, the SLIM project, etc.), aimed at 
extending the limited scope of the BIA. Such a hysteresis of initiatives 
ended up creating an overly confused scenario for EU impact assessment – 
exactly the regulatory creep that impact assessment was supposed to 
counter. For this reason, the EU institutions in 2002 agreed on the need for 
new action in the field of better regulation, with a specific focus on impact 
assessment. 
Today, as EU policy-makers are striving to lead Europe away from its 
disappointing economic performance and back onto the Lisbon track, better 
regulation has become a new mantra, and the ex ante impact assessment of 
EU legislation is conquering new fans, who see it as the philosopher’s stone 
that will improve the quality of EU legislation in the years to come. Thus, 
better regulation strongly relies on the successful implementation of the 
ambitious new Integrated Impact Assessment (IIA) model, which entered 
into force on 1 January 2003 and mandated the assessment of the economic, 
                                                      
124 See, inter alia, the Final Report Business Impact Assessment (BIA) pilot project, 
Lessons Learned and the Way Forward, Enterprise Paper No. 9, DG Enterprise, 
European Commission, 2002, p. 2. The Commission acknowledged that BIA “has 
not always worked as originally intended ... Instead, BIAs are often carried out as 
an  ex-post ‘paper exercise’ on already finalised proposals, leading to significant 
drawbacks with regard to both the quality of the analysis made and the possibility 
of feeding the results into the drafting process”. The Final Report also mentioned 
that “many BIAs are not backed up by objective information and impacts on 
business are rarely quantified”, and that “[t]here is little evidence of an 
institutional learning process from previous BIAs”. The report is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/enterprise-papers/pdf/enterprise_paper_09_ 
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social and environmental impact of major new initiatives included in the 
Annual Policy Strategy or in the annual Legislative Work Programme.  
A growing emphasis on impact assessment is found in the 2003 Inter-
Institutional Agreement on Better Regulation, in the Parliament’s ‘Doorn 
Motion’, in the Joint Statement issued on December 2004 by six consecutive 
Council Presidencies on “Advancing Regulatory Reform” and in the 
Commission’s Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in 
the European Union, issued in March 2005. And ex ante impact assessment 
is now being extended to major amendments proposed by the Council and 
the Parliament within co-decision procedures. Even at the recent US-EU 
summit held in Washington, D.C. on 20 June 2005, impact assessment was 
constantly in the spotlight, and the next summit will call for closer 
transatlantic cooperation on regulatory issues.125  
So far, so good. But is all this enthusiasm justified? Behind the façade, 
two decades of experience in OECD countries have highlighted that impact 
assessment is far from being a panacea, especially when it is built on shaky 
methodological and organisational grounds. ‘Bad’ impact assessment can 
raise administrative costs, increase regulatory creep, facilitate regulatory 
capture and lead to suboptimal regulations. Accordingly, EU policy-makers 
will be able to reap the benefits of better regulation only when the 
integrated impact assessment (IIA) model reaches more satisfactory 
standards from a methodological, organisational and institutional 
perspective.  
The next sections are dedicated to an illustration of the initiatives 
undertaken at EU level for the purpose of promoting high-quality 
regulation through ex ante impact assessment over the past two decades. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the current scorecard of the Commission DGs in 
performing regulatory impact assessment. Chapter 3 explores 10 roadmaps 
conceived for the purpose of reconciling – to the extent possible – the sein 
and the sollen of the EU impact assessment model in the near future.  
                                                      
125 See e.g. the speech by European Commissioner Viviane Reding, announcing “an 
OMB-European Commission dialogue to address, subject to mutual agreement, 
topics such as good regulatory practices, transparency provisions and public 
consultation, impact assessment methodologies and risk assessment 
methodologies”, as well as the creation of a “High Level Regulatory Co-operation 
Forum to promote regulatory cooperation between senior regulators”. See her 
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1.3.1 The early years: The BIA system  
The EU experience in regulatory impact assessment began in 1986, when 
the UK took its turn in the Presidency of the Council. For this reason, the 
impact analysis procedure introduced – called Business Impact Assessment 
(BIA) – closely echoed the UK model of Compliance Cost Assessment.126 
The BIA Pilot Project aimed at evaluating the impact of a limited number of 
proposed regulations on businesses, expressed in terms of compliance 
costs. Since 1989, the procedure has been put under the competency of 
DGXXIII (DG Enterprise), which coordinated other DGs and selected the 
proposals included in the Commission’s agenda that should be subjected to 
a BIA test.127 The BIA Pilot Project led to a selection of draft proposals from 
DG Enterprise in the fields of detergents, electromagnetic compatibility, 
environmental impact of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and 
prepackaging, and concentrated on examining three major elements of the 
impact assessment process, namely external consultation, economic 
analysis and organisational structures.  
Figure 3 illustrates the essential structure and the critical steps of the 
BIA procedure. As shown in the figure, DG Enterprise ensured that a 
limited number of proposals included in the Annual Policy Strategy were 
scrutinised under the BIA procedure. If a proposal was found to exert a 
substantial impact on compliance costs, the sponsoring administration was 
required to draft a fiche d’impact. The fiche had a standard form, and was 
introduced with the aim of representing the likely impact of the proposal at 
hand on target firms. First, the fiche  illustrated the main reasons for 
intervention. Lead DGs were asked to explain the reasons for changing 
legislation currently in force (or to intervene ex novo in unregulated fields). 
The next step was the identification of businesses that would be affected by 
the proposed intervention, followed by a list of actions to be undertaken in 
order to comply with the changing regulatory environment. For each of 
these actions a cost estimate had to be provided, by specifying bureaucratic 
costs, taxes, monitoring and reporting costs and other compliance costs. 
                                                      
126 See section 1.2.1 above. 
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Figure 3. The BIA procedure
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The standard fiche d’impact also included an evaluation of the likely 
macroeconomic effects of the proposed regulation, which in turn 
incorporated the impact on employment and on the investments and 
competitiveness of target firms. Finally, the fiche  should devote specific 
attention to assessing the expected impact of the proposal on SMEs, in line 
with the established ‘think small first’ principle.128 While drafting the fiche, 
lead DGs were required to consult interested stakeholders. The final 
document contained a summary of the opinions expressed during the 
consultation process.  
The BIA system was subject to heavy criticism, mostly related to its 
incompleteness and uncertain institutional setting. Firstly, as was already 
mentioned, the BIA procedure did not imply the preliminary identification 
of a range of alternative regulatory options, and only entered the stage after 
the Commission had identified the preferred option in its yearly regulatory 
agenda. Secondly, the BIA only contained information on business 
compliance costs, without considering other cost categories or the social 
impact of the proposed regulation, often less easily quantifiable and rarely 
                                                      
128 The ‘think small first’ principle was included in the European Charter for Small 
Enterprises, as endorsed by the Heads of State or Government at the Santa Maria 
da Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000 (Annex III of the conclusions of the 
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subject to market exchange. Furthermore, the EU experience with BIA was 
characterised by the scant scientific soundness of the evaluations 
performed, which cast heavy doubts on the reliability of such instrument as 
a support to EU policy-makers.129 The absence of training initiatives for 
officials of the DGs in charge of BIA contributed further to generate a 
widespread sense of pessimism over the prospects for improving the 
quality of performed evaluations in the short run without changing the 
procedure completely.130  
For this reason, the Commission decided during the 1990s to add new 
tools and to launch new projects for the purpose of completing the 
evaluation of proposals carried out under the BIA system. Such initiatives 
include the SLIM project (Simplification of the Legislation on the Internal 
Market), aimed at strengthening the ex post assessment of the quality of 
regulation; the creation of the BEST (Business Environment Simplification 
Task Force) in 1997; and the creation of the Business Test Panel in 1998, 
with the aim of acting as a permanent body for consultation of firms 
affected by EU regulations.131  
Such a proliferation of initiatives, however, did not produce the 
desired outcome, and ended up creating an overly fragmented framework 
for EU impact assessment. This led the Commission to issue in 2001 a 
White Paper on European Governance and the Lisbon Council to mandate 
the creation of a high-level advisory group (the ‘Mandelkern Group’) for 
the drafting of an “action plan for better regulation” and the definition of a 
new model of impact assessment to be implemented at Community level. 
The Mandelkern Group was created to “set out by 2001 a strategy for 
further co-ordinated action to simplify the regulatory environment, 
                                                      
129 See the BIA Final Report, op. cit. 
130 Ibid., p. 23, stating the need for a ‘cultural change’, both within the institution 
and in its relationships with the public, through the implementation of a series of 
straightforward and common-sense adjustments, which are intended to be neither 
bureaucratic nor complicated to put in place. 
131 As regards the SLIM pilot project, see the Commission Communication of 6 
November 1996, COM(96)559 (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ 
simplification/docs/com1996-559/com1996-559_en.pdf – visited 5 December 2005). The 
subsequent Commission reports are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/simplification/index_en.htm#slim (visited 5 December 2005). For what 
concerns the BEST project, the Final Report, issued in May 1998, is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/best (visited 5 December 2005).  48 | ANDREA RENDA  
including the performance of public administration, at both national and 
Community level”, and after the Ministers for Public Administration from 
EU members states had signed the Strasbourg Resolution in November 
2000, mandating the advisory group to “develop a coherent approach to 
this topic and to submit proposals to the Ministers, including the definition 
of a common method of evaluating the quality of regulation.” 
Such model was expected to provide a more complete tool for 
assessing the social, economic and environmental impact of proposed 
regulations.132  
1.3.2 The 2001 White Paper and the Mandelkern Report 
The Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance clarified the 
Commission’s agenda for the establishment of new better regulation 
standards in the EU.133 The preparation of the White Paper was coordinated 
by the former ‘Governance team’ chaired by Jerome Vignon. The team 
organised 12 working groups dealing with six main working areas. 
Working Group 2c dealt with issues of better regulation and explored 
possible actions for improving the quality of regulation at EU level as well 
as the implementation of EU legislation at member state level. Better 
regulation was defined in terms of seven dimensions, namely 
proportionality, proximity, legal certainty, coherence, high standards, 
timeliness and enforceability. The need for action at member state level was 
stressed during the preparatory work for the White Paper, in stating that 
“action at Community level alone – and a fortiori by the Commission alone 
– is certain not to succeed”.134 Subsequent developments, unfortunately, 
confirmed such prophecy. 
                                                      
132 The Mandelkern Group was made up of representatives of the EU-15 and 
officials from the Commission’s Secretariat-General. An interim report was 
finalised at the end of February 2001 and considered by the Heads of State and 
Government at the Spring European Council in Stockholm. The Final Report (so-
called ‘Mandelkern Report’) was published in November 2001; the majority of 
recommendations were included in the Commission’s 2002 Better Regulation 
Action Plan. 
133 See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, 
COM(2001)727, 25 July 2001. 
134 See the Preparatory Work for the White Paper, European Commission, 2002, p. 
119 (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/ 
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According to Working Group 2c, BIA was an inadequate tool to 
appraise the expected impact of a regulation for a number of reasons. First, 
BIA was “only a questionnaire, without a proper process and without 
guidance”.135 This, according to the opinion expressed by the working 
group, could lead to significant differences in the quality of the analysis. 
Moreover, the questions were handled only at a late stage of the regulatory 
process, when political pressures are expected to be highest.  
Finally, BIA was found to be inappropriate since the analysis 
contained in the fiche  was presented separately from the tests of 
subsidiarity and proportionality and the sectoral provisions in the Treaty, 
leaving stakeholders and policy-makers unaware of the relationship 
between prospective costs arising from the proposal for businesses and 
expected benefits to consumers, the environment or SMEs. Accordingly, 
more sophisticated tools were needed in order to support policy-makers 
with clearer, more relevant and more comprehensive information on the 
prospective cost/benefit balance of regulatory proposals.136  
The preparatory report of the working group on evaluation and 
policy also recommended the use of cost-benefit analysis as the most 
complete and accurate methodology in the evaluation of proposed 
legislations.137 However, exact economic calculations were considered not 
to be the most important contributors to regulatory quality. Rather, the 
working group took a ‘lesson-drawing’ approach by stating that observing 
the international experience and undertaking contextualised benchmarking 
are the most important steps towards a compete understanding of the logic 
of decision-making. The working group also suggested that monitoring 
existing EU legislation was at least as important as evaluating the expected 
impact of new regulation.138  
The publication of the White Paper on European Governance was 
followed by a fierce debate and a period of frantic institutional tension. The 
European Parliament issued a resolution on governance in the wake of the 
‘Kaufmann Report’, in which it criticised the lack of cooperation between 
the Commission and the Parliament in defining the EU agenda for better 
                                                      
135 Ibid., p. 106. 
136 See e.g. J. Pelkmans, S. Labory and G. Majone,  op. cit. 
137 See Preparatory Work for the White Paper, op. cit., section 3.2.1, p. 91. 
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regulation.139 In other words, the Parliament complained that, after stating 
the need for cooperation at both horizontal (inter-institutional) and vertical 
(with member states) level, in fact the Commission was ‘playing solo’ on 
the reform of European governance. For such reason, the Parliament 
warned the Commission “against taking measures in the legislative sphere 
which might affect the roles of Parliament and the Council in the legislative 
process before Parliament has been fully consulted”.140 Instead, the 
resolution suggested the promotion of stronger inter-institutional dialogue 
on governance reform, and welcomed the establishment of an inter-
institutional working group announced by President Romano Prodi on 2 
October 2001.  
But the Parliament resolution contained other interesting comments 
on the Commission’s White Paper. In particular, the Parliament considered 
some of the plans formulated by the Commission in the White Paper as 
patently (and sometimes unnecessarily) ambitious. Instruments such as 
“online consultation through the inter-active policy-making initiative” 
(Section 3.1 of the White Paper) created, in the Parliament’s view, the “risk 
of an escalation in consultation” which would end up being incompatible 
with the Commission’s goal of “reducing the long delays associated with 
the adoption and implementation of Community rules”.141  
A few months after the publication of the White Paper on European 
Governance, the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation published its 
final report. The report specified some of the features of the prospective 
new RIA model, suggesting its adoption by the Commission before June 
2002 and its application to all Commission proposals with possible 
regulatory effects.142 The Mandelkern Group also recommended that the 
Council and the Parliament should not consider proposals that had not 
been subjected to the agreed impact assessment system, except in cases of 
                                                      
139 European Parliament, Report on the Commission White Paper on European 
Governance, A5-0399/2001, adopted by the European Parliament on 29 November 
2001 (OJ C 153E, 27 June 2002, pp. 314-322). 
140 Ibid., p. 8. 
141 Ibid., p. 8. 
142 Mandelkern Group, Final Report (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
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urgency.143 Furthermore, the Mandelkern Report highlighted the need for 
increased participation by member states at an early stage of preparation of 
proposals, as well as the need for each member state to adopt its own 
impact assessment system “adapted to their circumstances” by June 2003.  
As regards Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), the Mandelkern 
Report contained a set of recommendations for an effective implementation 
of such procedure. These included the following steps:144 
•  description of the problem or risk to be addressed;  
•  description of different options considered;  
•  listing of the affected parties and at least a qualitative assessment of 
impact on them;  
•  summary of the consultation process undertaken and of its results;  
•  estimation of the lifetime of the policy or options;  
•  description of the impact on SMEs or other disproportionately 
affected group;  
•  explanation of how the proposal fits with existing rules and policies; 
and 
•  description of the methodology adopted. 
The Mandelkern Group also recommended the adoption of a ‘dual 
stage’ RIA model, with a preliminary impact assessment devoted to the 
analysis of alternative regulatory options and an extended impact 
assessment in which the detailed assessment of the benefits and costs of the 
preferred regulatory option is performed.  
However, the Mandelkern Report did not contain any indication on 
the scope and comprehensiveness of the impact to be assessed. The 
recommendations following from the Final Report represented a fairly 
important input into the Commission’s new impact assessment model. But, 
as will be clearer in the next section, the Commission’s new Better 
Regulation Action Plan and the Communication on impact assessment, 
both issued in June 2002, went somehow further than what the high-level 
advisory group had envisaged.   
                                                      
143 On 30 September 2002, the Competitiveness Council stated its intention, in 
principle, not to consider substantial regulatory proposals that were not 
accompanied by proportionate impact assessments. 
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1.3.3 Away from RIA: Building the Integrated Impact Assessment  
At the European Council meetings of Göteborg and Laeken, the 
Commission announced its Action Plan for Better Regulation, launched in 
June 2002. The new impact assessment model was introduced as part of the 
wider Action Plan, together with a communication aimed at simplifying 
and improving the regulatory environment and measures aimed at 
promoting “a culture of dialogue and participation” within the EU 
legislative process (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1. Elements of the Action Plan for Better Regulation 
During 2002 and early in 2003, the Commission developed its Action Plan 
through eight targeted Communications, at the same time defining with the 
European Parliament and the Council an overall strategy on better law-making. 
The Communications addressed the following issues: 
1) General principles and minimum standards for consultation (COM(2002)704); 
2) Collection and use of expertise (COM(2002) 713); 
3) Impact assessment (COM(2002) 276), including internal Guidelines; 
4) Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278); 
5) Proposal for a new comitology decision (COM(2002) 719); 
6) Operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies (COM(2002) 
718); 
7) Framework for target-based tripartite contracts (COM(2002) 709); and 
8) Better monitoring of the application of community law (COM(2002) 725). 
 
The Communication on impact assessment was inspired partially 
from the activity of the Mandelkern Group, but also from the commitment 
undertaken by the Commission at the Göteborg Council, to develop a tool 
for sustainable impact assessment.145 As a result, the Commission decided 
to integrate all forms of ex ante evaluation by building an integrated impact 
assessment model, to enter into force on 1 January 2003.146 Such model 
                                                      
145 See Communication COM(2002)276, p. 2. See also the Communication from the 
Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Global Partnership for 
Sustainable Development, COM(2002)82, 12 February 2002.  
146 “Impact assessment is intended to integrate, reinforce, streamline and replace all 
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bears the heavy responsibility of ensuring that adequate account is taken at 
an early stage of the regulatory process of both the competitiveness and 
sustainable development goals, which rank amongst the top priorities in 
the EU agenda.  
The new integrated impact assessment (IIA) model introduced in 
2002 – which incorporates not only the economic impact, but also the social 
and environmental impact of the proposals concerned  – adopts a ‘dual 
stage’ approach. All Commission initiatives proposed for inclusion in the 
Annual Policy Strategy or the Commission Legislative and Work 
Programme and requiring some regulatory measure for their 
implementation – thus including not only regulations and directives, but 
also white papers, expenditure programmes and negotiating guidelines for 
the international agreements – must undergo a ‘preliminary impact 
assessment’.147 Moreover, a selected number of proposals with large 
expected impact, are subjected to a more in-depth analysis called ‘extended 
impact assessment’.  
The selection of proposals for extended impact assessment forms part 
of the Commission programming and planning cycle. On the basis of the 
preliminary impact assessment statement, the Commission decides in the 
Annual Policy Strategy or (later) in its annual Legislative and Work 
Programme which proposals should undergo an extended impact 
assessment. In making this decision, it takes into account whether the 
proposal will result in substantial economic, environmental and/or social 
impacts on a specific sector or several sectors; whether the proposal will 
have a significant impact on major interested parties; and whether the 
proposal represents a major policy reform in one or several sectors. 
                                                                                                                                       
See the Commission’s Communication on impact assessment, COM(2002) 276, 5 
June 2002, section 1.3.  
147 Proposals that are exempted from impact assessment include: i) green papers 
where the policy formulation is still in process; ii) periodic Commission decisions 
and reports; iii) proposals following international obligations; iv)  executive 
decisions, such as “implementing decisions, statutory decisions and technical 
updates, including adaptations to technical progress”; and v) Commission 
measures deriving from its powers of controlling the correct implementation of 
Community Law (although the Commission may in some instances decide to carry 
out an impact assessment). See Communication on impact assessment, COM(2002) 
276, 5 June 2002, section 2 (“Coverage”). 54 | ANDREA RENDA  
The preliminary impact assessment consists of a short statement 
containing an identification of the issue at stake, the regulatory options 
available (including the ‘zero option’ or ‘no policy change’ scenario), 
preliminary indications on the expecte d  i m p a c t  a n d  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  
whether an extended impact assessment would be needed. There is no clear 
identification of the policy option to be preferred, but only a specification of 
the options that should be excluded at the preliminary stage, taking into 
account also the subsidiarity and the proportionality principle. Overall, the 
outline for preliminary impact assessment does not seem to be particularly 
informative.  
The extended impact assessment (ExIA) contains an in-depth 
evaluation of the expected social, economic and environmental impact of 
the various policy options associated with the proposal and a summary of 
the consultation activity, which should also focus on political and ethical 
issues related to the proposal. The Commission also specified that the 
expected impact should be estimated in qualitative, quantitative and 
possibly monetary terms. The alternative policy options are to be evaluated 
according to criteria such as the relevance to the problem, the effectiveness 
in achieving the objectives, the coherence with wider economic, social and 
environmental objectives, the interaction with other existing and planned 
Community interventions, the cost or resources required and the user-
friendliness of the regulatory option at hand. 
More in detail, the Commission provides a description of what is 
meant by economic, social and environmental impact: 
  The economic impact includes both the macro- and micro-economic 
impact of the selected option, mostly in terms of economic growth 
and competitiveness, i.e. changes in compliance costs, including 
administrative burdens to businesses/SMEs and implementation 
costs for public authorities, impacts on the potential for innovation 
and technological development, changes in investment, market 
shares and trade patterns as well as increases or decreases in 
consumer prices, etc. 
  The  social i m p a c t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o n  h u m a n  
capital, on fundamental/human rights, the compatibility of the 
proposal with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, but also prospective changes in employment levels or job 
quality, changes affecting gender equality, social exclusion and 
poverty, impacts on health, safety, consumer rights, social capital, 
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culture, as well as distributional implications such as effects on the 
income of particular sectors, groups of consumers or workers, etc. 
  The environmental dimension concerns positive and negative impacts 
associated with the changing status of the environment such as 
climate change, air, water and soil pollution, land-use change and 
bio-diversity loss, changes in public health, etc. 
As clearly emerges from these definitions, the IIA model proposed by 
the Commission appears as a complex exercise, aimed at predicting all 
possible consequences of the enactment of a new regulation, with 
evaluations that – whether qualitative or quantitative – will certainly be 
costly, burdensome, highly discretionary and time-consuming for 
administrations. Furthermore, the often denounced lack of training for EU 
public officials, which led to obscure and unreliable assessments at a time 
when the BIA was the prevailing impact assessment tool, will certainly 
create far greater problems with entry into force of such a new procedure, 
whose complexity goes probably beyond that of any other impact 
assessment model implemented worldwide. It must be recalled that the 
Commission decided to introduce the new procedure gradually, and 
expected to reach the planned complexity and comprehensiveness only in 
2004. Moreover, in September 2002, the Commission published its 
guidelines for the implementation of an impact assessment procedure.   
The new IIA model introduced by the Commission in 2002 is 
illustrated in Figure 4. As emerges from the diagram, the new procedure 
permeates the whole Commission’s Strategic Planning and Programming 
Cycle (SPPC), from the definition of the Annual Policy Strategy (APS) to 
the publication of the Commission’s Work Programme (CWP) that leads to 
inter-service consultation before selected initiatives are undertaken and 
pursued. Preliminary IAs can be included in the APS, but must be 
completed at the latest before the publication of the CWP. The availability 
of an extended IA (for proposals that have been selected for it) is a 
necessary precondition for launching inter-service consultation at the 
beginning of the year in which the regulation will be issued. The ExIA 
report is then attached to the proposal when it is submitted to the 
Commission for final adoption and is adopted as a working document of 
the services. After adoption, the ExIA is sent to the other institutions along 
with the proposals and made available on the web.   56 | ANDREA RENDA  
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2.  Putting EU Integrated Impact 
Assessment into Practice  
At first blush, the new integrated impact assessment model appeared to 
adequately take into account the main lessons drawn from international 
best practices in regulatory impact assessment, in particular from the UK 
and US experiences described in the previous sections. From a theoretical 
standpoint, the new EU model seems more complete and effective than its 
UK and US counterparts, since it integrates the features of regulatory 
impact assessment, sustainable impact assessment and other types of ex 
ante policy evaluation. However, the procedure appeared from the very 
beginning as being overly complex and likely to generate excessive 
administrative and transaction costs, given, inter alia, the need to 
coordinate the activity of many directorates-general and the General 
Secretariat; the uncertain boundaries of consultation; the absence of clear 
guidelines on the implementation of the proportionality principle; and 
many other sources of uncertainty for administrations, which in turn still 
lacked sufficient training and expertise. As a matter of fact, no major effort 
has been actually made in this respect, notwithstanding the resounding 
appeals by the Parliament and the Council in the Kaufmann and the 
Mandelkern Reports.  
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that a number of 
difficulties have emerged during the first two years of implementation, 
ranging from organisational problems (institutional conflict of 
competencies, excessive transaction costs, principal-agent incentive issues, 
asymmetric information on the side of EU regulators, exposure to third-
party capture of EU regulators) to theoretical problems (insufficient 
proportionality, lack of flexibility, limited consultation, insufficient training 
of the Commission’s employees, slow cultural change within EU 
institutions in charge of carrying out RIA); and methodological problems 
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choosing the inter-temporal discount rate, incomplete cost-benefit analysis, 
failure to quantify costs and/or benefits, etc.). 
This sensation was confirmed by available data on the procedure’s 
first trial year. In its Work Programme for 2003, the Commission had 
planned to have 43 extended RIAs completed by the end of the year, 
representing roughly 20% of the Commission’s total number of initiatives 
subject to RIA under the new model. However, only 22 of the foreseen 43 
Impact Assessment procedures were completed in 2003. The low 
implementation rate was at once cause and effect of a number of teething 
problems, which the Commission is now trying to tackle. First, the 
assessment of the environmental and social impacts of the proposals needs 
to be fully developed. Secondly, extended impact assessments should 
include a more thorough discussion of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, in particular of the respective merit of different regulatory 
approaches. Thirdly, analyses tend to focus on one policy option. Policy 
alternatives should be examined more thoroughly. Fourthly, there has been 
so far limited quantification, let alone monetisation, of the impacts. Fifthly, 
efforts should be undertaken to make RIAs more accessible to the general 
public. Sixthly, the application of this new model seems to have imposed 
quite a heavy burden on EU administrations, increasing the cost of many 
regulations. Finally, and most importantly, the new RIA model does not 
apply to regulations upheld by individual member states. Initiatives aimed 
at facilitating the convergence/coordination of national impact assessment 
procedures may therefore be highly advisable in order to improve the 
regulatory process and foster both competitiveness and sustainable 
development.148  
Similar conclusions were drawn by the Commission in the progress 
report on the implementation of the new IIA model, published on 21 
October 2004.149 The Commission highlighted that the principle of 
proportionality had not been adequately implemented, leading to overly 
burdensome procedures. According to the Commission, “[w]hile initial 
                                                      
148 See also N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, A Pilot Study of the Quality of European 
Commission Extended Impact Assessments, IARC Working Paper Series No. 8, Impact 
Assessment Research Centre, University of Manchester, 2004 (available at 
http://idpm.man.ac.uk/iarc/Reports/IARCWP8.DOC.pdf). 
149 See European Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment: Next Steps - 
in Support of Competitiveness and Sustainable Development, SEC(2004)1377, Brussels 
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experience shows that the methodology used is sound, there needs to be a 
more systematic application of the current methodology across 
Commission services. When applied correctly, the current method 
addresses many of the points raised by Council and Parliament as needing 
more emphasis, including coverage of impacts in all three dimensions – 
economic, environmental and social. The Commission notes, however, that 
the generalised use of Impact Assessments cannot be considered neutral 
either from the point of view of resource allocations or as regards the 
programming cycle of the EU’s legislative process. The complexity of a 
sizable number of Impact Assessments is therefore likely to require longer 
preparatory phases before their approval.”150 
Furthermore, scholars that have undertaken a tentative assessment of 
the first IIAs undertaken by European Commission DGs have reported 
quite puzzling results. For example, Lee and Kirkpatrick scrutinised the 
first six ExIAs completed by the Commission in 2003, reporting a number 
of weaknesses and an overall heterogeneity in the quality of the assessment 
performed. Methodological weaknesses included an unclear description of 
the problem, obscure ranking of the objectives, a relatively narrow range of 
alternative policy options considered, an unbalanced coverage of different 
types of impact (e.g. economic, social, environmental), unreliable 
assessment findings, deficiencies in the presentation of report findings, 
insufficient time and resources available to complete a sufficiently detailed 
analysis, lack of transparency in the process and inadequate arrangements 
for external consultation.151  
Similarly, Vibert (2004) analysed the first 20 Extended IAs performed 
by the Commission, by applying a scorecard approach similar to that 
developed by Robert Hahn of the AEI/Brookings Center for Regulatory 
Studies in the US.152 The results are quite disappointing: out of 20 Extended 
                                                      
150 Ibid., p. 4. 
151 See Lee and Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 27.  
152 F. Vibert, The EU’s New System of Regulatory Impact Assessment – A Scorecard, 
European Policy Forum, London, 2004. See also Robert W. Hahn and Patrick M. 
Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, Working Paper 
No. 04-01, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C., 
January 2004; and, for a recent comparison of scorecards for US and EU, Robert W. 
Hahn and Robert E. Litan, “Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for 
the U.S. and Europe”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, pp. 
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IAs, only 10 quantified (and only 9 monetised) costs and benefits, only 11 
carried data on market alternatives and only 2 contained a provision for 
peer review. Finally, all 20 proposal subjected to IA were finally approved, 
and 10 were re-designed as a consequence of the results obtained in the IIA 
process. The author concluded that the EU IIA model deserves a positive 
initial evaluation, in particular because it added a lesson-learning 
dimension to the formulation of the Commission’s legislative initiatives. 
However, it must be noted that the unreliability and heterogeneity of the 
cost-benefit analysis severely undermines the actual contribution that the 
new procedure can provide to EU competitiveness and sustainable 
development in the medium range.  
Other scorecards are provided by two recent studies. Opoku and 
Jordan (2004) analyse all of the 41 ExIAs completed by lead DGs in 2003 
and 2004, by focusing in particular on the consideration of the external 
dimension and on the detailed scoring of a more limited set of ExIAs, 
related to the sugar regime, the tobacco regime, the REACH Directive, the 
Kyoto Protocol, the ‘Youth in Action’ programme and the ‘Lifelong 
learning’ programme. They conclude that a number of measures would be 
required to improve the consideration of the external dimension in ExIAs. 
These include “updating the guidelines with more explicit instructions to 
consider the external dimension in all sections of the IA; the clarification of 
which aspects of the guidelines are mandatory and which are discretionary; 
the allocation of resources for undertaking the IAs; the clear application of 
selection criteria for choosing policy proposals to undergo an extended IA; 
and also the thorough consultation of all interested parties including DGs 
and outside actors (especially NGOs).”153 
Lussis (2004) applies a check-list model for the purpose of comparing 
13 ExIAs completed between 2003 and 2004. He finds that “most of the 
ExIA define policy alternatives and assess them. However, there is 
obviously a ‘methodological hole’ in the areas of impact identification, 
                                                      
153 See C. Opoku and A. Jordan, “Impact Assessment in the EU: A Global 
Sustainable Development Perspective”, paper presented at the Berlin Conference 
on the Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change, 3-4 December 2004 
(available at http://www.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2004/download/opoku_jordan_f.pdf 
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prediction and assessment. In addition, ... most ExIAs do not bring up a 
clear comparison of the alternatives regarding the impact assessment.”154 
An updated scorecard of the extended impact assessments completed 
by the Commission as of June 2005 is illustrated in the next section, 
showing – if possible – even more worrying results. 
2.1  How good is the Commission at impact assessment? An updated 
scorecard  
As of June 2005, the European Commission reported to have completed 70 
Extended Impact Assessments of major proposed initiatives. Fifteen ExIAs 
concerned proposed Directives, 14 addressed new Regulations, 22 assessed 
the impact of new Commission Communications and 19 ExIAs concerned 
the impact of proposed Commission Decisions.155 22 ExIAs were completed 
in 2003, 27 in 2004 and 22 in the first six months of 2005. The number of 
ExIAs completed led the Commission to highlight an increase in the 
coverage of impact assessment on Commission initiatives in 2004 and 2005. 
However, this is only partly true, as the analysis performed in this paper 
confirms. As a matter of fact, out of the 22 new ExIAs completed in the first 
six months of 2005, only 7 are true ExIAs, whereas 13 documents are short, 
preliminary IAs with neither quantitative nor qualitative estimates of costs 
and benefits. Two other documents are not qualified as ExIAs, and can be 
defined as background papers. As confirmed by the present analysis, the 
increase in the number of ExIAs is only apparent; instead, a marked 
decrease in the quality and comprehensiveness of assessment has occurred 
over time, as well as a reduced usefulness of reported results as a support 
for Brussels policy-makers.  
                                                      
154 See B. Lussis, EU Extended Impact Assessment Review, Institut pour un 
Développement Durable Working Paper, 9 December 2004 (available at 
http://users.skynet.be/idd/documents/EIDDD/WP01.pdf – visited 5 December 2005).   
155 The list of ExIAs completed is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
secretariat_general/impact/practice.htm and below, in Appendix A. Of the 71 listed 
ExIAs, one (SEC(2004)924) is listed twice, as it served as the basis for both the 
Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund 
(COM(2004)492) and for the Regulation on the European Social Fund, 
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Such preliminary findings called for further investigation on the 
quality of Commission’s ExIAs in the 2003-05 period. One useful and 
widely acknowledged way to measure the quality of performed IAs is to 
use a scorecard. The scorecard approach to impact assessment was 
successfully introduced by Robert Hahn, showing puzzling evidence on the 
quality of impact assessment conducted by federal agencies and the OMB 
in the US. In order to preserve the homogeneity of results while at the same 
time accounting for the EU model of impact assessment, most of the 
scorecard items listed by Hahn and Dudley156 are maintained here: 
however, the model used for the purposes of this paper included a number 
of additional scorecard items, which refer to the peculiar features of the 
Commission’s IIA model and the milestones of the Commission’s Better 
Regulation Action plan (e.g. competitiveness, proportionality, subsidiarity, 
consistency with the acquis, use of soft law, self- and co-regulation, etc.).157  
The next section presents the main finding of my scorecard analysis, 
with a caveat. Scorecards are currently subject to a heated debate in the US, 
as some commentators argued that such tools can hardly provide a reliable 
picture of the overall quality of the impact assessment exercise. 
Nonetheless, as recently recalled by Robert Hahn, probably the ‘guru of 
scorecardists’, the use of scorecards has proven quite useful in detecting 
significant flaws in the methodology used by sponsoring administrations as 
well as in indicating new paths for research and possible options to 
improve the quality of the assessment exercise.158 In the  n ex t pages, t h e  
scorecard approach will be used for a major purpose, which is to assess 
whether the quality of various DGs’ impact assessments supports the 
emphasis currently being place on the IIA model as a shortcut on the road 
to Lisbon.  
2.1.1 Overall results of the scorecard 
The results of the scorecard analysis of the first 70 ExIAs completed by 
Commission DGs are worrying in a number of respects. First, the problems 
highlighted by Lee and Kirkpatrick in their pilot study of the first 6 ExIAs 
completed by the Commission seem not to have been solved in subsequent 
                                                      
156 Hahn and Dudley,  op. cit. 
157 A list of scorecard items is reported in Appendix B. 
158 See R.W. Hahn, In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 2005. Box 2 below provides a more detailed 
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years.159 Secondly, the end of the trial phase in 2004 has not marked any 
encouraging change in the quality of performed ExIAs. Thirdly, the 
methodology used appears far from sound, and the level of detail in the 
assessment is even decreasing over time. Fourthly, the presentation of 
results is seldom clear and almost never comprehensive, which jeopardises 
the usefulness of the overall analysis. Finally, some of the Commission’s 
top priorities, such as reducing administrative burdens, ensuring 
consistency with the acquis communautaire, and exploring alternative 
methods of regulation, are almost never accounted for by lead DGs.  
A more detailed analysis of the scorecard results reveals that: 
  Costs are seldom estimated. Of the 70 ExIAs, only 28 (40%) 
quantified at least some costs and 19 (27.1%) monetised all or nearly 
all costs arising from the proposal. Of the latter, 13 ExIAs provided a 
best estimate of total costs and 9 specified a range for total cost of the 
proposal.  
  Costs for businesses are almost never quantified. Only in 10 cases 
(14.3% of the total) were compliance costs or other costs for 
businesses from entry into force of a new regulation assessed. Even 
the impact of the proposal on EU administration costs was rarely 
estimated (in 16 cases or 22.9%).  
  Benefits are rarely quantified. Although 95.7% of the ExIAs specify 
that the proposal will yield some benefits, 37.1% of ExIAs provide a 
quantification of some of the expected benefits, and in only 20 ExIAs 
(28.6% of the total) are some of the benefits monetised. A closer look 
reveals that only 10 ExIAs contain a quantification of all or nearly all 
benefits of the proposed initiative, a striking 14.3% of total ExIAs.  
  Specific benefits are not identified. Out of 70 ExIAs, only 3 contain a 
monetisation of safety benefits, whereas the DG monetised health 
benefits in only 2 cases. Pollution reduction benefits were monetised 
in 4 cases.  
  Costs and benefits are almost never compared. The net benefits of 
the proposed initiative were calculated in 12 ExIAs (17.1% of the 
total), only 3 of which specify a range for expected benefits. 
Moreover, the cost-effectiveness of the proposal was assessed in as 
few as 6 cases (8.6%), 5 of which include a point estimate of cost-
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effectiveness. This also implies that in 74.3% of the cases the ExIA 
exercise does not result in a real comparison of costs and benefits 
arising from the proposal. 
  Alternatives are seldom compared. Most ExIAs perform an 
assessment of the impacts after the preferred regulatory option has 
been identified. As a result, even if alternative regulatory options 
were identified in 84.3% of ExIAs, only in 17.1% of the ExIAs were 
the costs of each alternative quantified, and only in 15.7% were costs 
monetised. Similarly, benefits were quantified only in 14.3% and 
monetized in 8.6% of the observed ExIAs.  
  The methodology used is overly simplified in most cases. As an 
example, a discount rate for assessing the net present value of future 
costs and benefits was specified in only 2 cases (2.9% of the total). In 
both cases, the discount rate diverged from the 4% suggested by the 
Commission in its guidelines. In the report commissioned to BIPE for 
the ExIA of the Commission Communication on digital switchover, 
completed in September 2003, the chosen discount rate was 5%, 
whereas in the ExIA of the REACH Directive (issued in October 2003) 
the discount rate chosen by the lead DG was 3%.160 Furthermore, in 
only one case was the value of saved life-years calculated. Finally, a 
sensitivity test was carried out only in 4 ExIAs (5.7%).  
  The presentation of results is often obscure. Only 10 ExIAs contain 
an Executive Summary, and only in one case does the Executive 
Summary contain monetised costs, whereas in two cases it reports 
monetised benefits. Even if one ignores the problem of monetisation, 
only one ExIA includes an ES that reports non-quantified costs. 
Moreover, in a few cases the quality of the presentation is 
undoubtedly low – for example, some ExIAs are written half in 
English and half in French, while others don’t include a table of 
contents or selected references.161 The transparency and accessibility 
of the IA results are not facilitated by such features.  
                                                      
160 The two ExIAs in which a discount rate was used are the Communication on the 
transition from analogue broadcasting to digital broadcasting: Digital switchover 
in Europe (SEC(2003)992) and the Framework Legislation on Chemical Substances 
(establishing REACH) (SEC(2003)1171). 
161 See the ExIAs on the Decision Establishing the Culture 2007 Programme (2007-
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  Environmental and social impacts are not always assessed. Let 
alone the quantification of impacts, it emerges that the environmental 
impact of proposed regulations was considered in only 64.3% of the 
cases, while the social impact was accounted for in 81.4% of ExIAs.  
  Administrative burdens are not an issue in most ExIAs. Only in 17 
ExIAs (24.3%) were administrative burdens resulting from the 
proposal somehow assessed. This calls for further efforts in 
promoting the cost-awareness of administration on the burden of 
regulations.  
  Subsidiarity and proportionality are not always taken into due 
account. Of the 70 ExIAs observed, 44 considered subsidiarity issues 
and 40 took into due account the principle of proportionality. This 
finding is in line with the Commission’s statement that the 
proportionality principle should be further integrated in DG’s ex ante 
assessments.162  
  Competitiveness-proofing is not performed in most ExIAs. The goal 
of boosting competitiveness and achieving the Lisbon goals is 
becoming increasingly crucial in EU impact assessment. So far, the 
completed ExIAs do not appear to have taken competitiveness into 
due consideration. Only 15 extended assessments (21.4%) carry some 
form of competitiveness-proofing.  
  Soft law, self- and co-regulation are rarely included in alternative 
options.  In spite of the Commission’s increased focus on ‘de-
ossifying’ EU regulation, as few as 8 ExIAs consider some form of soft 
law amongst the alternative options. Likewise, in 6 cases the lead DG 
considered co-regulation and in 5 cases self-regulation was 
considered to be a possible alternative, whether or not such option 
was eventually endorsed.  
  Not all DGs are created equal. There seems to be prima facie evidence 
that some of the DGs that led the impact assessment process are 
better equipped than others for undertaking such task. Examples of 
DGs that have performed their tasks rather well are DG Information 
Society, DG Enterprise, DG Research, DG Sanco, DG Education and 
Culture and DG Agriculture, with mixed results for DG 
Environment, DG Energy and Transport and DG Internal Market. 
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Other DGs – such as JAI, JLS, REGIO and TAXUD – seem to lag 
behind in terms of expertise in carrying out a complete evaluation.  
  The timing of consultation can be improved. The good news is that 
almost all ExIAs (94.3%) report some form of consultation. However, 
in some cases consultation took place when the Commission had 
already identified the relevant option, and did not lead to major 
changes. Only in roughly half of the ExIAs did the results of the 
consultation seem to have contributed to the choice of the regulatory 
option and/or to major changes in the crafting of the final proposal.  
In summary, there seems to be a stark contrast between the 
Commission’s increased emphasis on impact assessment and the quality of 
assessments performed so far by Commission DGs. The grey picture gets 
even darker, in many respects, if one observes the scorecard for ExIAs in its 
evolution over time.  
2.1.2 Has the quality of ExIAs increased over time? 
When the IIA was introduced, the Commission specified that the procedure 
would be subject to a trial period until the end of 2004, and that it expected 
ExIAs to be less comprehensive and complete during the trial period. 
Accordingly, one would expect to observe an increased quality of ExIAs 
over time. The scorecard analysis performed in the present work, however, 
suggests that things went differently.  
Figure 5 shows the results of the analysis for the major scorecard 
items related to cost assessment. As clearly emerges from the figure, the 
percentage of ExIAs in which the lead DG has quantified/monetised costs 
decreased from 42.9% in 2003 to 36.4% in 2005. But the percentage of ExIAs 
that actually monetised all or nearly all costs was much smaller, accounting 
for 28.6% in 2003, to 33.3% in 2004 and as low as 18.6% in 2005. 
Accordingly, the share of ExIAs that provided either a best estimate or a 
range for total costs climbed from 33.3% to 37% from 2003 to 2004, but then 
fell to 22.7% in 2005. 
Similar results emerge from the analysis of data on benefit 
assessment. As reported in Figure 6, while in 2003, 57.1% of ExIAs 
quantified at least some of the benefits arising from the proposed initiative, 
the percentage fell to 33.3% in 2004 and to 22.7% in 2005. Similarly, the 
percentage of ExIAs that monetised at least some of the expected benefits 
fell from 47.6% in 2005 to 18.2% in 2005. Interestingly, only one ExIA 
monetised all or nearly all benefits in 2005.  IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 67 
 
Figure 5. Quality of ExIAs in 2003, 2004 and 2005: Selected scorecard items on 
cost assessment 
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Figure 6. Quality of ExIAs in 2003, 2004 and 2005: Selected scorecard items on 
benefit assessment 
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Moreover, very few ExIAs took account of health and safety benefits 
of the proposals, even though many assessed proposals had some form of 
environmental or health-related impact. Finally, not more than 19% of 
ExIAs calculated either a best estimate or a range for total benefits in 2003, 68 | ANDREA RENDA  
but this percentage fell dramatically in 2005, with only one ExIA carrying 
such a useful calculation.  
Moreover, Figure 7 shows similar decreases in the accuracy of 
estimates as regards four scorecard items related to overall impact 
assessment and analysis of alternative policy options. Here again, the 
percentage of ExIAs in which the lead DG calculated either the net benefits 
or the cost-effectiveness of the chosen option decreased from 28.6% in 2003 
and 33.3% in 2004 to 9.1% in 2005. Similarly, in the first six months of 2005, 
only 4.5% of ExIAs compared the cost of selected alternative policy options 
in quantitative terms, and no ExIA carried a quantitative comparison of the 
benefits of selected alternative options in the same period. On the contrary, 
such a quantitative exercise was carried out in 23.8% (costs) and 33.3% 
(benefits) of ExIAs in 2003, and in 22.2% (costs) and 11.1% (benefits) of 
ExIAs in 2004. As a result, if in 2003 lead DGs calculated either the net 
benefits or the cost-effectiveness of alternatives for 28.6% of the proposals 
subject to ExIAs, in 2004 the corresponding figure fell to 22.2% and in the 
first semester of 2005 – interestingly enough – no ExIA carried an 
assessment of net benefits or cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory 
options whatsoever.  
Figure 7. Quality of ExIAs in 2003, 2004 and 2005: Selected items on overall 
impact assessment 
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Finally, it is useful to assess whether the ExIAs performed by the 
Commission’s DGs in 2003-05 adequately mirror the peculiar features of 
the IIA model as well as the top priorities indicated by the Commission for 
boosting competitiveness and sustainable development through the quality 
of EU legislation. Figure 8, thus, compares the ExIAs performed by 
Commission DGs in 2003-05 by reporting the percentage of assessments 
that carried some mention of the environmental and the social impact of 
the proposal, as well as the principles of competitiveness, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.   
Figure 8. Quality of ExIAs in 2003, 2004 and 2005: Selected items on 
comprehensiveness of assessment 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
competitiveness
proofing
environmental
impact assessed
social impact
assessed
administrative
burdens assessed
Considered
subsidiarity
Considered
proportionality
Scorecard item
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
2003
2004
2005
 As emerges from Figure 8, the consistency of the proposal with the goal of 
competitiveness was tackled only in a few cases in the whole period 
observed, more precisely in 23.8% of ExIAs in 2003, in 18.5% in 2004 and in 
22.7% of the 2005 assessments. And, while social implications of the 
proposed initiatives were assessed in roughly 80% of all ExIAs in all the 
three years observed, environmental issues have been gradually discarded 
by lead DGs, falling from 81% of all ExIAs in 2003, to 59.3% in 2004 and 
54.5% in 2005. Finally, subsidiarity and proportionality were accounted for 
in most of ExIAs in 2003 and 2004, but were addressed in only 45.5% 
(subsidiarity) and 36.4% (proportionality) of the cases in the ExIAs 
completed in the first six months of 2005.  70 | ANDREA RENDA  
In summary, and interestingly enough, evidence reveals that the 
quality of Extended Impact Assessments performed by the Commission 
during the first years of implementation of the new IIA model has been 
constantly and remarkably declining. At first blush, it would seem at least 
hazardous to detect, in the performed assessments, the virtuous potential 
that would transform ex ante impact assessment into that powerful tool that 
the EU would need to reach Lisbon on the wings of better regulation. Put 
differently, the current implementation of the IIA model seems hardly 
geared towards contributing to the efficiency, effectiveness and overall 
quality of EU legislation.  
Efforts towards improving the current IIA model, with specific 
emphasis on its procedural dimension, have been recently undertaken both 
by the European Parliament and the Council. Moreover, the Commission 
itself seems to have realised that the results of the first experimental phase 
are more disappointing than they prima facie appear, and issued a new 
Communication on better regulation and impact assessment as well as new 
guidelines on how to carry out a methodologically sound IA in the first six 
months of 2005. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the proposals put forward by 
other EU institutions and the new Commission Communication, 
respectively. Chapter 3 explores possible ways in which the current 
implementation of the IIA model can be improved by the Commission over 
the next few years. 
2.2  Strengthening inter-institutional dialogue: Towards a new 
European Impact Assessment? 
As recalled earlier in this report, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Commission White Paper on European Governance, the European 
Parliament complained about the lack of inter-institutional cooperation 
between the Commission and other EU institutions on the issue of better 
regulation and in particular impact assessment.163 After the Council 
meetings held in Seville in 21-22 June 2002 and in Brussels on 20-21 March 
2003, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council decided to 
undertake a number of joint initiatives to improve the quality of law-
making at EU and member state level, and issued an Inter-institutional 
Agreement on better law-making which also covers the issue of impact 
assessment as a tool to improve the quality of legislation.164 The Agreement 
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clearly states that a more frequent use of impact assessments (both ex ante 
and ex post) will help ensure that EU legislation is of good quality, meaning 
that it is “clear, simple and effective”.165 The Agreement also specifies that 
the Commission will continue to take the lead on the development of the 
integrated impact assessment model, and the results will have to be made 
fully available to the Parliament, the Council and the general public. It also 
points out that whenever the co-decision procedure applies, the Parliament 
and the Council “may, on the basis of jointly defined criteria and 
procedures, have impact assessments carried out prior to the adoption of 
any substantive amendment, either at first reading or at the conciliation 
stage”. In view of such an overlap of impact assessment procedures, the 
three institutions agreed to carry out an assessment of their respective 
experiences and to consider the “possibility of establishing a common 
methodology”.166  
The Interinstitutional Agreement, however, was followed by a 
number of stand-alone initiatives by the three institutions. The Parliament 
was particularly active in the monitoring and evaluation of the currently 
enacted impact assessment model. Of particular interest is the so-called 
‘Doorn motion’ – from the name of Rapporteur Bert Doorn – that resulted 
in the Parliament Resolution on the “Assessment of the impact of 
Community legislation and the consultation procedure”.167 The Doorn 
motion proposes substantial changes in the Commission’s impact 
assessment model, in view of the creation of what is defined as a European 
Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure. The main features of the EIA are as 
follows: 
  The Commission, the Parliament and the Council adopt the same 
standards for impact assessment. 
  Any proposal by the Commission will be subjected to a global cost 
estimate. 
  The global cost estimate is performed by the official responsible in 
consultation with an audit reporting directly to the President of the 
Commission, which is also in charge of monitoring the cost estimate. 
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  The Parliament and the Council accept from the Commission only 
proposals accompanied by a cost estimate and an impact assessment. 
  The Commission, the Council and the Parliament must lay down a 
cost threshold above which an Extended IA must be carried out. 
  Not only the Commission proposal, but also all amendments by the 
Parliament and the Council that exceed the cost threshold must 
undergo an extended impact assessment. 
  In order to implement such a new procedure: a) the Parliament will set 
up an audit “with whatever reasonable means [it] has at its disposal”; 
and b) the Council will set up an audit in the Council Secretariat. 
Thus, the Doorn motion calls for the establishment of a common 
procedure in which three parallel audits are created for the joint 
implementation of the European Impact Assessment model by the three 
institutions, following commonly agreed criteria. No doubt, the 
implementation of such procedure would entail a major departure from the 
Commission’s integrated impact assessment model as set out in 2002. And 
it is hardly questionable that the implementation of the new EIA procedure 
would create the world’s most complex and sophisticated model of ex ante 
evaluation of proposed regulations. The EIA would at once present an 
unmatched comprehensiveness, incorporating the assessment of the 
economic, social and environmental impact of proposed regulations and 
proposed amendments, and a three-tiered audit system with enhanced 
inter-institutional competition. Prima facie, the model would also draw 
valuable lessons from the US and the UK experience – most notably, the 
introduction of a cost threshold for extended impact assessment and the 
appointment of ad hoc independent audits reporting directly to the General 
Secretariat of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council Secretariat. 
Finally, the proposed EIA model would encourage the submission of far-
reaching amendments to Commission proposals, thus strengthening the 
collaborative dimension of Community legislation.  
However, the Doorn model also elicits substantial concerns. First, the 
proposed EIA model does not seem to provide an encouraging contribution 
to the goal of cutting red tape and reducing administration costs. The 
proposed procedure is likely to appear at least cumbersome and risks 
substantially slowing down the approval of new regulations. Secondly, the 
administrative burden of the proposed EIA model is likely to be quite 
heavy: the procedure actually adds at least one procedural step (the initial 
cost assessment) plus all cost assessments, preliminary impact assessment 
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proponent institution in case of major amendments. Thirdly, the EIA model 
would be significantly more costly than the (already quite burdensome) IIA 
model adopted by the Commission. At a minimum, three new, dedicated 
structures (the audits) would have to be created, and in some cases external 
expertise would be required in order to complete the Extended Impact 
Assessment of proposals exceeding the cost threshold, Fourthly, the cost-
savings potential of the proposed cost threshold is at least uncertain, given 
that the Commission’s IIA model already mandates ExIAs for a selected 
number of major proposals to be identified in the Annual Policy Strategy 
decision in February each year. Fifthly, transaction costs are likely to 
increase, leaving room also for strategic behaviour by each of the three 
institutions vis-à-vis the others. And finally, the decision about the cost 
threshold and the common standards to be adopted for the performance of 
extended impact assessments would prove absolutely delicate and crucial 
for the efficiency and effectiveness of the new model.  
In summary, the Doorn motion for a European Impact Assessment 
seems overly ambitious and hard to implement at EU (and at any other) 
level. The Parliament resolution was adopted a few months before the 
Commission issued its first Progress Report on the implementation of its 
IIA model, highlighting that the procedure is already quite costly and 
burdensome for responsible officials. Thence, to set up such a complex 
system without facing more inefficiency would be almost impossible. As 
will be clarified in the next sections, an impact assessment of the impact 
assessment procedure (a meta-IA) would certainly help in defining the 
most efficient model to be adopted. Against this backdrop, what is clear 
from the Doorn motion is that the Parliament does not consider the current 
IIA model to be fully satisfactory, with specific respect to the Parliament’s 
right to propose far-reaching amendments and command its own impact 
assessments on the Commission’s proposed new regulations.  
Faced with such an institutional tension, the Council has adopted a 
milder position on the prospects of EU impact assessment. But activities at 
the Council have increased after the Finance Ministers of Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK launched the so-called ‘four 
presidencies’ initiative for a joint action on regulatory reform on 26 January 
2004.168 The four presidencies’ letter suggests that the selection of proposals 
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to be subjected to ExIAs should be agreed with the Council annually, 
before the APS (Annual Policy Strategy) decision by the Commission. 
Furthermore, the presidencies stated the need for more formal quality 
control on the Commission’s ExIAs before the publication of the proposal. 
But the letter also called for competitiveness-proofing of all proposed 
regulations by the Competitiveness Council, therefore advocating greater 
involvement of the Council in the procedure. Finally, the four presidencies 
called for greater use of review clauses in EU legislation and for a greater 
use of “imaginative, outcome-based” approaches to regulation, such as the 
New Approach based on essential requirements and mutual recognition.169   
Further emphasis on strengthening the competitiveness dimension of 
impact assessment performed by the Commission came from the 
Competitiveness Council in its meetings held in May and November 
2004.170 The Council also announced a pilot project aimed at carrying out 
impact assessments on proposed Council amendments, to be evaluated in 
May 2005. The Council’s increased involvement in the matter of better 
regulation culminated in the specification of a list of 15 priorities for 
simplification of EU legislation in November 2004, which included 
intervention aimed at streamlining regulation in a number of sectors.171 
Finally, a joint letter of the Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, UK, Austrian and 
Finnish Presidencies of the EU emphasised the need to tackle the issue of 
administrative costs of existing and prospective regulation, as well as the 
need to strengthen the competitiveness dimension and the Council 
involvement in the Commission’s IIA model.172 Further pressure on the 
Commission to progress in the implementation of the integrated impact 
assessment model as a competitiveness-oriented policy tool was exerted 
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until the European Council meeting held on 22-23 March 2005, where the 
Commission presented its new Communication on Better Regulation for 
Growth and Jobs in the European Union of 16 March 2005.173  
2.3  The 2005 Communication on impact assessment and the June 
2005 Guidelines: Back to basics?  
The Commission assessed the first results of its new Integrated Impact 
Assessment model in December 2004, which drew a mixed picture of the 
progress made in improving the quality of EU legislation. A first measure 
was to request services to establish ‘Roadmaps’ for the initiatives they have 
put forward for inclusion in the Annual Policy Strategy and in the 
Commission’s Work Programme.174 But several other sources of pressure 
were calling for major efforts from the Commission to significantly increase 
the momentum of better regulation, with specific emphasis on 
strengthening and improving impact assessment methods. First, as 
explained in the previous section, the Parliament and the Council urged the 
Commission to accept a greater involvement of all EU institutions in the 
procedure, by extending impact assessment to major amendments and 
defining common methodologies for carrying out assessments in all three 
institutions. Secondly, the worrying signals of delay shown by the mid-
term review of the Lisbon strategy in February 2005, called for greater 
emphasis on fostering employment and growth and reducing the 
administrative burdens of regulation, shifting the focus from sustainable 
development to competitiveness, and from integrated impact assessment to 
economic assessment, sometimes focusing exclusively on business 
compliance costs.175 Thirdly, the failure to reach the goal of achieving a 25% 
reduction in the volume of the acquis communautaire by 2005, stated by the 
Prodi Commission, suggested the need for new efforts in the field of 
simplification. Finally, the decision to extend the impact assessment 
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procedure to all the initiatives included in the Commission’s 2005 
Legislative and Work Programme (roughly 100) contrasted starkly with 
evidence that the scheduled IAs had not been completed and had exhibited 
significant methodological problems, calling for a refinement of the 
guidelines and a redress of the proportionality principle.  
The Commission took action in March 2005, with a new 
Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European 
Union, defining the achievements of the early years of implementation of 
the IIA as “first steps in what must be a permanent effort”.176 The 
Communication lays down important changes in the IIA procedure and re-
launches the role of impact assessment as part of the Lisbon strategy. The 
Communication’s vibrant statement on the need to boost better regulation 
initiatives at all levels resulted in the launch of three key actions, to be 
reviewed in 2007, devoted to: i) the design and application of better 
regulation tools at EU level; ii) a closer collaboration with member states to 
ensure a consistent application of better regulation principles; and iii) a 
stronger, constructive dialogue with all EU regulators, member states and 
other stakeholders.  
The main features of the Commission’s new strategy on better 
regulation and impact assessment can be summarised as follows: 
  Although the IIA is rooted in the sustainable development principle 
and its integrated nature is not under discussion, there is an urge to 
strengthen the assessment of the economic impact of proposed regulations 
– compared to the social and environmental impact assessments – in 
view of the increased importance of the competitiveness principle. 
  The Commission plans to develop a methodology to better integrate 
the  measurement of administrative costs in its IIA model, and has 
launched a pilot project for the quantification of such burdens that 
will produce the first results in late 2005, together with a trial new 
methodology called the ‘EU net administrative cost model’.177 
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  The Commission will reinforce the external validation of the 
methodology adopted for the IIA, and plans to have a 
“comprehensive independent evaluation of the Impact Assessment 
system  as it has evolved and been implemented since 2002”, 
scheduled for early 2006.178 
  The IIA model will be extended to the Parliament and the Council, 
where the co-decision procedure applies, for all major amendments to 
Commission proposals. 
  The Commission is strengthening its efforts on streamlining and 
simplifying the existing regulatory corpus by screening pending 
legislative proposals that have remained idle for a significant period of 
time and that have not been subjected to impact assessment or whose 
IA revealed major weaknesses. A subsequent Communication, issued 
in September 2005, withdrew 56 pending proposals dated before 1 
January 2004 and 12 proposals presented in 2004.179 
  Moreover, the Commission launched a three-year action plan  for 
simplification, which aims to repeal, codify, recast or modify 222 basic 
legislations and over 1,400 related legal acts in the next three years. 
The action plan – contained in a Communication issued on October 
25, 2005, initially focuses on heavily regulated sectors, such as cars, 
waste and construction, and will then address simplification in other 
sectors such as foodstuffs, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or services will 
follow.180  
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179 See the Commission Communication, COM(2005)462 (Outcome of the screening 
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security, external relations, research, health and consumer protection, codification, 
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180 See the Commission Communication, COM(2005)535, Implementing the 
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  The Commission will create two networks of experts. A first network 
will group high-level national regulatory experts for the development 
of a “coherent set of common indicators to monitor progress as 
regards the quality of the regulatory environment” both at EU and 
member state level. Another network will be composed of experts in 
better regulation issues, including academicians and practitioners 
from the economic, social and environmental fields, who will be 
called to advise the Commission on a case-by-case basis as regards 
the methodology adopted for carrying out the IIA.  
To those who have followed the debate on the implementation of the 
Commission’s IIA model since 2003, these changes came as no surprise. 
And those who have seen substantial continuity between the 
Communication issued in 2002 and the new strategy laid out by the 
Commission should not overlook the remarkable deviation made by the 
Commission in targeting its IIA model. The IIA is coming back to the 
somewhat tight walls of cost-benefit analysis, compliance cost assessment 
and simplification initiatives. This might seem as a thorough 
reconsideration of the overly ambitious initial goal of establishing a 
comprehensive, burdensome IA procedure without taking into account the 
existing legislative acquis, without relying on external expertise and 
without involving other EU institutions. The Commission has now taken a 
step backwards from such a challenging endeavour, with the stated aim of 
getting to grips with a more reliable, focused procedure whose main 
purpose is to help the EU and member states to reach a level-playing field 
on the road to Lisbon. Also the greater attention to ex post monitoring and 
the plan to have a meta-IA to be conducted in early 2006 substantiate this 
impression.  
The ‘back-to-basics’ hypothesis is supported by the new Guidelines 
issued by the Commission in June 2005.181 The Technical Annex to the 
Guidelines devotes special attention to methods for assessing the economic 
impact of proposed regulations, in particular the impact on growth, 
competitiveness and employment. A specific section is also dedicated to the 
assessment of administrative costs imposed by legislation.182  
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In summary, the first years of the Commission’s IIA model 
introduced in 2002 have attracted growing attention to impact assessment 
as a tool to improve the quality of EU legislation. It is far from being a 
panacea, however. Impact assessment has proven – in some international 
experiences – to provide valuable assistance at the early stage of policy 
formulation, and, as such, ranks amongst the key drivers of the now re-
targeted Lisbon strategy. However, the Commission has undertaken a ‘trial 
and error’ phase which has ultimately resulted in a step backwards, 
towards a more ‘canonic’ model of regulatory impact assessment, which 
will arguably be made more effective by an increased emphasis on 
administrative costs, compliance costs and cost-benefit analysis. This seems 
prima facie to achieve the valuable result of bringing the Commission’s 
initial endeavour ‘back to Earth’, in line with the widely acknowledged 
‘think-real’ approach.  
In the years to come, most of the newly stated objectives will have to 
pass scrutiny as drivers of enhanced legislative quality, greater inter-
institutional dialogue and increased administrative efficiency. Chapter 3 
offers some possible options to get the EU Better Regulation Action Plan 
back on the Lisbon track and to achieve a more satisfactory model of policy 
evaluation at EU and member state level.  
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3.  Can the IIA be improved? Roadmaps 
for the Years Ahead 
As recalled in the previous chapter, while reviewing its overall strategy for 
better regulation and impact assessment, the Commission stated that the 
improvements already achieved in the impact assessment procedure – 
which the Commission considers to be significant – are only to be 
considered as ‘a first step’ in what should be a permanent effort towards 
better policy-making at EU and member state level. Next steps already 
scheduled by the Commission include the new Communication on the 
simplification of EU legislation issued in October 2005 and the 
comprehensive independent evaluation of the IIA model to be launched in 
early 2006.183  
In this section, possible improvements to the current model are 
analysed under a more theoretical perspective and presented in the form of 
‘roadmaps’. Possible amendments include the following:  
  The IIA should be based on an improved and standardised methodology, 
in order to become a reliable and effective aid to policy-making. The 
current scorecard of the Commission’s Extended Impact Assessments 
shows quite disappointing results, as found by the few studies 
undertaken in this field and confirmed by the scorecard illustrated in 
section 2.1. In addition, in the future EU officials will have to 
reconcile the narrow focus of the emerging ‘EU net administrative 
cost model’ with the substantially broader scope of the Integrated 
Impact Assessment model – a further source of complexity for 
already challenged administrations.  
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  The impact assessment model can be made more ‘proportionate’ and 
‘flexible’: the depth and scope of the assessment, as well as the 
variables and options that regulators must take into account while 
carrying out an ex ante regulatory impact assessment should vary 
depending upon the expected impact of the proposed regulation as 
well as whether the proposed regulation will allegedly have an 
i m p a c t  o n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n d a  a n d / o r  m a j o r  
regulatory principles (as happens in the UK experience). Accordingly, 
administrations might choose different methodologies depending on 
the expected impact of the proposed initiative (e.g. adopting cost-
effectiveness analysis instead of full cost-benefit analysis, thereby 
reducing the administrative burden).184  
  The IIA model can be made ‘sector-specific’, meaning that different 
theoretical frameworks can be developed for ex ante impact 
assessments in some key sectors of the European economy (for 
instance, high-tech industries, financial markets, services of general 
interest, etc.). Sector-specificity of impact assessment procedures 
might also incorporate the proportionality principle, avoiding 
redundancies in the procedure and, consequently, increasing 
efficiency. 
  The IIA model can be made more ‘internally consistent’ and ‘cost-
effective’. For this purpose, there is a strong urge to further analyse the 
organisational dimension of the EU model, applying an organisation-
theoretic and a game-theoretic approach in order to suggest possible 
amendments to the EU model: this would help to reduce cost 
duplications, facilitate institutional accountability, involve all 
stakeholders in important proposed regulations and speed up the 
RIA procedure.   
  The EU impact assessment procedure can be made more ‘transparent’. 
Consultation procedures and public consultations are still under 
                                                      
184 In its IA guidelines, the Commission recalls that administrations should 
“[a]dapt the level of analysis to the likely impact of the initiative being examined 
(principle of proportionate analysis). In other words, the amount of work and the 
depth of the analysis for the impact assessment should be balanced against the 
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development in the new EU model. More in detail, it is still unclear 
whether the current model allows for sufficient transparency and, at 
the same time, shields EU administrations from the risk of being 
captured by powerful interest groups. 
  The procedure should take into account the organisational changes 
needed within EU administrations as a consequence of the 
introduction of the new model. In particular, the implementation of 
the new model must be mirrored and enabled by a corresponding 
cultural change in administrations, which goes beyond the mere 
capability to ‘think outside the box’, implying stronger accountability 
and performance-oriented behaviour, in line with the main lessons 
drawn from New Public Management as implemented in the UK and 
in a number of other OECD countries. 
  Setting up an efficient and effective procedure for ex ante evaluation 
is doomed to remain an incomplete measure, if methods for ex post 
evaluation and monitoring are not correspondingly fine-tuned. Current 
methods of ex post evaluation available at the European Commission 
appear insufficient for this purpose, whereas in the US the 
publication of yearly reports on the costs and benefits of major 
regulations has become a reality. Europe, in this respect, needs its 
own ‘grand experiment’.  
  The impact assessment model adopted in the EU should be made 
more attuned to the concept of subsidiarity by introducing measures 
to provide for a gradual convergence of RIA models implemented at 
member state (central and local government) level. This implies a stronger 
coordination/convergence between impact assessment procedures 
adopted by EU member states – an issue that has gained even 
stronger momentum following the May 2004 enlargement – which 
require accession countries to quickly adopt the acquis communautaire 
and establish new procedures aimed at ensuring the quality of 
regulations as well as their compatibility with the peculiar regulatory 
context of individual countries in transition.185  
                                                      
185 A similar concern is expressed by the “Joint Initiative on Regulatory Reform” 
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  The Commission should issue guidelines to ensure the competitiveness of 
new and existing regulations. This effort can be modelled on the 
corresponding endeavour undertaken in the US in 1986 with the 
creation of the Council on Competitiveness, whose mandate was to 
review and – where appropriate – suggest the elimination of any US 
regulation that could exert a negative impact on US competitiveness. 
The EU Competitiveness Council could take on such a demanding 
task to a greater extent than it has done so far.  
  An ad hoc oversight agency for better regulation should be created, in 
line with international best practices. The main functions of such a 
new agency would include advocacy, consulting, oversight, 
challenge, coordination, reporting and institutional relations.  
The following sections are dedicated to a more detailed explanation 
of these possible amendments to the IIA model. 
3.1  Roadmap 1 – Improving methodology and introducing cost-
benefit analysis 
As explained in section 2.1 above, the Commission’s implementation of the 
IIA model has been characterised by significant methodological flaws, 
which are only partially justified by the experimental nature of the 
exercises undertaken. An improvement in the soundness of the 
methodology adopted by lead DGs in performing ExIAs is certainly a 
necessary condition for improving the effectiveness of impact assessment 
as a better regulation tool in the EU. Accordingly, this section puts forward 
some suggestions for improving the methodological soundness of ExIAs 
without unduly raising its impact on DGs’ budgets. 
One straightforward critique of the implementation of the IIA model 
comes from the almost complete lack of quantitative analyses, most notably 
                                                                                                                                       
commit to ongoing national regulatory reform initiatives, including the 
introduction of effective systems of impact assessment for new legislation and 
simplification programmes, building on the best practice that can be shared across 
Member States”. The statement was then welcomed at the March 2004 European 
Council, which called upon the Commission and the Council to pursue a number 
of actions to drive forward the reform programme. At the end of the Dutch 
Presidency, the initiative was extended to the forthcoming Austrian and Finnish 
Presidencies. See the Joint Statement on “Advancing Regulatory Reform in 
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of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), normally considered as the most reliable, 
useful and comprehensive way to provide regulators with a litmus test for 
identifying regulatory options worth being undertaken. The reliability of 
CBA as a neutral tool for policy-makers has been constantly under debate 
in economic theory, and its wide application in the US – where the goal of 
creating a cost-benefit State has been often evoked – has been recently the 
subject of fierce debate.186  
Box 2 summarises the main arguments in favour and against CBA as 
outlined in the current US debate. What emerges is the finding that CBA is 
useful only if regulators understand its potential as well as its limits. 
Accordingly, CBA should be considered as a proxy for comparing 
alternative regulatory options, rather than a crystal ball enabling policy-
makers to foresee the exact impact of yet-to-be-introduced regulations, and 
a s  s u c h  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  o n l y  w h e n  its impact on alternative options is 
neutral – e.g. when costs and benefits of alternative policy options are 
expressed in the same measurement unit and occur over a similar time 
span.  
As a matter of fact, improving the methodology does not necessarily 
mean that all ExIAs should contain a complete monetisation and 
comparison of prospective direct and indirect costs and benefits. In many 
cases, a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis is too costly an exercise compared 
to the expected impact of the proposal to be assessed. Economists normally 
consider cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to be a viable alternative in such 
cases, and even wholly qualitative analysis can provide valuable support to 
the policy-maker, provided that it is performed with scientific accuracy.187  
With this caveat in mind, a first suggestion to improve the 
methodology used by DGs is to mandate CBA at least for major regulations, 
whose impact justifies the cost of such an exercise, and more generally 
promote the use of quantitative analysis (e.g. CBA, CEA, Risk-Risk analysis, 
                                                      
186 On cost-benefit analysis, see M.D. Adler and E.A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001; A.E. Boardman, Cost-benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997; and M. Munger, Analyzing Policy: Choices, 
Conflicts and Practices, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000.  
187 The next section (Roadmap 2) will deal with the issue of proportionality more 
extensively. For insightful suggestions on how to use qualitative and quantitative 
estimates, see K. Arrow, et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and 
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economic modelling, etc.) whenever feasible. In this respect, Robert Hahn 
and Robert Litan have recently recommended that the Commission should 
issue a Communication specifying that the primary objective of regulation 
is to maximise net benefits.188  
 
Box 2. The debate on CBA in the US 
Over the past few years, the reliability of quantitative CBA in regulatory impact 
assessment has been the subject of heated debate amongst economists and 
practitioners, especially in the US. Following the path-breaking work of Robert 
Hahn of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies and Frank 
Morrall of the OMB in the US, some authors have started criticising the use of 
CBA by defining it as a non-neutral, anti-regulatory tool that provides a 
misguided view of the costs and benefits of regulations. According to authors 
such as Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey, the application of CBA to a number 
of past decisions would have had disastrous consequence in terms of efficiency 
and public health.189 The authors mention three case studies: the removal of lead 
from gasoline in the 1970s and 1980s, the decision not to dam the Grand Canyon 
for hydroelectric power in the 1960s and the strict regulation of workplace 
exposure to vinyl chloride in 1974. They argue that use of cost-benefit analysis 
“would have gotten the answer wrong in all three cases”; thus, they conclude 
that CBA should not play a central role, at least for regulations involving 
substantial health, environmental or safety issues. CBA, according to Ackerman 
and Massey, amounts to “knowing the price of everything and the value of 
nothing”. In particular, the benefits of environmentally sensible regulations are 
often priceless, and unlikely to be captured by CBA, “an opaque and technically 
intricate process accessible only to experts, and one that all too frequently 
recommends rejection of sensible policies, on the grounds that their costs exceed 
economists’ estimates of their benefits.”190  
Other authors, such as Richard Parker and David Driesen have heavily 
criticised the neutrality of CBA and shaped it as an anti-regulatory instrument 
for policy-making. Parker also argued that Hahn’s scorecard analysis is biased 
                                                      
188 See Hahn and Litan, op. cit., p. 500. Needless to say, following this suggestion 
would prove, at least to a certain extent, inconsistent with the current shift away 
from net benefits, and towards the minimization of administrative costs in the EU. 
189 See F. Ackerman, L. Heinzerling and R. Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past 
Decisions: Was environmental protection ever a good idea?, Georgetown Public Law 
Research Paper No. 576161, Georgetown University, August 2004.  
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since it encompasses all rules for which a RIA was required – but RIA is 
required for the costliest rules, not for the most beneficial ones.191 Similarly, 
Driesen finds that the non-neutrality of CBA is in re ipsa, since postulating that 
regulatory costs should not exceed benefits will never lead to promoting greater 
protection of health, safety or the environment. He also argues that “[a]ssigning 
monetary values to avoided illness, death, and environmental damage raises 
ethical questions and serious technical problems. Monetisation requires very 
controversial value assumptions and in many cases proves impossible. The 
typical outcome of CBA includes a dollar value for expected costs and a wide 
range of dollar values for a few quantifiable benefits. This range often proves so 
large that it deprives CBA of any capacity it might have to objectively guide 
decision-making ... many important environmental, health, and safety effects 
cannot be quantified at all.”192 
Another critique to CBA was the indeterminacy of the approach to be 
adopted in comparing costs and benefits. Although the OMB has always 
specified that it uses CBA by specifying that regulatory costs cannot exceed 
benefits, approaches to CBA can vary, highlighting the non-neutral value 
judgments that underline benefit-cost tests as a policy-making tool. CBA 
approaches have been divided as follows: 
  An indeterminate position, which takes CBA as one of a number of available 
tools to inspire legislative decisions, representing economic efficiency as one 
possible policy objective together with ethical, safety, environmental, social 
and other issues. If this is the case, a full estimation of all expected benefits 
and costs is often too costly and time-consuming, and might delay 
enforcement.193 
  A benefits cannot outweigh costs approach, currently adopted at the OMB, but 
seen as “inherently not neutral” since “[i]f cost falls below benefit, this 
criterion does not require a more stringent standard. But if cost outweighs 
benefit, agencies are forced to weaken their standard in order to comply.”194 
  A  cost equals benefits or ‘optimizing benefits’ approach¸ which entails that 
regulatory interventions are planned only when they prove inherently 
efficient, i.e. up to a level where the marginal benefit of the intervention 
equals the marginal cost. This is certainly the more neutral version of CBA, 
but it is probably difficult to implement and is not adopted by the OMB. 
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Other critiques addressed the choice of the discount rate for calculating net 
present benefits; the ‘selection bias’; the use of ex ante estimates as a whole; the 
use of quantitative-only CBA; the scant attention to subgroups.195 More recently, 
a report by Frontier Economics pointed to the fallacy of regulators in estimating 
welfare gains from new regulations, with specific reference to the UK 
Competition Commission’s regulation of mobile termination charges.196  
All these critiques raised doubts on the reliability and usefulness of CBA as a 
guide to policy-makers. Well-known commentators such as Cass Sunstein and 
Bob Hahn have explicitly responded to these issues in their recent 
publications.197 In particular, Hahn extensively illustrated that the use of 
scorecards and economic analysis provides useful information on the 
effectiveness of regulatory policies; sets the stage for smarter regulation; 
facilitates oversight as well as the development of methods to assess the quality 
of regulation; promotes accountability and transparency in the policy-making 
process; and provides useful input for developing new research insights.198  
Already in 2002, the OIRA received complaints by academicians suggesting 
that the OIRA should revise its approach to cost-benefit analysis. For example, a 
letter from the University of Texas to Frank Morrall recalled that a “number of 
academics have published devastating critiques of the current use of cost-benefit 
analysis in public health and environmental regulation ... We urge OMB  to 
review these critiques and revise its approach to cost-benefit analysis 
                                                      
195 See C. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, and R.W. Hahn, In Defense of the Economic 
Analysis of Regulation, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
196 See Frontier Economics, “Wrong Numbers – Difficulties in Estimating the 
Welfare Gains from Regulation”, Bulletin, June 2005.  
197 Another line of (at least partial) defence for cost-benefit analysis comes from the 
law and economics literature. In particular, Eric Posner has performed valuable 
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agency discretion. Posner also argued that CBA reduces the possible influence of 
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fails a CBA test. See Eric A. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective”, University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 68, 2001, p. 1137. 
198 See Hahn, In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, op. cit.  88 | ANDREA RENDA  
accordingly”.199 An OIRA circular in September 2003 acknowledged that 
“[w]hen important benefits and costs cannot be expressed in monetary units, 
BCA is less useful, and it can even be misleading, because the calculation of net 
benefits in such cases does not provide a full evaluation of all relevant benefits 
and costs.”200 
Today, the debate on the relevance and reliability of quantitative techniques 
in impact assessment has not reached the final word. The dispute, however, 
seems to hinge more on the inherent limits of CBA in the quantification of net 
benefits for public health and environmental regulation, than on the usefulness 
of CBA in and of itself. CBA and CBA-based scorecards have proven quite 
useful in facilitating a comparative analysis of the efficiency and methodological 
soundness of regulatory impact assessments performed by agencies. Moreover, 
they have sent a signal to legislatures, emphasising that placing great emphasis 
on the neutrality of ex ante and  ex post evaluation is hardly sustained by 
empirical evidence on the methods currently used by agencies in estimating 
prospective net benefits of new and existing regulations. OIRA itself included 
separate sections in its RIA Guide on measuring the cost-effectiveness of public 
health and safety regulations, as well as on the calculation of distributional 
effects, thus responding to most of the above-mentioned critiques. 
Thus, once and again, the US experience seems to demonstrate that CBA is 
not a panacea, and that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ method that easily adapts to sectoral, 
economic, social and environmental regulations is nowhere to be found. As a 
consequence, a careful and gradual introduction of sector-specific impact 
assessment techniques would eventually solve many of the issues raised by 
scholars in criticising the current emphasis on quantitative CBA. See below, 
under Roadmap 3, for a discussion of sector-specific ex ante impact assessment. 
 
A second methodological concern is related to evidence that lead DGs 
almost never compare alternative options in the observed ExIAs. In most of 
the ExIAs conducted in the 2003-05 period, DGs carried out the assessment 
after selecting the most preferred option. As a result, the impact assessment 
exercise relies on an ‘educated guess’ or more simply on a rule of thumb.201 
The subsequent assessment of the (already) chosen option, then, is useful 
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December 2005). 
200 See OIRA Circular D-4, 17 September 2003. 
201 The term ‘educated guess’ is borrowed from B. Lussis, EU Extended Impact 
Assessment Review, op. cit. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 89 
 
only as an indication of estimated costs for administrations and businesses 
or as a basis for consultation, but it does not provide any guidance in the 
selection of the most appropriate option for solving the problem at hand. A 
likely improvement in the quality of performed ExIAs would be achieved if 
a quali-quantitative comparison of available alternatives is made mandatory, at 
least for major regulations, without performing impact assessment after the 
preferred option has already been chosen with a prima facie approach. 
Thirdly, the increasingly strong focus on reducing administrative 
burdens as one of the top priorities of EU better regulation clashes with the 
scant attention paid to administrative burdens by DGs in ExIAs. This 
problem is being tackled during the UK Presidency, based on the 
outstanding work recently done in the UK by the Better Regulation Task 
Force and the Better Regulation Executive on the issue of reducing 
administrative burdens.202 As explained in section 2.3 above, the 
Commission is now turning back to the goal of streamlining existing 
legislation and avoiding regulatory hysteresis. Therefore, there seem to be 
encouraging prospects for mandating that DGs assess the impact of alternative 
options also in terms of their potential to contrast regulatory creep and reduce 
compliance costs. 
Fourthly, and most importantly, the lack of methodological 
soundness in the Commission’s ExIAs could be reduced by appointing an 
ad hoc agency in charge of cooperating with DGs in the drafting of impact 
assessment and to act as a help desk for all problems faced by lead DGs in 
quantifying the economic, social or environmental impact of proposed 
regulations.203 As regards the likely impact on methodological soundness, a 
possible suggestion would be to require that an external oversight agency 
cooperates with lead DGs in the drafting of ExIA, consults on quantitative analysis 
and suggests the rejection of the proposed regulation in case of insufficient or 
unsatisfactory ExIA.   
These are only some of the many ways in which the IIA methodology 
can be improved. Another important suggestion is to promote the use of 
discount rates.  The analysis of the 70 ExIAs completed so far by the 
Commission reveals that DGs simply do not consider discounting future 
benefits, or calculating the net present value of future benefits. Only in two 
cases was the discount rate specified, and in both cases the assessment was 
                                                      
202 See supra, section 1.2.2. 
203 Roadmap 10 below deals with this issue more extensively.  90 | ANDREA RENDA  
carried out by commissioning external studies.204 Although the issue of 
benefit discounting is currently subject to debate (see Box 1), there is a wide 
consensus on the merit of choosing a reasonable social discount rate for 
calculating the present value of benefits from new regulations.205 The choice 
of an appropriate discount rate allows a better comparison of alternative 
policy options, especially when regulators are faced with some options 
whose impact will be felt over differing time horizons. The Commission 
has recommended the use of a 4% discount rate, although the exact 
measure of such a rate deserves further attention.206  
Moreover, the need to streamline existing regulation also calls for 
further emphasis on including soft law and methods of self- and co-regulation in 
the range of available alternatives. Since no external oversight agency is 
currently in charge of supervising the impact assessment conducted by 
DGs and no sanctions are expressly provided for insufficient or unsatisfactory 
assessments, there seem to be insufficient incentives for lead DGs to 
undertake difficult analyses such as the assessment of the expected impact 
of self-regulatory options.207 With the creation of an ad hoc oversight agency 
with similar functions and powers to those of the US OIRA or the UK 
National Audit Office, the EU’s stated ambition to de-ossify most EU 
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legislation and substantially reduce the acquis  would become more 
attainable.208  
Table 1 summarises the recommendations included in Roadmap 1.  
Table 1. Recommendations on Roadmap 1 - Methodology 
1.1  Increase use of quantitative analysis. 
1.2  Increase quali-quantitative comparison of available alternatives. 
1.3  Enable assessment of regulatory creep and compliance costs. 
1.4  Create an independent oversight agency as consultant, supervisor and 
regulatory clearinghouse. 
1.5  Increase the use and consistency of discount rates. 
1.6  Mandate inclusion of soft law, self- and co-regulation in the alternatives. 
1.7  Introduce sanctions for insufficient or unsatisfactory IA. 
1.8  Increase reliance on external expertise. 
3.2  Roadmap 2 – Understanding and applying proportionality 
The proportionality principle is one of the major pillars of the EU IIA 
model, and was expressly mentioned by the 2002 Communication on 
Impact Assessment as one of the guiding principles of the assessment 
exercise.209 Emphasis on the proportionality principle was added by the 
Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking of December 2003.210 
Unfortunately, a precise definition of what is to be understood as 
‘proportionality’ was not provided in the Commission background 
documents on impact assessment. The Guidelines and the Technical Annex 
to the 2002 Communication only provided a rather obscure definition, 
limited to guidance to DGs on ‘getting things in proportion’. The 2002 
Guidelines specified that the lead DG is in charge of defining how the 
principle of proportionate analysis applies to the proposal at hand, and that 
                                                      
208 See e.g. the Commission Report, “Better Lawmaking 2004”, COM(2005)98, 21 
March 2005 (“Simplification of the acquis remains a top priority, in particular for 
the Lisbon strategy”). 
209 See the 2002 Communication on Impact Assessment, COM(2002)276, section 
3.2.c, stating that the “principle of proportionate analysis will be the driver of the 
[Impact Assessment] process”.  
210 See supra, note 148 and accompanying text 92 | ANDREA RENDA  
the “form, content, volume and degree of detail” of ExIAs “will vary 
widely according to the nature of the proposal and its expected 
significance”.211   
As a matter of fact, the Commission realised that the first two years of 
implementation of the IIA model were characterised by a poor 
understanding of the principle of proportionate analysis. The 2004 progress 
report stated that “[t]he principle of proportionate analysis is to be better 
applied in practice”, specifying that “the analysis has to focus on the most 
significant impacts and the most important distributive effects, and the 
depth of analysis has to match the significance of the impacts. Impact 
Assessments of proposals with no major impacts should, therefore, be 
avoided or at least kept short”. The same report also highlighted the need 
for further guidance on the application of this principle, and stressed that 
“[t]he level of analysis needed will, for example, be easier to decide with 
increased transparency and better planning upstream of the impact 
assessment process”.212 
Some clearer guidance on how to apply the principle of 
proportionality while conducting an Extended Impact Assessment was 
provided in the updated Guidelines issued in June 2005. The new 
Guidelines specify that the principle of proportionate analysis implies that 
“the more significant an action is likely to be, the greater the effort of 
quantification and monetisation that will generally be expected. Besides, 
depending on the political and legal nature of the proposal under 
preparation, its sectoral particularities and the point in the policy-making 
process at which the IA is undertaken, some aspects of the analysis will 
often have to be developed more than others”.213 The Commission then 
clarifies that: 
  The ExIA must be particularly developed whenever the proposal 
addresses an entirely new area or an area that was previously left to 
member states. 
  The ExIA should not be too detailed when proposals aim at 
reviewing existing legislation. In this case, the analysis should focus 
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on whether the available policy options are effective and versatile 
(meaning that they will adapt to future changes).  
  In case of ExIAs on White Papers, Action Plans, other 
Communications setting out strategic orientations or proposed 
framework directives, the analysis will be ‘rather broad’, the IA will 
necessarily be preliminary and not quantitative.  
  ExIAs will use already available estimates when they concern the 
proposed extension or renewal of existing programmes, and will use 
evidence on the impact of past comparable programmes in case they 
concern new expenditure programmes. The Commission clearly 
states that “[i]nformation about the impact of past activities will often 
be more convincing in this context than speculation about expected 
impacts.”214 
In the Annexes to the 2005 Guidelines, the Commission more directly 
invites DGs to apply the proportionality principle in deciding whether to 
monetise minor costs or benefits: “don’t devote a lot of energy to putting a 
value on non-marketed impacts if they are a very small part of the overall 
impacts”.215  
It must be recalled that the proportionality principle can be given two 
different and complementary interpretations in the EU context:  
  On the one hand, the so-called ‘treaty-based’ proportionality 
principle entails that the chosen policy option is adequate and not 
excessive to tackle the issue at stake, and can incorporate both a cost-
effectiveness assessment and a compliance cost assessment, meaning 
that action undertaken at EU level should not impose unnecessary 
burdens on administrations, industry stakeholders and society as a 
whole.  
  On the other hand, the ‘methodological’ principle of proportionate 
analysis focuses on the level of detail of impact assessment and 
postulates that the effort in quantifying and monetising impacts 
should be made directly dependent on the type and relevance of the 
proposal at hand. 
The Commission seems to refer to the latter principle in providing 
guidance to DGs, but then appears to revert to the former in prescribing 
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that DGs perform detailed regulatory impact assessments of new 
regulations, by ensuring that policy options do not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives.216 The major methodological questions, 
therefore, remain: When should an in-depth quantitative analysis be 
undertaken, and when is qualitative assessment a proportionate choice 
with respect to the type of proposal and the magnitude of the expected 
impact? 
A first way to improve the use of proportionate analysis is certainly 
the introduction of thresholds. Just as in the US and the UK, lead DGs might 
be called upon to perform a detailed assessment of prospective benefits and 
costs of a proposed regulation only when the latter is expected to exert a 
substantial impact on the EU economy or, alternatively, when it has the 
potential to significantly affect the EU agenda or key policy priorities in 
subsequent years.217 As was recalled in section 2.2, the Parliament’s ‘Doorn 
motion’ envisaged the introduction of thresholds for impact assessment on 
‘major amendments’ by the Council and the Parliament.  
Secondly, the Commission should issue more specific guidelines on how 
to assess compliance with the proportionality principle. To ensure compliance 
with the Treaty-based proportionality principle, instead of merely stating 
that the principle of proportionate analysis “should be the driver of the 
process”, the IIA model should require a detailed illustration of the reasons 
why less invasive regulatory options (e.g.  self-regulatory options) have 
been discarded. Lead DGs should be required to ascertain that: i) the means 
employed are suitable for the purpose of achieving the objectives 
(effectiveness test); and ii) these means do not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives (efficiency test).218 Moreover, the Commission’s 
guidelines should specify the criteria that should inspire the lead DG in 
choosing among the following options: i)  perform a detailed quali-
quantitative assessment of a range of policy alternatives, and then a 
                                                      
216 See ibid., section 5, p. 8. 
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is provided by the Danish model of impact assessment. In Denmark, cost-benefit 
analysis is required only with respect to regulations that include major public 
construction projects, and the results of such analysis are then used as inputs to the 
RIA procedure. 
218 See e.g. the Report on developments in European Union procedures and 
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detailed quantitative assessment of the prospective net benefits of the most 
preferred option; ii)  perform a qualitative comparison of the available 
alternatives, and then a more detailed quantitative assessment of the 
prospective net benefits of the most preferred option; iii)  quantify net 
benefits only for the preferred option, selected through a qualitative 
assessment; and iv)  identify the preferred option only on the basis of a 
qualitative analysis.   
Furthermore, an effective implementation can only be ensured if the 
Commission clearly states that whenever ExIAs will not carry a justified 
application of the Treaty-based proportionality principle, they will be rejected as 
incomplete. The introduction of a sanction mechanism would prove crucial 
for disciplining the lead DGs in acting consistently with one of the key 
principles of the whole IIA model. Likewise, in co-decision procedures, the 
Council and the Parliament might also state that they will not consider any 
proposal from the Commission if it does not adequately take into account the 
Treaty-based proportionality principle.219   
Finally, as already mentioned in the previous section, the actual 
implementation of the methodological proportionality principle would be 
facilitated by the creation of an independent oversight agency, with the 
power to challenge ExIAs that fail to comply with the Commission 
guidelines on how to choose the appropriate depth of analysis. An 
oversight agency might also intervene at an early stage of the impact 
assessment exercise, in order to consult with sponsoring DGs on 
                                                      
219 In the case of the Parliament, such a provision might reduce the costs associated 
with the subsequent scrutiny provided for in Art. 5 of the “Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”, OJ C310/207, 16 
December 2004 (“Draft European legislative acts shall be justified with regard to 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Any draft European legislative 
act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This statement should 
contain some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and, in the case of a 
European framework law, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by 
Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons 
for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be 
substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. Draft 
European legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether 
financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional 
or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and 
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preliminary drafts and speed-up the assessment process by suggesting 
changes in the methodology chosen by the DG.  
Suggestions on improving the application of the proportionality 
principle are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Recommendations on Roadmap 2 - Proportionality 
2.1  Indicate proposals that require quantitative CBA of all alternatives. 
2.2  Indicate proposals that require qualitative assessment of alternatives, and 
quantitative CBA of the selected option. 
2.3  Indicate clearly when lead DGs can resort to cost-effectiveness, risk-risk or 
compliance cost analysis instead of CBA. 
2.4  Appoint an external oversight agency in charge of supervising the 
application of the proportionality principle by lead DGs. 
2.5  State that whenever ExIAs will not carry a justified application of the Treaty-
based proportionality principle, they will be rejected as incomplete. 
2.6  In case of co-decision procedures, the Parliament and the Council will not 
accept the proposal until it accounts for Treaty-based proportionality.  
2.7  An external oversight agency should supervise the application of the 
methodological proportionality principle by lead DGs. 
3.3  Roadmap 3 – Sector-specific impact assessment 
Many of the problems encountered in the implementation of the IIA model 
can be traced back to the originally stated ambition to build a 
comprehensive integrated framework to be applied to several different 
types of regulatory initiatives, ranging from framework programmes to 
directives and regulations, and spanning fields with varying social, 
environmental and economic relevance. Defining a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model 
of impact assessment is no doubt an arduous task, and consensus on the 
need to provide for sector-specific assessment seems to be spreading 
amongst scholars and practitioners.   
Further support to the idea of defining different IA models for 
different sectors comes from the scorecard illustrated in section 2.1. In 
particular, the analysis of ExIAs completed so far highlighted that some 
DGs appear to be less skilled than others in performing complex 
calculations on prospective costs and benefits. Moreover, some DGs are 
often called upon to perform specific assessments of non-marketable goods 
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life-years (QALY), the reduction of livestock, etc. Examples of DGs that 
have faced difficulties in performing complex calculations are DG FISH in 
the assessment of Council regulations establishing measures for the 
recovery of the southern hake stock and the Norway lobster stocks in the 
Cantabrian Sea and Western Iberian peninsula as well as the sole stocks in 
the Western Channel and the Bay of Biscay;220 a n d  D G  A G R I  i n  t h e  
assessment of the Regulation on support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund and in the reviews of the sugar and tobacco 
regimes.221 It is hard to imagine how the tools used for such assessments 
can be reconciled with those needed to assess, say, the i2010 
Communication or the EC Directive on the interoperability of digital 
interactive television services.222  
Given the different skills and needs existing in the various DGs, the 
requirement to fine-tune the methodology used would have to be 
supported, once more, by the creation of an oversight agency in charge of 
supervising the activity of the DGs and cooperating with them in the 
definition of a satisfactory methodology.  
Such a new model of sector-specific impact assessment would 
initially require that the Commission defines the ‘modules’ of its IIA model that 
should be made sector-specific, while declaring  those that will remain 
unchanged for all DGs. Each Directorate General (or group of DGs) will 
then have to propose its own methodology, in a joint effort with the external 
oversight agency. Involvement of the European Regulators Group would be 
needed for those regulations that will be implemented and enforced by 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). The sector-specific methodologies 
will then be subject to a period of public consultation of at least 60 days, 
during which interested stakeholders will be allowed to submit their 
comments on the model chosen by the DG. Following the public 
consultation, the ad hoc agency and the DGs would start implementing the 
new methodology in sponsoring new regulations. The resulting sector-
specific methodology would have to be subject to periodic review.   
The expected impact of such a new ‘modular’ framework is of course 
hard to assess. From a theoretical viewpoint, increasing the specificity of 
methodologies used is likely to produce mixed consequences for the 
                                                      
220 SEC(2003)1480 and SEC(2003)1481. 
221 SEC(2003)1022 and SEC(2003)1023.  
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viability of the Commission’s IIA model. Possible shortcomings include: i) 
a loss of standardisation; ii) an increase in short-run administrative costs, 
since a new oversight agency will have to be appointed and each DG will 
have to develop its own ‘modules’ in the IIA procedure; and iii) an increase 
in transaction costs, since DGs will have to negotiate the new procedure 
with the ad hoc agency.  
Possible beneficial effects, however, include: i) greater precision and 
awareness in the application of the methodology; ii) lower medium- and 
long-run administrative costs, since DGs will invest resources una tantum in 
developing their own ‘modules’, and will have to produce less effort 
overtime in trying to adapt the ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to their peculiar 
needs; iii) greater involvement of stakeholders at an early stage, i.e. in the 
definition of the methodology; iv) possibility of benchmarking and lesson-
drawing between different DGs, as well as beneficial identification of best 
practices and virtuous competition between DGs; v) greater responsibility 
and accountability for each of the DGs, with beneficial effects on the 
development of a ‘culture of assessment’ within each DG; vi) expected 
gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of the procedures; and vii) 
flexibility, since the new model would avoid useless efforts in trying to 
quantify and/or monetise variables that play only a marginal role in the 
problem at hand, yet must be assessed under the prescriptions of the 
standardised IIA model (e.g. environmental and social impact, subsidiarity, 
sustainability, etc.).  
Examples of sector-specific methodologies include the so-called ‘new 
approach to appraisal’ (NATA) developed in the UK to stimulate efficient 
decision-making in the transport sector, which takes into account 
environment, safety, economy, accessibility and integration as top 
priorities;223 the Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) developed by 
                                                      
223 The New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) provides a framework within which 
“impacts under the headings of environment, safety, economy, accessibility and 
integration can be taken into account by the decision-maker. The idea is that the 
decision-maker applies his or her own weights to the impacts recorded against 21 
objectives and makes a judgment about the proposal’s overall value for money. In 
reaching a decision about a proposal, it is intended that account is also taken of the 
distribution and fairness of the impacts, the affordability and financial 
sustainability of the proposal, and its practicality and acceptability to the public”. 
See the Commission of Integrated Transport (http://www.cfit.gov.uk/docs/2003/ 
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the European Environmental Agency;224 the Health Impact Assessment 
developed within the World Health Organization,225 the crime-proofing 
models currently being developed for the purpose of “testing legislative 
proposals as regards the crime opportunities  they might create”;226 and 
many other models, whose theoretical soundness is strengthened by their 
widespread application in most developed and developing countries.  
But the most insightful example of sector-specific impact assessment 
is no doubt the publication, by UK sectoral regulators such as OFCOM, 
OFGEM and the FSA, of guidance documents in which the sector-specific 
methodology applied in ex ante assessment is explained and made subject 
to public consultation.227 This new approach should be adopted also by 
                                                      
224 See e.g. F.L. Toth, Participatory integrated assessment methods - An assessment of 
their usefulness to the European Environmental Agency, EEA Technical Report No. 64, 
European Energy Agency, 12 September 2001; and M. Pierce, Computer-based models 
in integrated environmental assessment, EEA Technical Report No. 14, European 
Energy Agency, 25 October 1999.  
225 See the HIA Guidance section on the WHO website 
(http://www.who.int/hia/about/guides/en/ - visited 5 December 2005). For a 
model of a sector-specific IA, see G. Donev, “Methodology for Regulatory Impact 
Assessment related to Occupational Safety and Health”, paper presented at the 
International Seminar on Implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment: Best 
Practices in Europe, 8-11 June 2004, AUBG, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. 
226 See, inter alia, the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, The prevention of crime in the European Union - Reflection on 
common guidelines and proposals for Community financial support,  COM/2000/0786; 
for a more updated description of current research on crime-proofing and impact 
assessment, see T. Vander Beken, “Legislative crime proofing - Detection and 
evaluation of loopholes that offer opportunities for organised crime”, paper 
presented at the first European Congress on developing public/private 
partnerships to reduce the harm of organised crime, Dublin, 21 November 2003 
(available at http://www.ircp.be/uploaded/dublin-21-11-2003.ppt - last visited 5 
December 2005). 
227 See e.g. OFGEM, Guidance on Impact Assessment ( http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ 
temp/ofgem/cache/cmsattach/11688_14805.pdf, revised June 2005 - accessed 5 
December 2005); OFCOM, Better  Policy Making. Ofcom’s Approach to Impact 
Assessment, 21 July 2005 (available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/policy_making/ 
guidelines.pdf – last visited 7 December 2005); and FSA’s N2+2 Review of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, which included two elements: a report by National Economic 
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Commission DGs, in order to proceed towards more sector-specific impact 
assessment.  Industry stakeholders would also welcome an increased 
institutionalisation of such procedures in specific ‘modules’ of the IIA 
model.228  
Within the European Commission, only one DG (SANCO) has taken 
action to develop its own approach to impact assessment. It did so by 
launching the so-called ‘Scoping paper’, a single document covering all the 
necessary information to discuss, launch and develop an initiative from 
conception up to submission for approval. A Scoping paper contains what 
is termed as a ‘quick and dirty’ Impact Assessment, as well as a delivery 
plan, and applies to all new legislative and non-legislative initiatives 
leading to a Commission decision, with the sole exception of recurrent 
decisions or reports, routine comitology acts and technical measures 
deriving from already enacted legislation.229 Such a new tool, launched in 
September 2005, is certainly to be welcomed as a step forward in the 
introduction of a culture of impact assessment in the Commission. 
However, it will be used more as a means to achieve greater homogeneity, 
awareness and transparency in the regulatory process, than as a way to 
increase the control on the prospective benefits and costs of yet-to-be-
enacted regulation.230  
Table 3 summarises some of the suggestions illustrated for 
introducing sector-specific impact assessment within the general 
framework of the IIA model.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
& Co (JHC) on embedding CBA more deeply in the FSA. Both reports are available 
at  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Other_publications/Miscellaneous/2004/ 
n2_review.shtml (last accessed 7 December 2005). 
228 A possible objection lies in the Commission’s plan to introduce a computerised 
system for facilitating the impact assessment exercise performed by lead DGs. 
However, the standard software produced by the Commission will probably be 
made open-source when submitted to DGs, and as such might be tailored – at least 
in some of its modules – to the specific methodologies developed by individual 
DGs.  
229 See http://teamwork.intbase.com/0509_01/docs/SANCO_scoping.pdf for explanations 
and guidelines on how to prepare a SANCO Scoping Paper.  
230 See also the presentations by Mattia Pellegrini and John Bell at the DG SANCO 
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Table 3. Recommendations on Roadmap 3 – Sector-specific impact assessment 
3.1  Define the modules of the IIA model that should be adapted to the sector. 
3.2  Enable each DG to propose its own methodology. 
3.3  Involve the ERG for assessments that will be carried out by NRAs. 
3.4  Provide for supervision, consultancy and clearance by an external audit. 
3.5  Open defined procedures to public consultations for at least 60 days. 
3.6  Provide for review of the defined methodology every three years. 
3.7  Enable benchmarking of methodologies and lesson-drawing between DGs. 
3.4  Roadmap 4 – Internal consistency and cost-effectiveness 
A more urgent issue in the implementation of the IIA model is promoting 
its inherent consistency and cost-effectiveness by streamlining the IA 
procedure and taking action to enhance its efficiency, performance and 
overall coordination. The need to streamline the procedure is made more 
urgent as the number of entities currently dealing with better regulation 
issues in EU institutions has skyrocketed over the past decade, providing 
an outstanding example of how regulatory hysteresis can lead to useless 
cost duplications, reduced accountability and high administrative costs.  
Within the Commission, active bodies and projects include inter-
service groups such as the Interservice Coordination Group, the Impact 
Assessment Working Group, the APM-SPP Group; administrations with 
horizontal mandates such as the Legal Advisers Group, the General 
Secretariat, DG ADMIN, DG RTD and an announced Expert Group on 
Impact Assessment, and administrations with sectoral mandates such as 
most DGs, the Internal Market Advisory Committee (IMAC) and its Expert 
Group on Better Regulation; but also the European Business Test Panel, the 
Red Tape Observatory, the SINAPSE project and stand-alone projects on 
regulatory quality indicators and legislative burdens. 231 
                                                      
231 A document issued by the Commission highlights the striking proliferation of 
uncoordinated initiatives on better regulation in the Commission, the Parliament 
and the Council. See European Commission Working Document, Who is Doing 
What on Better Regulation at EU Level – Organisation Charts, 1 July 2004 (available at 
http://www.eipa.nl/Topics/EPMF/documents/EU_Who_is_who_Better_regulation_July_0
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On the other hand, Council administrations devoted to better 
regulation include the Competitiveness Council, the General Affairs 
Council, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, the Group of 
Ministers Responsible for Public Administrations, the High-Level Group on 
Competitiveness, the Working Group on Competitiveness and Growth, the 
Directors and Experts on Better Regulation, the Economic Policy 
Committee, the announced Ad Hoc Working Group on Better Regulation, 
the General Affairs Group and many others. Whereas in the Parliament, the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Market, the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, the Committee on Industry, External Trade, 
Research and Energy, the Directorates on External Relations, Internal 
Relations, and Legislative Coordination/Interinstitutional Relations all 
retain some competency on better regulation and impact assessment. Such 
an overlap of competencies and uncoordinated initiatives certainly does 
not contribute to the accountability, transparency or efficiency of the EU’s 
plans to enhance the quality of regulation. Not a great result for initiatives 
aimed, inter alia, at streamlining existing legislation and simplifying the 
acquis.  
In addition, perhaps one of the most enduring problems faced in 
fostering the responsiveness and accountability of competent 
administrations is the absence of clear-cut sanction mechanisms for cases of 
insufficient quality of impact assessment. From a principal-agent 
perspective, the existence of sanctions and oversight by an external entity is 
a crucial step on the way to establishing a fruitful and efficient alignment 
between the efficiency-bound incentives of the principal and the self-
interest of the agent. Action is urgently needed for establishing a 
comprehensive system in which an ad hoc agency is in charge of supervising 
and coordinating the many initiatives on impact assessment that are currently 
undertaken at EU level. Proposals aimed at increasing the internal 
consistency of the IIA procedure, such as the three-tiered model of impact 
assessment contained in the Parliament’s Doorn Motion (see section 2.2) 
might achieve the same objective, yet would probably entail an excessive 
duplication of costs and provide for a milder inter-institutional dialogue, 
given the need to appoint three different audit bodies.  
The proposed ad hoc agency would also be called to ensure the overall 
consistency of the methodologies applied by lead DGs, the Parliament and 
the Council for all assessed proposals with the key priorities set at EU level. 
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issuing a yearly publication on the overall impact of major EU regulations, 
modelled on the US yearly report on the costs and benefits of regulation.232  
 
Table 4. Recommendations on Roadmap 4 – Internal consistency 
4.1  Introduce sanction mechanisms. 
4.2  Appoint a single ad hoc agency for the supervision of initiatives. 
4.3  The agency will also supervise methodological consistency. 
4.4  The agency will be in charge of reporting on overall impact of regulations. 
3.5  Roadmap 5 – Increase the clarity of presentation 
The current implementation of the Commission’s IIA model exhibits fairly 
limited transparency, although the pervasiveness of the consultation 
process is probably the most encouraging achievement in the 
Commission’s better regulation action plan. In some cases, the 
transparency of the ExIA exercise is already jeopardised by the nature of 
the proposal to be assessed – an example being certainly the “proposal 
amending the amended proposal for a decision amending Decision No. 
1692/96/EC on the trans-European transport network”.233 Possible 
improvements in the transparency of the overall process as well as of the 
individual ExIA forms include better quality and clarity of presentation, 
better drafting, greater compliance with the IIA standard model and 
greater comprehensiveness of the ExIA forms.  
First, the ExIAs are often obscure in the presentation of the 
methodology and the results. In many cases, the comparison between 
identified costs and benefits has to be inferred from the DG’s explanations, with 
no clear reference to the justification for undertaking one of the options. 
Moreover,  some ExIAs are drafted half in English and half in French, and 
present puzzling statements that undermine the general public’s 
understanding of the grounds for intervention and for choosing a policy 
option.234 Finally, the use of comprehensive executive summaries (included only 
in 10 out of 70 ExIAs) should be made mandatory. Executive summaries 
                                                      
232 See section 1.1. 
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should include a description of the methodology, tables summarising the 
qualitative or quantitative assessment performed, a summary of the 
consultation process and a description of the policy alternative undertaken 
and of its overall expected impact.  
Secondly, DGs should strictly adhere to the format outlined by the 
Commission Guidelines while drafting ExIAs. Although most ExIAs observed 
follow at least some sections of the standard IIA form (i.e. description of the 
issue at stake, policy options available, stakeholder consultation and final 
Commission proposal), other sections are often willingly neglected. 
Thirdly, the lead DGs seldom report quantitative calculations 
emerging from external studies, which are in most cases the only available 
source of cost-benefit analysis for the assessment of alternative policy 
options. An example is the ExIA on the “Communication on an Action plan 
for the implementation of the legal framework for electronic public 
procurement”, for which costs and benefits were assessed through several 
external studies, but most figures were not reported in the final ExIA 
document.235 A complete ExIA is supposed to directly report the results of 
external studies, without forcing the reader to consult those studies to find 
out about the reasons that led the DG to choose one alternative option over 
the others.   
Finally, and needless to say, streamlining the procedure (roadmap 4) 
and appointing an ad hoc agency for impact assessment (roadmap 10) would 
provide the IIA model with an increased potential for supervising and 
controlling the transparency of the process. Table 5 summarises all the 
suggestions for roadmap 5.  
 
Table 5. Recommendations on Roadmap 5 – Clarity of presentation 
5.1  Always perform comparison between costs and benefits. 
5.2  Improve clarity in the drafting. 
5.3  Use comprehensive executive summaries. 
5.4  Follow the standard IIA form. 
5.5  Include the results obtained through external studies in the ExIA document. 
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Roadmap 6 – Boosting cultural change  
Emphasis on better regulation and the importance of impact assessment 
emerged as a result of the waves of public administration reforms that were 
introduced in some OECD countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. In 
particular, the UK New Public Management experience and the US National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government created fertile ground for the 
introduction of better policy-making tools, increased accountability of 
public administrations, greater transparency of the regulatory process and, 
more generally, higher responsiveness on the part of the regulators. The 
economic theory of organisation and the game-theoretical approach to 
policy-making as a principal-agent relationship suggest that better 
regulation initiatives are not likely to produce actual results unless 
accompanied by a parallel cultural shift, aimed at creating accountable and 
performance-oriented agents and promoting a ‘culture of assessment’.  
The Commission has initially underestimated the importance of 
training programmes as a tool to ensure responsible application of the IIA 
model. Only recently, an increased number of officials were reported to be 
receiving training organised by both the General Secretariat and individual 
DGs. The overall training system, however, seems still uncoordinated and 
is often left to the spontaneous initiative of individual units.  
Cultural change within administrations can be promoted in at least 
three different ways. First, training should be further coordinated. Secondly, 
DGs can be involved in the development of their own methodologies (as described 
in Roadmap 3). Finally, all measures directed towards increasing the 
transparency and accountability of the IIA model (discussed in Roadmap 
5), and particularly the introduction of stronger oversight and control can 
stimulate cultural change in administrations. Under a principal-agent 
approach, by adding oversight and monitoring mechanisms, agents (the 
DGs) internalise the externalities deriving from their behaviour, and thus 
have an incentive to behave efficiently in performing ex ante impact 
assessment.236  
Table 6 summarises the above-mentioned suggestions. 
                                                      
236 See e.g. J.E. Lane, Public Principals and their Agents, available at 
http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/wp/wp32.pdf (accessed 5 December 2005), and, more 
in general, J.J. Laffont and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
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Table 6. Recommendations on Roadmap 6 – Promoting cultural change 
6.1  Coordinate training initiatives. 
6.2  Involve DGs in the development of methodologies. 
6.3  Introduce control mechanisms for insufficient assessments. 
3.6  Roadmap 7 – Strengthening ex post monitoring and evaluation 
tools 
As widely acknowledged in the economic literature, an ex ante impact 
assessment model is not a sufficient tool for ensuring the quality of 
legislation. Methods for the ex post assessment of the effectiveness of IA 
models are being introduced in most OECD countries, and in a few cases 
have already shown encouraging results. Ex post assessment, moreover, is 
crucial for the adoption of a longer-term view on the responsiveness of 
regulators, a type of approach that is certainly needed at EU level for 
achievement of ambitious goals such as those stated in Lisbon. Policy tools 
for ex post evaluation and monitoring are currently underdeveloped in the 
EU, although the Commission has tendered a comprehensive external 
study on quality indicators, which will allegedly provide some guidance on 
how to monitor RIA compliance and performance. The review of the IIA 
model scheduled for early 2006 should make use of sophisticated tools for 
evaluating ex post the quality of the ExIAs conducted in the 2003-05 period. 
A first way to implement ex post monitoring is to introduce some form 
of compliance testing. In line with the definition provided in a recent OECD 
report, compliance testing is a process-focused approach that implies 
verifying whether, in implementing the IIA model, lead DGs have met the 
procedural requirements set out in the Commission’s Communications and 
guidelines on impact assessment.237 Once discrepancies are found – as is 
likely to be the case for the IIA model – the competent authority should 
also  investigate the reasons for non-compliance b y  l e a d  D G s .  S u c h  r e a s o n s  
might range from the novelty and experimental nature of the procedure to 
difficulties in the quantification or monetisation of benefits or costs, but 
might also include political pressure directed at hindering the 
comprehensiveness of IIAs and cultural resistance by public officials.  
                                                      
237 See OECD, Regulatory Performance: Ex Post Evaluation of Regulatory Tools and 
Institutions, Paris, September 2004, p. 21.  IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 107 
 
Examples of compliance tests used by regulators in OECD countries 
include, in part, the review of 48 RIAs completed between 1996 and 1999 by 
Robert Hahn and Patrick Dudley;238 the National Audit Office’s evaluation 
of RIA compliance between the 1998-2002 and the 2002-03 time frames, and 
subsequent compendium reports;239 compliance testing introduced by the 
Swedish NNR (Board of Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation).240 
In the case of the IIA model, however, compliance testing is likely to 
be an insufficient tool for a full evaluation of the quality of ExIAs. A more 
effective tool for evaluating the impact of the IIA model is the use of 
output-focused performance tests. Such tests are geared towards measuring 
the quality and consistency of undertaken ExIAs, more than mere 
compliance with pre-defined requirements. Although more resource-
intensive, such tests can provide useful guidance for both taking stock and 
looking forward to improvements in the IIA model. According to a recent 
OECD survey, performance tests are the most widely adopted form of ex 
post evaluation, with the UK, Netherlands and Sweden being amongst the 
international best practices.241  Performance tests can take many forms, 
ranging from survey-based analysis of IA quality to tests aimed at 
assessing the differences between the actual effects of regulations and the 
effects that had been predicted ex ante in the IA document.  
The use of performance testing also enables the identification of best and 
worst practices  amongst administrations in charge of performing impact 
assessment. In the UK, for example, after an extensive review of RIAs 
performed by the NAO in the 2000-2002 timeframe, the Chairman of the 
Better Regulation Task Force, David Arculus, publicly called for further 
scrutiny on the activity of individual departments (most notably, the Home 
                                                      
238 See Hahn and Dudley, op. cit. 
239 See National Audit Office, Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Compendium Report 2004-2005, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 
341 Session 2004-2005, 17 March 2005. 
240 See N. Munnich, The Regulatory Burdens and Administrative Compliance Costs for 
Companies, survey conducted by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Brussels 
Office, April 2004.  
241 See e.g. W. Harrington, “RIA Assessment Methods”, and W. Harrington and 
R.D. Morgenstern, “Evaluating Regulatory Impact Analyses”, papers prepared for 
the OECD project on ex post evaluation of regulatory tools and institutions, OECD, 
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Office, the Department of Transport and the Department for Media, 
Culture and Sport) which had, in his opinion, performed particularly 
badly; whereas the Department of Trade and Industry was indicated as an 
example of good practice. Arculus also identified individual RIAs from 
which ‘interesting lessons’ could be learnt.242 In the EU case, the best 
practice so far would probably be the ExIA performed for the INSPIRE 
Directive, at least according to the results of the scorecard presented in 
section 2.1.243 
Moreover, the use of performance tests can provide useful information 
on the timing of evaluations performed. A reported example is that of the 
Netherlands, where an interview-based evaluation of RIA performance led 
to the conclusion that early involvement of a regulatory oversight body can 
add significantly to the effectiveness and timeliness of the overall 
procedure. Similar lessons would probably be drawn with respect to the 
European IIA model, in which a real oversight body has not been 
appointed.244  
Finally, another form of performance testing is to evaluate the actual 
cost of regulatory initiatives undertaken under a RIA regime. The main goal 
pursued in using such tools is to evaluate whether the introduction of 
impact assessment has led to a reduction in the administrative costs of 
regulation. Examples include the administrative cost assessment conducted 
by the Danish Business Test Panels in the late 1990s;245 but also 
Morgenstern’s analysis of environmental regulatory programmes in the 
US;246 and, most importantly, the ex post assessment of administrative 
burdens undertaken through the Standard Cost Model in the Netherlands, 
                                                      
242 See the letter sent by David Arculus to the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
op. cit. 
243 E x t e n d e d  I m p a c t  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  proposed Directive establishing an 
infrastructure for spatial information in the Community, SEC(2004)980 (Directive 
COM(2004)516).  
244 See OECD, Regulatory Performance, op. cit., §97. 
245 See B. Hagerup, Business Impact Assessment – The Danish Model (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/39/2410437.pdf); and the section on Denmark at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/best-directory/en/administration/ 
denmark.htm (visited 5 December 2005). 
246 R.D. Morgenstern, Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact, 
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Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and currently under consideration in the 
UK and – under the UK Presidency – in the EU.247  
Besides compliance and performance tests, scholars have also 
developed more sophisticated tools known as ‘function tests’, whose main 
feature is the search for the actual contribution provided by impact 
assessment to the regulatory process. Function tests can include: i)  the 
assessment of the frequency with which initial proposals are revised or 
abandoned as they progress through the process; ii) measures of the 
difference between initial proposals and finally adopted regulations; iii) 
‘audit trail’ methods that focus on the measurement of changes in the initial 
proposal as well as on the treatment of such changes; and iv) survey-based 
methods to investigate the change in the administrative or regulatory 
culture fostered by RIA. Function testing can be expected to be significantly 
more resource-intensive and discretionary than performance testing. 
Perhaps forms of function tests that can be applied most usefully to the 
peculiar features of the IIA model are ex post measures of cultural change, 
as they stress the importance of monitoring increased awareness amongst 
public officials as an essential ingredient of a successful better regulation 
action plan. Examples of the use of such tests can be found in Canada and 
New Zealand, with encouraging results, and in Denmark, with more 
disappointing findings.  
A final, important question is who should undertake ex post 
evaluation. Once more, both international experience and economics 
literature suggest that oversight by an independent body is key to the 
successful implementation of ex post evaluation. For example, the UK Better 
Regulation Task Force considers the Dutch experience on performance 
testing as showing clear evidence that “it is essential to have an 
independent body overseeing the Administrative Burden reduction effort”, 
just like Actal does in the Netherlands.248 More generally, compliance 
testing and performance testing should be scheduled on a periodic basis 
and performed by an independent governmental body, whereas function 
                                                      
247 For a comprehensive list of sources and figures on the Dutch and international 
experience in calculating administrative burdens with the standard cost model, see 
www.compliancecosts.com; the UK attempt to apply the Dutch methodology for the 
purpose of reducing red tape is described above in footnotes 105-106 and 
accompanying text.  
248 See the Less is More White Paper by the BRTF, op. cit., section 3.  110 | ANDREA RENDA  
testing – essentially survey-based – should make use of external expertise 
and be left out of periodical reviews, as it might prove significantly more 
costly than compliance and performance testing.  
At EU level, a pilot project on indicators of regulatory quality (IRQ) 
was launched in 2004 within the 2001-05 Multiannual Programme for 
Enterprise and Entrepreneurship. The project’s Final Report, issued in 
December 2004, proposed the use of three systems of quality indicators: i) 
macro and ex-ante indicators, focusing on the design of better regulation tools 
and policy; ii) micro and ex-post indicators, more outcome-focused and to be 
implemented in countries where stakeholder consultation is already an 
established practice; and iii) systems of quality assurance aimed at bridging 
the (technical) measurement of regulatory quality and the (political) 
evaluation of better regulation as public policy.249 The results of the project, 
if implemented systematically through the Commission’s legislative cycle, would 
allow for significant improvements in the monitoring of EU legislation, as well 
as in the fight against red tape. However, a lot still needs to be done to 
ensure that the articulated corpus of EC legislation is scrutinised in terms of 
output, outcomes and administrative costs.  
An attempt to monitor administrative burdens at member state level 
is contained in the Final Report of the Pilot Project “Ex-Post Evaluation of 
EC Legislation and its Burden on Business”, published in May 2005.250 The 
project considered a sampling of directives – the construction sites 
Directive, the medical devices Directive, the IPPC (integrated pollution 
prevention and control) Directive and the product safety Directive – and 
analysed their transposition into national legislation in eight EU member 
states.251  The main results of the survey were presented by reporting the 
share of existing companies that would have cancelled or down-scaled 
their activities in the absence of regulation – an approach that reveals the 
real focus of the project, i.e. exploring the extent to which target firms have 
welcomed the regulation. The results showed that a significant share of the 
companies find that the requirements of at least two of the analysed 
                                                      
249 See the pilot project’s website (http://www.brad.ac.uk/irq/ - visited on 5 December 
2005).  
250 Final Report of the Pilot Project “Ex-Post Evaluation of EC Legislation and its 
Burden on Business”, published in May 2005 by the European Commission, 
Enterprise DG. 
251 The member states considered were Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 111 
 
directives (the construction sites Directive and the medical devices 
Directive) are burdensome and do not add any important value to their 
business processes in the field. Insufficient data were gathered for the IPPC 
Directive, while results were more encouraging for the product safety 
Directive.  
Such an approach, of course, seems hardly suitable for new pieces of 
legislation – such as the product safety Directive – which inevitably impose 
new burdens on regulated firms, irrespective of whether such burdens can 
be passed-on downstream to final consumers.252 Moreover, the 
methodology used to capture the impact of transposed Directives on 
health, safety and the environment should significantly depart from that 
used to measure the extent to which firms remain disappointed by a new 
‘protectionist’ measure. In other words, regulatory burdens are not always 
bad, although useless burdens certainly are. The sample of directives 
chosen and the scope of the analysis, therefore, appear too limited; this, in 
turn, calls for a better fine-tuning of the tools used for sampling the 
perception of firms faced with the transposition of EC directives into 
national legislation. 
Table 7 summarises the suggestions for undertaking ex post 
monitoring and evaluation of the IIA model. 
 
Table 7. Recommendations on Roadmap 7 – Ex post monitoring and evaluation 
7.1  Introduce methods of compliance testing. 
7.2  Investigate reasons for non-compliance. 
7.3  Enable performance testing. 
7.4  Follow the recommendations of the IRQ Pilot Project. 
7.5  Identify and publish best and worst practices. 
7.6  Appoint independent body to monitor administrative burdens. 
7.7  Schedule periodic testing. 
7.8  Use external expertise for una tantum survey-based tests of cultural change. 
                                                      
252  See e.g. R.  Craswell, “Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and 
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships”, Stanford Law Review, No 43, 1991, p. 
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3.7  Roadmap 8 – National RIA models: A new Koine dialectos?  
As recently recalled by one authoritative commentator, the meaning of RIA 
can vary widely amongst the EU member states.253 As impact assessment 
tools are conceived for strikingly different purposes and with differing 
levels of sophistication in member states, the potential of an improved EU 
IIA model to boost competitiveness in the EU25 could be significantly 
hindered by the heterogeneity of procedures adopted at member state level 
for the transposition of EU legislation as well as for the enactment of new 
national rules. As a result, the quality of a pan-European IIA strongly 
depends on both coordination and competition between RIA systems 
adopted at EU, national and sub-national levels.  
From this standpoint, it would seem prima facie appropriate to 
provide for a standardisation of the IA procedure throughout all the EU25. 
However, a closer look reveals that RIA cannot be implemented as a 
standardised, ‘one-size-fits-all’ procedure for all individual member states. 
Each nation exhibits a peculiar business and social environment, as well as 
a different legislative acquis, which ultimately call for different criteria in 
conceiving, drafting and transposing regulations.  
A quick look at impact assessment models adopted at member state 
level reveals a striking heterogeneity of approaches as well as a patchwork 
of regulatory initiatives often converging towards a common goal, i.e. 
fostering better regulation as a means to reduce administrative burdens, 
foster competitiveness and enable sustainable development. As regards 
impact assessment procedures, EU countries differ in many respects, 
including: i) the actual implementation of impact assessment; ii) the 
institutional setting in which assessment is performed; iii)  the stage of 
legislative preparation/drafting at which impact assessments take place; iv) 
the degree of comprehensiveness of impact assessment models adopted;254 
                                                      
253 See C. Radaelli, “How Context Matters: Regulatory Quality in the European 
Union”, paper prepared for the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 
on Policy Convergence, 17 April 2004; and C. Radaelli, What Does Regulatory Impact 
Assessment Mean in Europe?, Working Paper No. 05-02, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C., January 2005.  
254 A good example of the different scope of RIA in EU countries is the type of the 
analysis required: as a matter of fact, while the Netherlands adopted a business 
effects analysis, which focused on the impacts arising from businesses, in the 
Czech Republic the analysis focuses on the financial and economic impacts, which 
has expanded to cover other socio-economic impacts. France adopted a General 
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v) the methodologies adopted for impact assessment, ranging from cost-
effectiveness analysis to cost-benefit analysis, risk-risk analysis, assessment 
of procedural efficiency, qualitative techniques, etc.; vi) the use and timing 
of public consultation as an input to regulatory impact assessment, and in 
general the transparency of the procedures adopted; vii) the adoption of a 
so-called ‘two-stage approach’ to impact assessment, which entails the 
performance of both a preliminary and an extended impact assessment; 
viii)  the use of ex post evaluation procedures; ix)  the adoption of an 
integrated, multi-valued model of impact assessment such as that adopted 
in the EU; and x) the extent to which compatibility between national and 
EU legislation is taken into account; and many others.  
First, as regards the implementation of impact assessment at national 
level, pioneering countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland, seem to have already achieved a mature and effective 
model of regulatory impact assessment, although significant margins for 
improvement still exist. Likewise, other member states, such as Germany, 
Poland and Austria, recently took significant steps towards a more efficient 
assessment system, although it is probably too early to draw definitive 
conclusions in this respect. In contrast, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
most accession states seem to lag behind, and remain in an experimental 
phase in the introduction of effective and pervasive models of impact 
assessment. In some cases, impact assessment is still at a stage of a 
declaration of intentions, whereas in other cases, RIA has gradually lost 
momentum after a period of initial thrust.255 
Secondly, member states exhibit profound differences on other issues 
as well. On one extreme, countries such as the UK and Denmark seem to 
take into account all possible aspects of major regulations. In Denmark, for 
example, since 1995, assessing the impact of a proposed regulation requires 
three stages of analysis (screening, scoping and assessment) together with a 
mandatory assessment of the impact on competition, the environment and 
the relationship with EU legislation. Denmark adopted a multi-valued 
model which takes into account the economic, social and environmental 
impact of proposed regulations, and also developed ex post methods for 
                                                                                                                                       
whereas Austria and Portugal only undertake fiscal analyses, which focus on the 
direct budgetary costs of government administration.  
255 See Radaelli, What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe?, op. cit., p. 
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evaluating the impact of selected regulations. The proportionality principle 
is broadly and effectively applied, so that cost-benefit analysis is used 
mostly in the evaluation of major public construction projects. The Danish 
model implies an extensive use of consultation and business test panels, 
normally before a bill is presented to the Parliament. Consultation is open 
to the general public and its results – like RIA results – are published on the 
Internet.256  
At the other extreme, some EU member states seem to lag far behind 
in the adoption and effective implementation of impact assessment. This 
situation has emerged with further evidence after the enlargement process. 
Countries such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Baltic states are 
currently following the EU and the OECD recommendations in the 
application of RIA, but have limited experience in the field of better 
regulation. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, had to face the 
overwhelming challenge of both a transition towards a market economy 
and the adoption of the acquis communautaire. Of course, the transition 
phase created enormous problems in the identification of possible market 
failures, since well-developed markets did not exist in most of these 
countries. Consequently, both the regulatory and (where separate) 
sustainability impact assessment procedures needed an ad hoc crafting. 
Urgent issues also included the establishment and institutional positioning 
of a Better Regulation Unit, considered as crucial for the monitoring and 
achievement of better regulation in those countries. Such units have to 
accomplish the delicate task of coordinating existing national legislation 
with the acquis, as well as that of ensuring that national and sub-national 
laws comply with minimum standards of transparency, accountability and 
methodological soundness.257 
Another example is Slovakia, where RIA is currently being 
implemented. Many commentators recently stressed the absence of 
oversight, transparency, pervasiveness and public participation in the 
policy-making process in Slovakia, and the lack of specific training of 
public officials as one of the main obstacles towards the achievement of 
                                                      
256 See Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) Inventory, op. cit., p. 20.  
257 See e.g. J. Kleinertova, “Specifics and Problems of RIA in Transition Economics 
and How to Overcome Them”; and J. Rajdlova, “Impact Assessment in a Country 
of Reforms – Slovak Experience”, papers presented at the International Seminar on 
Implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment: Best Practices in Europe, 8-11 
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effective methods of assessing the impact of proposed regulations.258 
Political instability also contributed to the slow adoption of a satisfactory 
impact assessment model. In the case of Slovakia, a team of Dutch and 
Slovak experts developed a set of Guidelines and a business impact 
assessment model within the MATRA pre-accession project, but the 
implementation of such project was then hindered by a change of 
government. 
Even greater difficulties are associated with the implementation of 
impact assessment procedures in candidate countries. The EU stimulated 
adoption of RIA in candidate countries by inserting regulatory reform and 
impact assessment amongst the requirements to be fulfilled on the way to 
accession. International organisations such as the OECD and the World 
Bank and, in some cases, EU member states such as the UK are now 
supporting candidate countries in the development of effective RIA 
models. For example, the role of impact assessment in the EU-Turkey 
negotiations was the subject of a recent seminar held in Ankara in June 
2005 within the OECD SIGMA project, where the content and purpose of 
regulatory impact assessment was illustrated to Turkish officials with a 
view to future implementation. The same applies to Croatia, where 
regulatory impact assessment was introduced only through a pilot project 
in 2004.259  
The transplant of impact assessment models already implemented in 
EU member states will certainly prove delicate for candidate countries such 
as Ukraine. Moreover, each candidate country will face peculiar challenges 
in fulfilling its European ambition, leaving no room for single recipes, or 
even less comprehensive solutions that prove bonnes à tout faire.260  
                                                      
258 See e.g. K. Staronova, Analysis of the Policy-making Process in Slovakia, 2003 
(available at http://www.policy.hu/staronova/FinalResearch.pdf).  
259 Even outside the EU borders, regulatory impact assessment is a key item in 
negotiations undertaken by the EU in its external relations. For example, in the 
EU/Ukraine Action Plan, Ukraine committed to “adopt and implement a system of 
impact assessment of regulatory measures, consultation of stakeholders, and prior 
notification of regulatory changes to economic operators to ensure transparency 
(predictability of regulatory environment)”. See EU/Ukraine Action Plan 
(http://www.ieac.org.ua/pics/content/15/1109931048_ans.doc, p. 7). 
260 The situation, however, is not confined within the boundaries of accession 
countries. Italy, for example, introduced RIA for a number of pilot projects in 2000, 
with overtly disappointing results. In 2001, the Presidency of the Italian 116 | ANDREA RENDA  
More recently, the European Commission has provided a snapshot of 
the current level of implementation of RIA at member state level. Figure 9 
provides an overview of measures in the area of better regulation and 
impact assessment as reported by the Commission in its March 2005 
Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the EU.261 
Although some of the Commission’s findings might be questionable, the 
                                                                                                                                       
Government issued a new Directive on RIA, which launched a new experimental 
phase and a comprehensive reform of the initially adopted RIA model, including 
also a careful reconsideration of the ‘two-stage’ approach. However, the results of 
the second experimental phase have been, if possible, even more worrying. 
Another example is Spain, where regulatory impact assessment is underdeveloped 
and cost-benefit analysis is replaced by a questionnaire composed by 20 questions 
on reasons for intervention, legal and institutional impact and social and economic 
impact. The Spanish model entails no ex-post scrutiny and no consultation. 
261 See section 2.3 above. 
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overall picture is crystal-clear on the patchwork of heterogeneous 
experiences that composes the EU mosaic on impact assessment.262 
In summary, the persisting (and even widening) differences between 
impact assessment models adopted in EU member states call into doubt the 
likelihood that the EU’s efforts towards better regulation will be effectively 
mirrored by efficient and effective national policies. And, as good quality 
r e g u l a t i o n  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  a  m a jor step to achieving the ambitious 
Lisbon goals, further efforts are required in order to foster the convergence 
of impact assessment at member state level. Such efforts may include: 
  Improving the transposition process, in particular by avoiding 
unnecessary ‘gold-plating’ of directives, which can impose harmful 
administrative burdens and excess regulation on targeted groups, 
and encouraging the adoption of ‘light touch’ regulatory options. 
  Establishing a common language on impact assessment, in order to avoid 
the ‘garbage can’ fallacy.263 This goal can be pursued, for example, by 
issuing a Communication on impact assessment performed at 
national level, in which the Commission could clarify the key 
principles that should inspire the IA exercise.264  
  Providing for gradual convergence on key issues such as mandatory 
competitiveness-, subsidiarity- and proportionality-proofing, red tape 
screening, stakeholder consultation and calculation of net benefits of 
major proposals.265 
                                                      
262 Similar findings emerge from the so called ‘Rhodes Report’. See Report to the 
Ministers responsible for Public Administration in the EU member states on the progress 
of the implementation of the Mandelkern Report’s Action Plan on Better Regulation, ad hoc 
Group of Directors and Experts on Better Regulation (DEBR), Athens, May 2003.   
263 See Radaelli, What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe?, op. cit., 
observing that RIA is seen as a solution to different problems amongst EU 
countries. In particular, some countries (Germany, Sweden and Italy) see RIA as a 
solution to the problem of simplification, others (e.g. the Netherlands) as a tool to 
promote competitiveness, while still others (Denmark) link RIA to the quality of 
the business environment.   
264 Such a Communication could be linked to the National Lisbon Programmes, as 
implemented under the new “Recommendations for Actions to Member States for 
Inclusion in their Lisbon Programmes”. See COM(2005)24, companion document, 3 
February 2005. 
265 The UK Presidency of the European Union stated its intention to “reach 118 | ANDREA RENDA  
  Creating a network of national RIA authorities, coordinated by a new 
European independent oversight agency, in order to stimulate 
dialogue, knowledge dissemination and exchange of best practices 
amongst EU member states.266  
All these efforts should be geared towards the definition of a 
‘common language’ on impact assessment. Such endeavour should not, 
however, aim at erasing all contextual differences between national policy 
processes. Instead, the different ‘RIA dialects’ existing in the EU25 should 
be reconciled, leading to a koine dialectos that would certainly help the EU 
Better Regulation Action Plan achieve its ultimate goals. Table 8 
summarises the suggestions for enabling a gradual convergence of RIA 
models at member state level. 
Table 8. Recommendations on Roadmap 8 – Subsidiarity 
8.1  Improve transposition. 
8.2  Issue a communication on RIA in member states. 
8.3  Provide for gradual convergence on key issues. 
8.4  Create a network of national RIA authorities to be coordinated by a new 
independent oversight agency at EU level. 
                                                                                                                                       
agreement among Member States and the Commission on a common methodology 
for the measurement of the administrative burden of legislation, which, once 
agreed, would be included in all impact assessments.” See Prospects for the EU in 
2005 – The UK Presidency of the European Union, presented to Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her 
Majesty, June 2005, pp. 10-11. On establishing a common language on the need to 
calculate and maximise net benefits in Europe, see Hahn and Litan, Counting 
Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the US and Europe, op. cit., p. 500. (“The 
European Union should implement a policy specifying that the primary objective 
of regulation is to maximize net benefits.”)  
266 This initiative would draw on the work already done by the Mandelkern Group. 
The conclusions of the meeting of the Ministries of Public Administration at La 
Rioja in May 2002 required “that the Directors of Better Regulation and the 
Mandelkern Group experts continue to meet together on a regular basis under the 
name of Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, ensuring the coherence of their 
work with the above-mentioned Action Plan. The group in question will report to 
the Ministers responsible for Public Administration and Better Regulation on the 
results of the implementation of better regulation tools in Member States and on 
the Action Plan.” See the Rhodes Report, op. cit., p. 3. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 119 
 
3.8  Roadmap 9 – Issue guidelines on competitiveness-proofing and 
competition assessment 
As recalled earlier, although the IIA model was initially rooted in 
sustainable development, it gradually became an important tool to facilitate 
the achievement of the competitiveness goal set at the Lisbon Council and 
re-launched in the wake of the Kok Report.267 As a result, all IA exercises 
completed should ensure that the policy option undertaken will not harm 
the competitiveness of EU firms. In this respect, many stakeholders have 
underlined the need to provide for competitiveness-proofing of the 
proposals analyzed through preliminary impact assessment.  
Further support to this idea came from the ‘four presidencies 
initiative’ launched on 26 January 2004, which proposed to introduce 
mandatory competitiveness-proofing of major new regulations by the 
Competitiveness Council (CC).268 The Irish Presidency declared that it 
would ensure “that the policy proposals tested for their impact on 
competitiveness under the Commission Integrated Impact Assessment 
process will be considered at the Competitiveness Council leading to an 
effective system of ‘competitiveness proofing’ for proposed legislative 
measures.”269 Similar plans were formulated by the UK Presidency in 
setting its priorities for the July-December 2005 term.270 However, it is still 
unclear what is meant by competitiveness-proofing. Such an oversight can 
take many different forms and intervene at different points in time. As 
regards the timing of intervention, possible options are: 
  The CC can intervene in the choice of the regulatory option by 
suggesting the ‘more competitiveness-oriented option’; 
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268 See supra, note 168.  
269 See the Report of the Irish Presidencies, The Competitiveness Council Priorities 
Paper, January 2004, p. 6.  
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  The CC takes part in the consultation process after the preferred 
option has already been chosen, but before the extended impact 
assessment is completed; 
  The CC is consulted before the ExIA is drafted for an ‘interim 
competitiveness-proofing’; 
  The CC is consulted for a ‘final competitiveness check’ after the ExIA 
document has been completed; 
  The CC is consulted both at the preliminary stage and at the end of 
the impact assessment exercise; or 
  The CC supervises the whole impact assessment process and retains 
the power to repeal any proposal that is likely to harm EU 
competitiveness. 
Amongst these options, the ones in which the Competitiveness 
Council is called upon to supervise all the regulatory impact assessment 
process and/or to intervene at more than one stage appear probably too 
costly and burdensome, unless the CC is provided with more extensive 
powers to act as an independent body in charge of overseeing the overall 
quality of the methodology and procedure adopted by the lead DGs and 
other officials in charge of impact assessment. Economists and practitioners 
have stated the importance of involving oversight bodies at quite an early 
stage of the regulatory process, and in this respect the most preferred 
option should be to involve the CC in the choice of the regulatory option, 
so that the CC can suggest the most pro-competitive of the available 
alternatives. However, in this case the CC would not be able to actually 
perform a real check on the pro-competitive nature of the proposal 
undertaken. For this reason, the most effective timing for competitiveness-
proofing is probably the interim stage following the preliminary IA and 
preceding the completion of the ExIA.  
Concerning the form of intervention, possible options include: 
  The CC grants a clearance to the proposed regulation by stating that 
it is not inconsistent with the goal of promoting EU competitiveness; 
  The CC performs a detailed assessment of the impact of the proposal 
on EU competitiveness; or 
  The lead DGs mandatorily report in the ExIA on the consistency of 
the preferred regulatory option with the goal of competitiveness; the 
CC only monitors to ensure that the lead DG has correctly performed 
this task. Competitiveness-proofing is included in the IIA model as a 
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body) is granted the power to mandate the review of ExIAs in case of 
insufficient compliance with the obligatory requirement.  
Of the three above-mentioned options, the third seems to be probably 
more consistent with the target of streamlining the IIA procedure. First, it 
would reduce transaction costs between lead DGs and the CC. Secondly, it 
would reduce uncertainty for DGs in drafting the ExIAs. Thirdly, it would 
increase the DGs’ accountability for the overall quality of their impact 
assessments. Finally, it would save on administration costs, by avoiding the 
introduction of another procedural step between DGs and the CC.  
Another available option that may increase the consistency of 
proposed regulations with the competitiveness goal is to involve 
competition authorities in the overall process when necessary. Much of the 
competitiveness principle is rooted in the elimination of obstacles to 
competition in specific markets, and the involvement of competition 
authorities at least in the consultation stage would guarantee that proposals 
do not place excessive burdens on firms’ strategies, harming competition 
and consumer welfare. One easy way to involve competition policy-makers 
in the regulatory process is to publish the proposal on the competition 
authority’s website for comments, as was proposed in Ireland during a 
recent consultation on better regulation.271 A greater involvement of DG 
COMP with increased power to signal proposals that allegedly reduce the 
degree of competitiveness of individual relevant markets seems to be 
attracting growing interest among practioners and policy-makers. 
An example of competitiveness-proofing that can be considered as 
embedded in the IA model is provided by the UK Office of Fair Trade’s 
Competition Filter test, illustrated in Box 3. The competition assessment 
introduced in the UK in 2001 provides a very good example of how 
competitiveness issues (and competition authorities) can be involved in the 
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Ireland proposes that a mechanism for proofing regulations from a competition 
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RIA process. Table 9 lists the introduction of competition assessment as one 
of the suggestions for improving the competitiveness-proofing of ExIAs 
completed by lead DGs.  
 
Box 3. The OFT’s competition filter test  
Following the Government's 2001 White Paper on Enterprise, Skills and 
Innovation, entitled Opportunity for All in a World of Change, a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment of proposed regulations is now required to include the 
identification and assessment of potential competition concerns or benefits.272 
For this reason, the Office of Fair Trade has published ad hoc guidelines for 
policy-makers in government departments who are in charge of performing 
regulatory impact assessment.273 The UK Better Regulation Executive has also 
included a section on competition assessment on its website.274 Under the new 
screen test, officials in charge of RIA have to perform an initial ‘competition 
filter test’, by answering the following nine questions: 
1.  In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, does any firm have more than 10 per 
cent market share? 
2.  In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, does any firm have more than 20 per 
cent market share? 
3.  In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, do the largest three firms together 
have at least 50 per cent market share? 
4.  Would the costs of regulation affect some firms substantially more than others? 
5.  Is the regulation likely to affect the market structure, changing the number and size 
of firms? 
6.  Would the regulation lead to higher set-up costs for new or potential firms that 
existing firms do not have to meet? 
7.  Would the regulation lead to higher ongoing costs for new or potential firms that 
existing firms do not have to meet? 
8.  Is the sector characterised by rapid technological change? 
9.  Would the regulation restrict the ability of firms to choose the price, quality, range 
or location of their products? 
                                                      
272 The White Paper is available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/opportunityforall/ (visited 5 
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policymakers completing regulatory impact assessments, OFT355, February 2002.  
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This implies that competent officials are required to engage in a market 
definition exercise, just as normally performed by competition authorities. 
Where there are more ‘no’ than ‘yes’ answers to the filter questions, the 
administration can conclude that the proposal is not likely to exert a significant 
impact on competition in the relevant market(s). In this case, the results of the 
filter test must be reported in the initial RIA form, and no further analysis of 
competition effects is carried out. Nonetheless, the initial RIA should carry a 
definition of the affected markets, a summary of the characteristics of each 
relevant market, and – most notably - a “clear statement about the anticipated 
positive and negative effects on competition for each policy option with an 
explanation of the reasoning behind the answers to the nine questions.”275   
Conversely, whenever there are more ‘yes’ answers than ‘no’, a ‘detailed 
competition assessment’ has to be included in the RIA. Such an assessment is 
very similar to that performed by competition authorities in scrutinising the 
prospective effects of mergers. It requires the sponsoring administration to 
consider all possible effects of a regulation, including any knock-on effects on 
related sectors; check whether these effects do in fact raise concerns for 
competition; and compare policy options in terms of their impact on 
competition, and, if possible, identify suitable alternative policy options. The 
detailed competition assessment is articulated in three steps: i)  identifying 
directly and indirectly affected markets; ii) understanding the current nature of 
competition, by exploring supply and demand factors, market outcomes and the 
competitive process, and iii) identifying the impacts of the regulation, which 
mandatorily include both the direct and indirect impacts on competition 
resulting from each policy option presented in the RIA.  
In performing the detailed competition assessment, sponsoring 
administrations can rely on an ad hoc structure at the Office of Fair Trade, called 
Regulatory Review Team.  
 
Table 9. Recommendations on Roadmap 9 – Competitiveness-proofing 
9.1  Include competitiveness in the IIA standard model by issuing guidelines on 
how to perform competitiveness-proofing or competition assessment. 
9.2  Involve CC at the interim stage between the preliminary IA and the ExIA. 
9.3  Allow the CC to signal ExIAs that do not sufficiently address 
competitiveness. 
9.4  Involve DG COMP in the consultation process. 
9.5  Introduce a competition filter test supported by the DG COMP. 
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3.9  Roadmap 10 – Create a regulatory watchdog 
Most of the roadmaps illustrated in previous sections crucially depend on 
the appointment of a centralised unit in charge of overseeing the 
implementation of the IIA model. The main problem in the EU is certainly 
not the absence of entities with expertise on impact assessment; on the 
contrary, it is the proliferation of administrative bodies linked to the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament, each with autonomous 
activities in the field of better regulation and impact assessment.276 As a 
matter of fact, none of these structures – and certainly not their sum – 
would be able to replicate the oversight functions performed by 
successfully created governmental and independent bodies in most OECD 
countries where impact assessment has produced some encouraging 
results. The absence of a dedicated, individual oversight body is certainly 
one of the evident limits of the current IIA model. 
The need for an independent agency in charge of overseeing the 
implementation of the impact assessment procedure had been stressed 
even before the introduction of the IIA model in the EU. In the Final Report 
on the BIA system, the Commission stated that “weaknesses identified in 
the BIA system, particularly as regards the identification of proposals that 
should be subject to BIA and the quality check on the analysis carried out, 
indicate that a dedicated structure is needed to support an impact 
assessment process. This is also in accordance with international 
practice.”277 The Commission also acknowledged that such a structure 
should be given a mandate for issuing guidance and checking that the 
quality of the analysis is satisfactory, and suggested that “[p]referably, it 
should be situated centrally within the Commission in order to ensure 
transparency and coordination”.278  
This suggestion, however, was not transposed into the new IIA 
model introduced in 2003. Today, most of the problems encountered in the 
IIA experimental phase should ‘ring a bell’ in Brussels, and lead to a 
decision to remedy the ‘original sin’ of not appointing a supervising agency 
for what now appears as a quite uncoordinated and unsupervised 
assessment exercise.   
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The creation of (more than) one oversight body was already the 
subject of the so-called ‘Doorn motion’ at the European Parliament, as 
described above, in section 2.3. The model proposed by Doorn served 
exactly the purpose of reconciling the need for independent evaluation by 
DGs, the Council and the Parliament with the need to have an external 
agent overseeing the procedure, consulting with proposing administrations 
and highlighting significant inconsistencies and/or methodological flaws 
in the analysis. However, as already recalled, the model proposed would 
probably prove too complex and burdensome for EU administrations, 
which are currently feeling a strong urge to cut red tape and simplify 
administrative procedures. Endorsing such a three-tiered approach would, 
in addition, significantly jeopardise the convergence of approaches adopted 
by different EU institutions, thus increasing the likelihood of 
inconsistencies between adopted procedures and – from a more game-
theoretical perspective – putting incentives on individual audits to behave 
strategically and compete against each other, in order to both legitimise 
their existence and serve the mandate of their principal institution. All 
these would translate into an increase, not a reduction, of administrative 
costs. 
A more effective, cost-reducing and organisationally efficient model 
would entail the creation of a centralised agency for integrated impact 
assessment. As both Commission proposals and Council and Parliament 
amendments will be subjected to the IIA, a single task force is more likely 
to effectively guarantee the convergence of the assessment methods applied 
and avoid duplication in consultations and in competitiveness-proofing as 
well as in the assessments of subsidiarity, proportionality, cost-
effectiveness, environmental and social impacts. A single clearinghouse for 
EU assessment exercises would also facilitate lesson-drawing and the 
identification of best practices.  
Further support to the creation of dedicated oversight bodies for 
impact assessment carried out by proponent administrations comes from 
the OECD’s extensive experience in surveying better regulation initiatives 
in developed countries. Since the late 1990s, OECD reports have always 
stated the importance of linking impact assessment to an oversight body as 
a key enabler of the success of regulatory impact analysis models.279 Most 
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recently, Josef Konvitz recalled that “[t]he relationship between an 
effective, comprehensive regulatory policy and the existence of a central 
oversight body appears to be strong. They are mutually supportive, and 
where one exists, the other is usually also present.” Konvitz also 
highlighted that oversight bodies “can perform a number of different 
functions ... an advocacy role, a challenge function (the critical assessment 
of RIA), and practical and technical support for the application of 
regulatory tools”. As a result, “[r]esources must be allocated to promote 
regulatory policy, for example to central oversight bodies, which need 
adequate authority for their tasks such as the formal oversight of RIA. 
Measures including sanctions must be built in to ensure compliance with 
regulatory quality processes and tools.“280 
Moreover, authoritative scholars such as Robert Hahn and Robert 
Litan have recently advocated the creation of a “strong centralised 
oversight unit to help evaluate significant regulatory proposals” at EU 
level, adding that “states that do not have such unit should consider 
creating them”.281 Hahn and Litan also specified that the centralised unit 
should have a status similar to the units it will have to discipline (i.e. lead 
DGs); that the unit should take on a leadership role in establishing 
information quality and regulatory guidelines both for EU and member 
state policy-makers; that the unit should be given the power to challenge 
proposals that do not carry a sufficient or satisfactory estimate of net 
benefits; that it should publish its findings on the Internet; that it should 
publish a comprehensive annual report on the costs and benefits of EU 
regulation; and that it should be adequately funded in order to provide 
training for EU regulators and better information to MEPs.282  
Finally, most scholarly literature considers the delegation of policy-
making powers to regulatory agencies as a solution that maximises 
regulatory legitimacy and credibility. Enhancing the credibility of the EU 
                                                                                                                                       
London, 10-11 January 2005 (available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/28/ 
35028836.pdf – accessed 5 December 2005).  
280  See J. Konvitz, “The Institutional Context for Better Regulation”, paper 
presented at the Conference on Simple is Better: Effective Regulation for a More 
Competitive Europe, Amsterdam, 7-8 October 2004, p. 8. 
281 See Hahn and Litan, op. cit., p. 503. See also C. Radaelli, “The Diffusion of 
R e g u l a t o r y  I m p a c t  A n a l y s i s  i n  O E C D  Countries: Best Practices or Lesson-
Drawing?”, European Journal of Political Research, 43(5), 2004, pp. 723-747.  
282 See Hahn and Litan, op. cit., p. 503. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 127 
 
IIA model has been recently defined as an overarching goal for EU 
institutions, even with respect to other priorities, such as efficient 
regulation.283 Well-known scholars have also advocated the creation of 
agencies whenever the regulatory issues to be tackled exhibit increased 
technical and scientific complexity, as is the case for the IIA exercise.284 
Other commentators have argued that the creation of ad hoc regulatory 
agencies can facilitate the involvement of certain groups in the decision-
making process.285 And some have argued that a centralised regulatory 
agency could profit from scale economies, collecting experience and 
expertise and emerging as a one-stop-shop also for member state 
administrations in charge of impact assessment.286  
In summary, a widespread consensus seems to be emerging on the 
merit of creating a centralised regulatory oversight unit for EU impact 
assessment, with enhanced advocacy, consulting, oversight and challenge 
functions. However, the road to achieving such goal is punctuated by a 
number of question marks, concerning in particular: i) the governance 
structure of the unit; ii) the powers and the functions it should be granted; 
iii) the expertise it should collect; and iv) the timing and scope of its 
intervention.  
As regards the governance structure of the oversight body, several 
alternative options should be considered. First, the governmental or non-
governmental nature of the unit should be addressed. Examples of 
governmental bodies performing oversight functions in OECD countries 
                                                      
283 See C. Radaelli, What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe?, op. cit., 
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include the OIRA in the US and the BRE in the UK, whereas other 
countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan and Mexico, 
have created non-governmental bodies reporting directly to the Parliament. 
Australia is probably the most extreme case. The State of Victoria allows 
any competent person or organisation to certify that a RIA document 
complies with the relevant requirements.287 As a result, even external 
scholars are allowed to perform the challenge function normally attributed 
to institutional oversight bodies.  
The EU case, however, is certainly peculiar in this respect. In the IIA 
model, oversight would be needed on all regulatory proposals subjected to 
extended impact assessment, which include major Commission initiatives 
and amendments proposed by the Council and the Parliament under the 
co-decision procedure. Against this backdrop, the available options for the 
creation of an oversight agency would include: establishing an independent 
monitoring agency; an inter-institutional agency; a unit rooted in the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General; or an agency dependent on the 
Competitiveness Council or one of the Parliament’s Committees.288  
From a theoretical standpoint, none of the above-mentioned options 
strictly dominates the others. Furthermore, the EU’s peculiar institutional 
setting needs to be taken into due account before deciding on the 
governance structure to be given to the new regulatory unit. As a matter of 
fact, the EU model of policy initiation and formulation has significantly 
departed from the traditional ‘separation of powers’ by establishing an 
indigenous “institutional balance of powers” approach, deeply rooted in 
the principle of ‘non-interference’ introduced from the outset in Article 4 of 
the Treaty of Rome. According to such principle, each EU institution must 
strictly adhere to the limits of the individual competences assigned to it by 
the Treaty.289 Within this wider framework, the EU institutions have 
developed their own model of policy-making, which almost fully delegates 
policy initiation powers to the Commission. For such reason, creating an 
inter-institutional unit to oversee and challenge impact assessments 
performed by individual DGs would at least seem hazardous – and 
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evidence confirms that no similar structure exists in the EU. Furthermore, 
the Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making signed in 2003 
specifies that the Commission should keep taking the lead on impact 
assessment, and ensure that the result of its activities is made available to 
the Council and the Parliament.290 The two most viable options would 
therefore be the creation of an independent oversight agency and the 
creation of a specialised unit within the Commission’s Secretariat-
General.291   
The identification of the best option would inevitably depend on the 
choice of the powers and duties that the oversight agency should be 
granted. The more extensive and far-reaching such powers and duties are, 
the less likely that an independent agency can be called upon to perform 
them. These would inevitably include advocacy, consulting, guidance, 
challenge, coordination of existing initiatives, training, yearly reporting and 
keeping institutional relations. Table 10 describes in more detail the powers 
and duties a centralised regulatory unit should have in order to effectively 
oversee the implementation of the IIA model.  
Table 10. Powers and duties of an ideal centralised regulatory unit for IIA 
Powers/Duties Description  Timing 
Advocacy 
-  Participate in the advocacy process by 
identifying areas in which regulatory 
reform would be needed, with specific 
emphasis on areas in which 
administrative burdens appear excessive 
and SMEs are faced with overwhelming 
red tape 
-  Issue ‘prompt letters’ by suggesting 
initiatives by individual DGs in 
identified areas of regulatory reform 
Ongoing 
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-  Issue suggestions on the choice of 
regulatory options to be considered, by 
promoting the assessment of self-
regulatory and other ‘light touch’ 
options 
-  Gather opinions from stakeholders on 
areas in which regulatory costs are 
excessive and submit them to individual 
DGs 
Consulting 
-  Provide assistance to DGs at an early 
stage of drafting the preliminary and 
extended impact assessment forms 
-  Intervene in early drafts by suggesting 
more in-depth assessment of compliance 
with competitiveness, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, reduction of 
administrative burdens requirements, 
etc.  
-  Help DGs in performing competition 
assessments 
-  Help Council and Parliament in 
assessing the impact of major 
amendments to Commission proposals 
Ongoing 
Guidance 
-  Issue guidelines on methodological 
issues, such as testing the compliance 
with competitiveness, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, reduction of 
administrative burdens requirements, 
etc.  
-  Issue guidelines on competition 
assessment 
-  Collaborate with individual DGs in 
defining sector-specific impact 
assessment methodologies and in their 
periodical reviews 
Periodical 
Challenge 
-  Power to reject proposals not 
accompanied by a satisfactory impact 
assessment form 
-  Power to impose the drafting of an ExIA 
if the agency has performed only a 
preliminary IA 
-  Power to impose amendments in terms 
of more extensive stakeholder 
consultation, screening for 
administrative costs, proportionality, 
subsidiarity, competitiveness, etc. 
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-  Power to impose a competition 
assessment 
-  Power to impose the calculation of net 
benefits 
Coordination  
-  Coordination of the relaunched IIA 
model with existing initiatives/pilot 
projects at EU level, such as BEST, SLIM, 
IRQ, etc. 
-  Coordination with DG COMP for 
performance of competition assessments 
-  Coordination with existing groups active 
in the field of better regulation, such as 
the DEBR, the High Level Group, 
Council and Parliament ad hoc groups, 
etc.  
-  Coordination with national units 
responsible for impact assessment 
Ongoing 
Training 
-  Organise training sessions for EU public 
officials, involving also practitioners and 
academicians 
-  Provide training to officials responsible 
for impact assessment in individual 
member states 
Ongoing 
Reporting 
-  Publish yearly reports on the net benefits 
of major EU legislation 
-  Publish the results of oversight activities 
on the Internet 
-  Report to the Competitiveness Council 
on simplification priorities and 
competition assessments performed 
Yearly 
Institutional relations 
-  Report to meetings of the 
Competitiveness Council on 
simplification priorities and competition 
assessments performed 
-  Report to Parliament on oversight 
activities carried out every year and on 
Parliament’s request 
-  Cooperate with the US Office of 
Management and Budget in the US-
Commission Dialogue on regulatory and 
impact assessment practices launched in 
Washington, D.C. on 20 June 2005 
Periodical 
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Turning to the issue of expertise, most functions embedded in the 
oversight body would certainly call for the appointment of specialised staff 
with extensive expertise in the field of economic, environmental and social 
impact assessment. The unit should be able to challenge proposed 
regulations both for the failure to comply with procedural steps as well as 
in cases where the substantive assessment is lacking methodological 
soundness. An issue that has been raised is whether the ‘regulatory 
watchdog’ should do the analysis itself or commission it to external 
experts, by engaging in spot or framework contracting with practitioners, 
consultants or academicians. From this perspective, a trade-off seems to 
emerge between the need to develop an independent expertise and the 
difficulty and costliness of creating a single unit with all the required 
expertise to scrutinise economic, social and environmental assessments 
performed by all DGs across widely disparate fields. A wise solution 
would consist in initially relying on external experts, and gradually 
requiring that the unit performs in-house analyses by drawing on past and 
consolidated experience. 
 
Table 11. Recommendations on Roadmap 10 – Creating a regulatory watchdog 
10.1  Create a centralised regulatory unit rooted in the Commission’s Secretariat-
General. 
10.2  Empower the unit with roles of advocacy, consulting, guidance, challenge, 
coordination of existing initiatives, training, yearly reporting and keeping 
institutional relations. 
10.3  Allow for initial reliance on external expertise, and gradual development of 
in-house knowledge and competences.  
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4.  Conclusion: It’s a long way to Lisbon 
The importance of impact assessment as a key tool to ensure the viability of 
proposed pieces of legislation has been acknowledged by scholars of a 
significant number of disciplines in the social sciences. Mainstream 
economists consider impact assessment as a method to compare 
prospective direct and indirect costs and benefits of proposed regulations, 
and to assess the desirability of a given regulatory option by using some 
form of efficiency criterion, whether it be the Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency criterion, mixed tests accounting for justice or distributive issues 
such as the Kaldor-Hicks-Zerbe Jr. criterion, the recently proposed KHM 
criterion, the lexicographical criterion developed by John Rawls, or some 
other measure.292  
Game theorists and scholars in the economic theory of organisation 
tend to consider impact assessment as an instrument of accountability, 
within a broader framework in which public administrations, legislative 
and government structures are analysed as a complex, multi-level nexus of 
principal-agent relationships. For example, distinguished scholars in law 
and economics have analysed CBA and RIA as tools to increase the 
principal’s degree of control over bureaucrat-agents, a goal that is 
considered as per se more important than the actual scientific soundness of 
the assessment exercise.293  
                                                      
292 For an overview of most criteria, see F. Parisi and J. Klick, “Functional Law and 
Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking”, Chicago-Kent 
Law Review, 79, 2004, pp. 431-450; but also J.R. Hicks, “The Foundations of Welfare 
Economics”,  Economic Journal, 49, 1939, pp. 696-712; N. Kaldor, “Welfare 
Propositions of Economics and Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility”, Economic 
Journal, 49, 1939, pp. 549-52; R.O. Zerbe Jr., “Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal? Three 
Rules”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17, 1998, pp. 419-456; and R.O. 
Zerbe Jr., Y. Bauman and A. Finkle, An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
Working Paper 05-13, AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory Studies, 
Washington, D.C., August 2005.  
293 See E.A. Posner, Controlling Agencies, op. cit. 134 | ANDREA RENDA  
More generally, economic theory suggests that, when using ex ante 
policy evaluation tools, the absolute outcome of the evaluation is less 
important than the relative, comparative result – i.e. RIA becomes useful 
when it provides support in deciding which regulatory option should be 
undertaken, by enabling the use of criteria and tests that exert a neutral 
impact on all the regulatory options to be compared. Such an agnostic view 
of RIA, of course, highlights the importance of using quali-quantitative 
tools at an early stage, before the regulatory option has been chosen.  
Lawyers, on the other hand, tend to see impact assessment as a 
standardised procedure that legitimises and integrates the choice to 
delegate powers to dependent and independent administrations. The 
distinction between pro-forma RIA, informative RIA and integrated RIA 
developed by the UK National Audit Office is useful in this respect.294 In 
the first case, RIA becomes a procedural requirement that integrates and 
standardises the regulatory process, and only helps governments and 
parliaments in observing the underlying rationale that led an individual 
department or agency to undertake a given policy option. In the second 
case, RIA can be used as a communication tool, for example, in a late 
consultation process or in implementing the regulatory option, thus mostly 
to increase transparency vis-à-vis targeted groups. Whereas only in the 
third case, the results of impact assessment exert a significant impact on the 
policy option chosen by proposing administrations. Thus, from a lawyer’s 
perspective, the timing, scope and procedural aspects of a RIA are the most 
important and decisive: failure to complete a RIA form should lead to 
sanctions by competent administrations, and to the consequent annulment 
of regulations not backed by a sufficiently exhaustive RIA.  
Finally, political scientists tend to award priority to the contextual 
dimension of impact assessment. As has been recently stated, depending on 
the institutional context in which it is introduced, RIA can become a way to 
coordinate policy, an expression of formal bureaucratic behaviour, an 
efficiency-oriented set of tests or a creature geared towards enabling a 
common discourse in a world dominated by multi-level, disintegrated 
governance. In the EU case, failure to provide RIA with a specific identity 
and function has been considered as a typical way to “disguise political-
distributional problems under the veil of pseudo-methodological 
problems”.295 
                                                      
294 See e.g. The Compendium Report 2004-2005, op. cit., p. 3. 
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In this paper, I tried to take into account all the abovementioned 
perspectives by presenting an integrated, interdisciplinary discussion of the 
most urgent issues that may be addressed in the review of the EU 
integrated Impact Assessment model, scheduled for early 2006. Far from 
representing a complete picture, this analysis is conceived for policy-
makers as possible ‘food for thought’ in discussing the upcoming review.  
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the present analysis is 
clear. On the one hand, EU institutions are relying heavily on impact 
assessment as a shortcut to Lisbon. And in doing so, they are announcing 
future savings in business compliance costs and in administrative costs, a 
yet-unknown pervasiveness of cost-benefit analyses, a higher level of 
coordination between EU institutions, and finally a more transparent, 
accountable, ‘open’ regulatory process to the benefit of next generation 
businesses and citizens.296 On the other hand, however, the results achieved 
so far in this direction are, to say the least, poor. Before the gap gets too 
wide, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament should take action 
to take the review of the IIA model seriously.  
Evidence from other international experiences as well as from the 
past EU experience reveal that it is preferable not to have RIA, than to have 
a bad one. And EU institutions, especially after the French and Dutch ‘no’ 
votes on the European Constitution and the latest disappointing economic 
results, cannot count on the power of the gospel. If the Commission really 
has the numbers, then action must be taken seriously and now to increase 
the methodological soundness, transparency, cost-effectiveness and 
external oversight of impact assessments. And similar procedures must be 
included in national Lisbon strategies. For these reasons, the upcoming 
review of the impact assessment model, expected in early 2006, is even 
more crucial than it might prima facie seem. If Europe fails to square the 
circle, the panacea is likely to become a Pandora’s box, leading, on the one 
hand, to fertile ground for regulatory capture; on the other, to more 
‘scientific’ attempts to defend the virtues of vicious pieces of legislation. In 
other words, a scapegoat both for the regulators and for the regulated.  
                                                      
296 On the concept of ‘openness’ in regulatory processes, see OECD, Modernising 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF EXIAS ANALYSED 
  Lead DG  Date  Title  ExIA  Proposal 
71 COMP  07/06/2005 
State Aid Action Plan - Less and 
better targeted state aid: a roadmap 
for state aid reform 2005-2009  
SEC(2005)795 COM(2005)107 
70 DEV  12/04/2005 
Accelerating progress towards 
attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals - Financing for 
Development and Aid Effectiveness 
SEC(2005)454 COM(2005)133 
69 DEV  12/04/2005 
Accelerating progress towards 
achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals - The European 
Union's contribution  
SEC(2005)452   COM(2005)132 
68 EAC  06/04/2005 
Decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
establishing for the period 2007-
2013 the programme "Citizens for 
Europe" to promote active 
European citizenship  
SEC(2005)442 COM(2005)116 
67 EAC  30/05/2005 
Communication on "Addressing the 
concerns of young people in Europe 
- implementing the European Youth 
Pact and promoting active 
citizenship"  
SEC(2005)693 COM(2005)206 
66 EMPL  09/02/2005 
Communication on the Social 
Agenda  
SEC(2005)177 COM(2005)33 
65 EMPL  01/06/2005 
Communication on Non-
discrimination and equal 
opportunities for all - a framework 
strategy  
SEC(2005)689 COM(2005)224 
64 ENTR  06/04/2005 
Decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme 
(2007-2013)  
SEC(2005)433 COM(2005)121 
63 ENV  2005/ 
Communication on Winning the 
Battle against Global Climate 
Change  
SEC(2005)180 COM(2005)35 
62 ENV  06/04/2005 
Council Regulation establishing a 
Rapid Response and Preparedness 
Instrument for major emergencies  
SEC(2005)439   COM(2005)113  150 | ANDREA RENDA  
61 FISH  06/04/2005 
Council Regulation establishing 
Community financial measures for 
the implementation of the Common 
Fisheries Policy and in the area of 
the Law of the Sea  
SEC(2005)426 COM(2005)117 
60 INFSO  01/06/2005 
Communication on "i2010 - a 
European Information Society for 
growth and employment"    
SEC(2005)717 COM(2005)229 
59 JLS  14/02/2005 
Communication on a EU Drugs 
Action Plan (2005-2008)  
SEC(2005)216 COM(2005)45 
58 JLS  06/04/2005 
General Programme on 
Fundamental Rights and Justice  
SEC(2005)434 COM(2005)122 
57 JLS  06/04/2005 
General Programme Security and 
Safeguarding Liberties  
SEC(2005)436 COM(2005)124 
56 JLS  06/04/2005 
General Programme Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows  
SEC(2005)435 COM(2005)123 
55 REGIO  06/04/2005 
Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the European Union 
Solidarity Fund  
SEC(2005)447 COM(2005)108 
54 RELEX  12/04/2005 
Communication on the "Tenth 
Anniversary of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: A work 
programme to meet the challenges 
for the next five years  
SEC(2005)483   COM(2005)139 
53 RTD  06/04/2005 
Decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the seventh framework 
programme of the European 
Community for research, 
technological development and 
demonstration activities (2007-2013) 
SEC(2005)430 COM(2005)119 
52 SANCO 28/04/2005 
Council Directive on Community 
measures for the control of Avian 
Influenza / Council Decision 
amending Council Decision 
90/424/EEC on expenditure in the 
veterinary field  
SEC(2005)549 COM(2005)171 
51 SANCO 06/04/2005 
Health and Consumer Protection 
Strategy and Programme 
SEC(2005)425 COM(2005)115 
50 TAXUD 06/04/2005 
Communication on the Community 
programmes Customs 2013 and 
Fiscal 2013  
SEC(2005)423 COM(2005)111 
49 DEV  20/07/2004 
Council Regulation establishing a 
voluntary FLEGT licensing scheme 
for imports of timber into the 
European Community 
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48 EMPL  21/04/2004 
Recast of the gender equality 
Directives 
SEC(2004)482 COM(2004)279 
47 EMPL  22/09/2004 
Directive amending Directive 
2003/88/EC concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of 
working time 
SEC(2004)1154 COM(2004)607 
46 ENTR  29/09/2004 
Regulation on medicinal products 
for paediatric use and amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1786/92, Directive 2001/83/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 
SEC(2004)1144 COM(2004)599 
45 ENTR  25/10/2004 
Directive laying down rules on 
nominal quantities for pre-packed 
products, repealing Council 
Directives 75/106/EEC and 
80/232/EEC, and amending 
Council Directive 76/211/EEC 
SEC(2004)1298 COM(2004)708 
44  ENV  25/02/2004  Environment & Standardisation   SEC(2004)206  COM(2004)130  
43  ENV  09/06/2004  Environment & Health Action Plan  SEC(2004)729 
COM(2004)416(1) 
COM(2004)416(2) 
42 ENV  23/07/2004 
Directive establishing an 
infrastructure for spatial 
information in the Community 
(INSPIRE) 
SEC(2004)980 COM(2004)516 
41 FISH  28/04/2004 
Council Regulation establishing a 
Community Fisheries Control 
Agency 
SEC(2004)448 COM(2004)289 
40 INFSO  17/05/2004 
Update of eEurope 2005 Action 
Plan 
SEC(2004)608 COM(2004)380 
39 INFSO  30/07/2004 
Communication on interoperability 
of digital interactive television 
services 
SEC(2004)1028 COM(2004)541 
38 JAI  12/02/2004 
Council Decision establishing the 
European Refugee Fund for the 
period 2005 2010 
SEC(2004)161 COM(2004)102   
37 JAI  28/04/2004 
Framework Decision on procedural 
rights in criminal proceedings 
SEC(2004)491 COM(2004)328 
36 JLS  28/12/2004 
Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the Visa Information 
System (VIS) and the exchange of 
data between Member States on 
short stay-visas 
SEC(2004)1628 COM(2004)835 
35  MARKT  21/04/2004  Directive on reinsurance  SEC(2004)443  COM(2004)273 152 | ANDREA RENDA  
34  MARKT  14/07/2004  Capital adequacy Directive  SEC(2004)921  COM(2004)486(1) 
33 MARKT  14/09/2004 
Directive amending Directive 
98/71/EC on the legal protection of 
designs 
SEC(2004)1097 COM(2004)582 
32 MARKT  29/12/2004 
Communication on an Action plan 
for the implementation of the legal 
framework for electronic public 
procurement 
SEC(2004)1639 COM(2004)841 
31 TREN  03/03/2004 
Directive amending Council 
Directive 91/440/EEC on the 
development of the Community's 
railways 
SEC(2004)236 COM(2004)139   
30 AGRI  14/07/2004 
Council Regulation on support for 
rural development by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development 
SEC(2004)931 COM(2004)490 
29 EAC  14/07/2004 
Decision establishing the Culture 
2007 Programme (2007-2013)  
SEC(2004)954 COM(2004)469 
28 EAC  14/07/2004 
Decision concerning the 
implementation of the MEDIA 2007 
Programme 
SEC(2004)955 COM(2004)470 
27 EAC  14/07/2004 
Decision creating the "Youth in 
action" Programme (2007-2013) 
SEC(2004)960 COM(2004)471 
26 EAC  14/07/2004 
Decision establishing an integrated 
action programme in the field of 
lifelong learning 
SEC(2004)971 COM(2004)474 
25 EMPL    2004/07/14 
Regulation on the European Social 
Fund 
SEC(2004)924 COM(2004)493 
24 ENV  15/07/2004 
Communication on financing 
Natura 2000 
SEC(2004)770 COM(2004)431 
23 FISH  14/07/2004 
Council Regulation on European 
Fisheries Fund 
SEC(2004)965 COM(2004)497   
22 REGIO  14/07/2004 
Council Regulation laying down 
general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund 
SEC(2004)924 COM(2004)492 
21  AGRI  23/09/2003  Review of the Sugar Regime  SEC(2003)1022  COM(2003)554 
20  AGRI  23/09/2003  Review of the Tobacco Regime  SEC(2003)1023  COM(2003)554 
19 ECFIN  15/10/2003 
Communication of the Commission 
on the state of play and 
development of the Euro-Med 
Facility 
SEC(2003)1110 COM(2003)587 IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 153 
 
18 EMPL  14/01/2003 
Review of the European 
Employment Strategy 
Communication COM(2003)6 
17 EMPL  05/11/2003 
Directive on non-discrimination on 
the basis of sex (art. 13) 
SEC(2003)1213 COM(2003)657 
16 ENTR  21/11/2003 
Basic orientations for the 
sustainability of European Tourism 
SEC(2003)1295 COM(2003)716 
15 ENV  23/07/2003 
Legislation on the Kyoto flexible 
instruments Joint Implementation 
(JI) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) 
SEC(2003)785 COM(2003)403 
14 ENV  06/10/2003 
Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
concerning groundwater protection 
SEC(2003) 1086  COM(2003)550 
13 ENV  29/10/2003 
Framework Legislation on 
Chemical Substances (establishing 
REACH) 
SEC(2003) 1171  COM(2003)644 
12 ENV  24/11/2003 
 Directive on batteries and 
accumulators 
SEC(2003)1343 COM(2003)723 
11 FISH  23/12/2003 
Proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing measures for the 
recovery of the sole stocks in the 
Western Channel and the Bay of 
Biscay  
SEC(2003)1480 COM(2003)819 
10 FISH  23/12/2003 
Proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing measures for the 
recovery of the southern hake stock 
and the Norway lobster stocks in 
the Cantabrian Sea and Western 
Iberian peninsula  
SEC(2003)1481 COM(2003)818 
9 INFSO 15/09/2003 
Communication on intelligent 
vehicles and road safety 
SEC(2003)963 COM(2003)542 
8 INFSO 17/09/2003 
Communication on the transition 
from analogue broadcasting to 
digital broadcasting: Digital 
switchover in Europe 
SEC(2003)992 COM(2003)541 
7 JAI  03/06/2003 
Communication on immigration, 
integration and employment 
SEC(2003)694 COM(2003)336 
6 MARKT  13/01/2004 
Proposal for a directive on services 
in the internal market  
SEC(2004)21 COM(2004)2 
5 RELEX 28/10/2003 
European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights Regulations 
975/1999 and 976/1999 
SEC(2003)1170 COM(2003)639 154 | ANDREA RENDA  
4 SANCO  18/06/2003 
Framework Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council on fair commercial 
practices 
SEC(2003)724 COM(2003)356 
3 TREN  01/10/2003 
Decision replacing Decision 
1692/96/EC on the Community 
guidelines for the development of 
the Tran-European Network in the 
field of transport (TEN guidelines) 
SEC(2003)1060 COM(2003)564 
2 TREN  10/12/2003 
Directive on Security of Supply for 
Electricity  
SEC(2003)1368 COM(2003)740 
1 TREN  10/12/2003 
Decision laying down guidelines 
for Trans-European energy 
networks 
SEC(2003)1369 COM(2003)742 | 155 
APPENDIX B. LIST OF SCORECARD ITEMS 
Item Number  Variables 
   Estimation of costs 
1  Stated costs exist 
2  Quantified at least some costs 
3  Monetised at least some costs 
4  Monetised all or nearly all costs 
5  Provided best estimate of total cost 
6  Provided range for total costs 
7  Associate costs w/EU institutions 
8 Associate  costs/non-EU  institution 
9  Associate costs with producers (BIA) 
10  Provided best estimate and range for total costs 
   Estimation of benefits 
11  Stated benefits exists 
12  Quantified at least some benefits 
13  Monetised at least some benefits 
14  Monetised all or nearly all benefits 
15  Provided best estimate of total benefits 
16  Provided range for total benefits 
17  Monetised safety benefits 
18  Monetised health benefits 
19  Monetised pollution reduction benefits (not health related) 
20  Monetised pollution reduction benefits (health related) 
21  Provide best estimate or range for total benefits 
22  Provided best estimate and range for total benefits 
23  Monetised any health-related benefit 
   Comparison of costs and benefits 
24  Calculated net benefits 
25  Provided a best estimate of net benefits 
26  Provided a range for net benefits 
27 Calculated  cost effectiveness 
28  Provided a best estimate of cost effectiveness 
29  Provided a range for cost effectiveness 
30  Provided a point estimate or range for total cost effectiveness 156 | ANDREA RENDA  
31  Had positive net benefits 
32  Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness 
33  Calculated net benefits and cost effectiveness 
53  Calculated both point estimate and range for net benefits 
54  Calculated either point estimate or range for net benefits 
   Evaluation of alternatives 
34  Gave at least one alternative standard level 
35  Considered at least one alternative policy option 
36  Quantified alternatives (costs) 
37  Monetised alternatives (costs) 
38  Quantified alternatives (benefits) 
39 Monetised  alternative  (benefits) 
40  Cost effectiveness of alternatives 
41  Net benefits of alternatives 
42  Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness of alternatives 
43  Considered some alternative 
   Clarity of presentation 
44  Contain executive summary 
45  Summary contains tables 
   Consistent use of analytical assumptions 
46  Identified euro year 
47  Used consistent euro year 
48  Identified discount rate 
49  Used consistent discount rate 
50  Discount rate = 4% 
51  Consistent costs and benefits 
52  Identified and consistently used discount rate and euro year 
   Lives 
55  Point estimate for numbers of lives saved 
56  Range estimates for number of lives saved 
57  What was the point (or range) estimate of lives saved? 
58  Point estimate for numbers of life-years saved 
59  Range estimate for number of life-years saved 
60  What was the point (or range) estimate of life-years saved? 
   VSL 
61  Point estimate for VSL 
62  Range estimate for VSL 
63  Point estimate for VSLY IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 157 
 
64  Range estimate for VSLY 
65  What was the point (and/or range) estimate of VSL or VSLY) 
66  Did IIA give € year for VSL (or VSLY)? 
67  What was the € year for VSL (or VSLY)? 
   Discount rate 
68  Point estimate for discount rate 
69  Range estimate for discount rate 
70  What was the point (and/or range) estimate of discount rate? 
71  Did IIA specify real or nominal discount rate? 
72  Was the discount rate real or nominal? 
   Executive summary 
73  ES presented at least some monetised costs 
74  ES presented at least some monetised benefits 
75  ES presented any measure of cost effectiveness 
76  ES presented any estimate of net benefits 
77  ES offer a best judgment of how benefits and costs compare 
78  ES summarised any non-quantified benefits 
79  ES summarised any non-quantified costs 
   Other Items 
80 Competitiveness  proofing 
81 Environmental  impact  assessed 
82  Social impact assessed 
83 Administrative  burdens  assessed 
84  CBA, CEA, risk-risk analysis 
85 Consultation  reported 
86  Consultation led to changes 
87  Data from affected interests 
88  Provision for review 
89  Zero option considered 
90  Consequence on single market 
91 Considered  the  acquis 
92  Considered soft law 
93 Considered  self-regulation 
94  Considered co-regulation/open method of coordination 
95 Considered  subsidiarity 
96 Considered  proportionality 
97 Sensitivity  test 
98  Use of external expertise | 158 
APPENDIX C. SCORECARD RESULTS  
Item  Variables  2003 2004 2005 
Estimation of costs 
1  Stated costs exist  66.7% 74.1% 81.8% 
2  Quantified at least some costs  42.9% 40.7% 36.4% 
3  Monetised at least some costs  42.9% 40.7% 36.4% 
4  Monetised all or nearly all costs  28.6% 33.3% 18.2% 
5  Provided best estimate of total cost  19.0% 22.2% 13.6% 
6  Provided range for total costs  14.3% 14.8%  9.1% 
7  Associate costs w/EU institutions  9.5% 29.6%  27.3% 
8  Associate costs/non-EU institution  9.5% 7.4% 0.0% 
9  Associate costs with producers (BIA)  33.3% 11.1%  0.0% 
10  Provided best estimate and range for total costs  4.8% 90.9% 4.5% 
Estimation of benefits 
11 Stated  benefits  exists  95.2% 100.0% 90.9% 
12  Quantified at least some benefits  57.1% 33.3% 22.7% 
13  Monetised at least some benefits  47.6% 22.2% 18.2% 
14  Monetised all or nearly all benefits  23.8% 14.8%  4.5% 
15  Provided best estimate of total benefits  19.0% 14.8%  4.5% 
16  Provided range for total benefits  4.8% 3.7% 0.0% 
17  Monetised safety benefits  14.3% 0.0%  0.0% 
18  Monetised health benefits  4.8% 0.0% 4.5% 
19 
Monetised pollution reduction benefits (not 
health related)  14.3% 3.7%  0.0% 
20 
Monetised pollution reduction benefits (health 
related)  0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 
21  Provide best estimate or range for total benefits  19.0% 18.5%  0.0% 
22 
Provided best estimate and range for total 
benefits  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
23  Monetised any health-related benefit  4.8% 0.0% 9.1% 
Comparison of costs and benefits 
24 Calculated  net  benefits  28.6% 18.5%  4.5% 
25  Provided a best estimate of net benefits  23.8% 14.8%  0.0% 
26  Provided a range for net benefits  4.8% 3.7% 4.5% 
27 Calculated  cost  effectiveness  0.0% 18.5% 4.5% IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 159 
 
28  Provided a best estimate of cost effectiveness  0.0% 14.8% 4.5% 
29  Provided a range for cost effectiveness  0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
30 
Provided a point estimate or range for total cost 
effectiveness  0.0% 18.5% 4.5% 
31  Had positive net benefits  33.3% 40.7%  4.5% 
32  Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness  28.6% 33.3%  9.1% 
33  Calculated net benefits and cost effectiveness  0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
53 
Calculated both point estimate and range for net 
benefits  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
54 
Calculated either point estimate or range for net 
benefits  28.6% 18.5%  4.5% 
Evaluation of alternatives  
34  Gave at least one alternative standard level  9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
35  Considered at least one alternative policy option  81.0% 92.6% 77.3% 
36  Quantified alternatives (costs)  23.8% 22.2%  4.5% 
37  Monetised alternatives (costs)  19.0% 22.2%  4.5% 
38  Quantified alternatives (benefits)  33.3% 11.1%  0.0% 
39  Monetised alternative (benefits)  19.0% 7.4%  0.0% 
40  Cost effectiveness of alternatives  9.5% 14.8% 0.0% 
41  Net benefits of alternatives  19.0% 11.1%  0.0% 
42 
Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness of 
alternatives  28.6% 22.2%  0.0% 
43  Considered some alternative  71.4% 81.5% 72.7% 
 Clarity of presentation 
44 Contain  executive  summary  23.8% 3.7% 18.2% 
45  Summary contains tables  4.8% 3.7% 9.1% 
 Consistent use of analytical assumptions  
46  Identified euro year  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
47  Used consistent euro year  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
48  Identified discount rate  9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
49  Used consistent discount rate  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
50  Discount rate = 4%  9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
51  Consistent costs and benefits  9.5% 3.7% 0.0% 
52 
Identified and consistently used discount rate 
and euro year  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lives  
55  Point estimate for numbers of lives saved  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
56  Range estimates for number of lives saved  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 160 | ANDREA RENDA  
57 
What was the point (or range) estimate of lives 
saved?  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
58  Point estimate for numbers of life-years saved  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
59  Range estimate for number of life-years saved  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
60 
What was the point (or range) estimate of life-
years saved?  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
VSL  
61  Point estimate for VSL  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
62  Range estimate for VSL  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
63  Point estimate for VSLY  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
64  Range estimate for VSLY  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
65 
What was the point (and/or range) estimate of 
VSL or VSLY)  4.8% 3.7% 4.5% 
66  Did IIA give € year for VSL (or VSLY)?  4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
67  What was the € year for VSL (or VSLY)?  4.8% 3.7% 4.5% 
Discount rate 
68  Point estimate for discount rate  9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
69  Range estimate for discount rate  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
70 
What was the point (and/or range) estimate of 
discount rate?  9.5% 7.4% 9.1% 
71  Did IIA specify real or nominal discount rate?  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
72  Was the discount rate real or nominal?  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Executive Summary (ES) 
73  ES presented at least some monetised costs  0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
74  ES presented at least some monetised benefits  0.0% 3.7% 4.5% 
75  ES presented any measure of cost effectiveness  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
76  ES presented any estimate of net benefits  0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 
77 
ES offer a best judgment of how benefits and costs 
compare  0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
78  ES summarised any non-quantified benefits  23.8% 3.7%  9.1% 
79  ES summarised any non-quantified costs  0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
 Other Items  
80 Competitiveness-proofing  23.8% 18.5% 22.7% 
81  Environmental impact assessed  81.0% 59.3% 54.5% 
82  Social impact assessed  81.0% 81.5% 81.8% 
83  Administrative burdens assessed  19.0% 37.0% 13.6% 
84  CBA, CEA, risk-risk analysis  38.1% 22.2%  4.5% 
85 Consultation  reported  100.0% 100.0%  81.8% 
86  Consultation led to changes  52.4% 55.6% 45.5% IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 161 
 
87  Data from affected interests  0.0% 33.3%  18.2% 
88  Provision for review  28.6% 70.4% 68.2% 
89 Zero  option  considered  85.7% 81.5% 81.8% 
90  Consequence on single market  47.6% 40.7% 31.8% 
91 Considered  the  acquis  33.3% 37.0% 13.6% 
92  Considered soft law  14.3% 3.7% 18.2% 
93 Considered  self-regulation  4.8% 11.1% 4.5% 
94 
Considered co-regulation/open method of 
coordination  4.8% 7.4%  13.6% 
95 Considered  subsidiarity  71.4% 70.4% 45.5% 
96 Considered  proportionality  71.4% 63.0% 36.4% 
97 Sensitivity  test  14.3% 3.7%  0.0% | 162 
APPENDIX D.  
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
ROADMAP 1 - METHODOLOGY 
1.1  Increase use of quantitative analysis. 
1.2  Increase quali-quantitative comparison of available alternatives. 
1.3  Enable assessment of regulatory creep and compliance costs. 
1.4  Create an independent oversight agency as consultant, supervisor and 
regulatory clearinghouse. 
1.5  Increase the use and consistency of discount rates. 
1.6  Mandate inclusion of soft law, self- and co-regulation in the alternatives. 
1.7  Introduce sanctions for insufficient or unsatisfactory IA. 
1.8  Increase reliance on external expertise. 
 
ROADMAP 2 - PROPORTIONALITY 
2.1  Indicate proposals that require quantitative CBA of all alternatives. 
2.2  Indicate proposals that require qualitative assessment of alternatives, and 
quantitative CBA of the selected option. 
2.3  Indicate clearly when lead DGs can resort to cost-effectiveness, risk-risk or 
compliance cost analysis instead of CBA. 
2.4  Appoint an external oversight agency in charge of supervising the application 
of the proportionality principle by lead DGs. 
2.5  State that whenever ExIAs will not carry a justified application of the Treaty-
based proportionality principle, they will be rejected as incomplete. 
2.6  In case of co-decision procedures, the Parliament and the Council will not 
accept the proposal until it accounts for Treaty-based proportionality.  
2.7  An external oversight agency should supervise the application of the 
methodological proportionality principle by lead DGs. 
 
ROADMAP 3 – SECTOR-SPECIFIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
3.1  Define the modules of the IIA model that should be adapted to the sector. 
3.2  Enable each DG to propose its own methodology. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU | 163 
 
3.3  Involve the ERG for assessments that will be carried out by NRAs. 
3.4  Provide for supervision, consultancy and clearance by an external audit. 
3.5  Open defined procedures to public consultations for at least 60 days. 
3.6  Provide for review of the defined methodology every three years. 
3.7  Enable benchmarking of methodologies and lesson-drawing between DGs. 
 
ROADMAP 4 – INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
4.1  Introduce sanction mechanisms. 
4.2  Appoint a single ad hoc agency for the supervision of initiatives. 
4.3  The agency will also supervise methodological consistency. 
4.4  The agency will be in charge of reporting on overall impact of regulations. 
 
ROADMAP 5 – CLARITY OF PRESENTATION 
5.1  Always perform comparison between costs and benefits. 
5.2  Improve clarity in the drafting. 
5.3  Use comprehensive executive summaries. 
5.4  Follow the standard IIA form. 
5.5  Include the results obtained through external studies in the ExIa document. 
 
ROADMAP 6 – PROMOTING CULTURAL CHANGE 
6.1  Coordinate training initiatives. 
6.2  Involve DGs in the development of methodologies. 
6.3  Introduce control mechanisms for insufficient assessments. 
 
ROADMAP 7 – EX POST MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
7.1  Introduce methods of compliance testing. 
7.2  Investigate reasons for non-compliance. 
7.3  Enable performance testing. 
7.4  Follow the recommendations of the IRQ Pilot Project. 
7.5  Identify and publish best and worst practices. 
7.6  Appoint independent body to monitor administrative burdens. 
7.7  Schedule periodical testing. 164 | ANDREA RENDA  
7.8  Use external expertise for una tantum survey-based tests of cultural change. 
ROADMAP 8 – SUBSDIARITY  
8.1  Improve transposition. 
8.2  Issue a communication on RIA in member states. 
8.3  Provide for gradual convergence on key issues. 
8.4  Create a network of national RIA authorities to be coordinated by a new 
independent oversight agency at EU level. 
 
ROADMAP 9 – COMPETITIVENESS-PROOFING 
9.1  Include competitiveness in the IIA standard model by issuing guidelines on 
how to perform competitiveness-proofing or competition assessment. 
9.2  Involve CC at the interim stage between the preliminary IA and the ExIA. 
9.3  Allow the CC to signal ExIA that do not sufficiently address competitiveness. 
9.4  Involve DG COMP in the consultation process. 
9.5  Introduce a competition filter test supported by the DG COMP. 
 
ROADMAP 10 – CREATING A REGULATORY WATCHDOG 
10.1 Create a centralised regulatory unit rooted in the Commission’s Secretariat-
General. 
10.2 Empower it with roles of advocacy, consulting, guidance, challenge, 
coordination of existing initiatives, training, yearly reporting and keeping 
institutional relations. 
10.3 Allow for initial reliance on external expertise, and gradual development of 
in-house knowledge and competences.  
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